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The thesis emerged from two streams.  First, from an interest in portraiture.  
Both the portrait as an art object and portraiture as a social process are 
mediated by power relations, yet, despite this, it is a genre that has been 
relatively underexplored by sociology.  Second, as a response to calls within 
the sociology of art for approaches that, rather than maintaining a distance, 
seek to take the artwork “seriously” as a source of “social knowledge that is 
of its own worth” (Harrington, 2004, p.3). Explorations of the ‘affordances’ 
that material objects provoke in socially situated subjects reflect this interest 
in capturing the ‘in-itself-ness’ of the art object in ways which are “congruent 
with social constructionism” (De la Fuente, 2007).  
 
These two streams inform the thesis’ three aims, addressed through three 
case studies of five 20th Century portraits.  First, to present portraiture and its 
relations of power to the sociological gaze.  Second, to develop an empirical 
approach, characterised as ‘taking a line for a walk’, that seeks to keep in 
play: the material properties of the image and what these may afford to a 
situated viewer; to explore how these affordances operate to constitute the 
subjectivities of the individuals portrayed and the artists;  and to consider 
how these processes play out in and through the processes of consecration of 
the object and artist within the cultural field.  Third, to make a contribution 
to understanding how to capture sociologically the ‘in-itself-ness’ of the art 
object.  
 
The thesis suggests the value of an approach that keeps in focus the art object 
and the context of its circulation, helping to deepen understanding of the 
operation of the field.  Second, it reveals portraiture as an exercise of power, 
including in the constitution of the subjectivities represented in and through 
the portrait.  Third, it suggests the continued difficulties of empirically 
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1.1 The genesis of an idea 
 
“Art…is bracketed in its own terms, as an expression of sensuousness and 
imaginative performance. Art forms establish a world for which 
meaningfulness is given, but the given is the occasion of considerable critical 
and interpretive analysis.” (Blau, 2001, p.190)  
 
“Sociology and art do not make good bedfellows.” (Bourdieu, 1993 [1984], 
p.139) 
 
The thesis is an exploration of the potential for a productive engagement 
between sociology and the art object. That is, an engagement that seeks to 
acknowledge art as “an expression of sensuousness and imaginative 
performance”, with the capacity to generate knowledge and understanding 
“in its own terms” (Blau, 2001, p.190), but which also maintains an 
intellectual distance from, and critical stance toward, normative, or aesthetic 
judgement’s about art (Harrington, 2004).  In other words it explores the 
possibilities of a relationship between art and sociology, which, if not that of 
“good bedfellows”, at least recognises the scope for mutuality and reciprocal 
understanding.  This is examined through the prism of portraiture:  a focus 
stemming from the ‘pre-history’ of the thesis. The following describes this 
’genesis’. Section 1.2 sets out the aims of the thesis and section 1.3 
summarises its structure. 
  
The thesis started from an initial and long-standing personal interest in 
visual representations of madness.  As I began reading the literature and 
looking at the visual images my own field of vision shifted from a specific 
concern with the images as vehicles for understanding the constitution of 
madness, to a broader interest in the images in and of themselves.  An 
interest in them, that is, not only as visual objects in and through which 
subjectivities were constituted, but as ‘artworks’ created by an ‘artist’ and 
with potential trajectories through a field of cultural production – in other 
words, as ‘portraits’. 
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What this shift in focus revealed was not only sociology’s hitherto cursory 
glance in the direction of the portrait (notwithstanding its ubiquity, and that 
of representations of the face, in ‘art’, advertising, ‘selfies’, photograph 
albums, passports etc.), but also, more generally the discipline’s ambiguous 
relationship to the individual art object.  While the sociology of art has 
revealed much about the context of art production, distribution and 
consumption, and the relations of power that underwrite and sustain 
discourses of ‘aesthetics’, there has been a reluctance to engage with the art 
object as an “equal partner” (Harrington, 2004).  This hesitancy stems in part 
from a concern not to cross into areas of knowledge outwith the discipline’s 
purview, but also about breaching disciplinary principles of value distance – 
of being drawn into a discourse of aesthetic appraisal that the discipline 
seeks to critique. 
 
Since at least the late 1970’s, however, it has been argued that the sociology 
of art’s reluctance to engage with the art object ‘in itself’, risks isolating the 
sub-discipline from the very object of its enquiry (Becker et al, 2006;  Bird, 
1979;  Harrington, 2004;  Stewart, 2014;  Wolff, 2008;  Zolberg, 1997). As part 
of a wider shift toward consideration of the material world through, for 
example, cultural studies, cultural sociology/sociology of culture (Eyerman, 
2006;  Inglis et al, 2007;  Stewart, 2014),  and theoretical developments such as 
Actor Network Theory (Latour, 2005), there have been calls for a ‘new 
sociology of art’, one that puts ‘art’ back into social sciences but in a way 
which is “congruent with social constructionism and which avoids 
unnecessary ‘essentializing’ of what we mean by art” (De la Fuente 2007, 
p.418). This, however, begs the question what would such an approach look 
like?  
It was from these two streams that the thesis emerged;  a curiosity about 
portraiture, and a puzzlement about how to empirically address individual 
artworks in a way that mediates between the object’s own affordances 
(Gibson, 1986 [1979]) and a critical analysis of the social practices and 
institutions of art production, distribution and consumption. 
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1.2 The aims of the thesis 
The thesis had three broad and overlapping aims.  First, to bring portraiture 
to sociological consciousness.  Both the portrait as object and portraiture as a 
social process are mediated by power relations.  Power plays out in terms of 
who (and who is not) portrayed, how and by whom;  in the relationship 
between artist/’sitter’; and between subject/object of the work and a situated 
viewer.  As an ‘art’ object power is manifest in the ‘struggle’ by artist and 
object for recognition within a field of cultural production (Bourdieu, 2004;  
Rubio and Silvo, 2013).  Yet, in a context in which, as Inglis (2005a) argues, 
“the sociological view tends to see ‘art’ as always thoroughly bound up with 
politics” (p.12, emphasis in original) such a “politically invested genre” (van 
Alphen, 1997), has been relatively underexplored.  Presenting portraiture to 
the sociological gaze is therefore productive for what it reveals of these 
operations of power, within and through ‘art’ objects. In particularly, as a 
representational genre, with a focus on the human face, an analysis of 
portraiture illustrates how the properties of images, and the evaluative 
processes of the object as artwork, can contribute to the constitution of the 
subjectivities of both the subject of the work and of the ‘artist’-producer. 
 
Second, analytical frameworks have been developed which seek to mediate 
between the ‘social and the aesthetic’ (see, for example, Born, 2010; Griswold, 
1987). In the sociology of music, for example, commentators such as Born 
(2005), deNora (2003;  2004), Darmon (2015) and Hennion (2003; 2007) draw 
on the concept of mediation to describe a process of ‘co-production’ 
emergent from the ‘intermingling’ (Born, 2005) of the materiality or “matter” 
of cultural objects and socially situated subjects.  There is, however, little 
comparable work focusing on the individual visual art object – painting or 
photography – or which examines the specific generative potential of 
portraiture.  The thesis seeks to contribute to filling this ‘gap’ by developing 
an empirical approach that, firstly, engages with and retains a focus on the 
material qualities of individual portraits and what these properties afford or 
provoke in situated viewers. Given the focus on portraiture of particular 
interest is how these properties work to ‘co-produce’ or constitute the 
subjectivities of those who are represented in and through the images.  
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Secondly, it seeks to examine the social and historical operation of the field in 
which these visual images are constituted (or perhaps “consecrated”) as 
‘artworks’.  In effect the aim was to explore the potentialities of an approach 
that seeks to both work outward, centrifugally from the art object to the 
wider social context, and centripetally from the wider context back to the 
object.  It meant engaging with the image, the subject(s) constituted in and 
through the images and the circulation of the image in the field. 
 
In the course of the analysis the third aim of the thesis was to make a 
contribution to understanding how to capture sociologically both the ‘in 
itself-ness’ of the art object and the (“politically invested”) social production 
of meaning and value.  
 
To meet these aims the thesis draws on a broad range of theoretical 
literature.  Theoretically, it is underpinned by an understanding of the field 
of cultural production (Bourdieu, 2004, 2005 [1992]).  But to attempt to 
articulate and describe the ‘affordance’ or ‘supplement’, the “source of 
existential knowledge that is of its own worth” (Harrington, 2004, p.3) 
implied in the notion of ‘in-itselfness’ it draws on a number of ‘conceptual 
frames’.  In chapter 5 Barthes’ concept of the ‘punctum’ is drawn upon to 
describe the “pricking” an image may generate in a (situated) viewer, in 
chapter 6 the sense of the ‘abject’ (Kristeva, 1982) is used as another way of 
attempting to pin down the ‘something’ provoked or afforded, and the 
notion of aura (or its absence) (Benjamin, (1999 [1936]) is used as the basis for 
the case study image in chapter 7. 
 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows.  The next substantive chapter 
provides an overview of sociology’s engagement with art and the artwork, 
including the intellectual shifts over time and within different theoretical 
paradigms. This includes institutional approaches to ‘art’, as well as 
approaches which have sought to analyse individual art objects to inform or 
illustrate wider social processes.  This provides the context against which 
calls for a ‘new’ sociology of art are to be understood.  
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Chapter three presents the parallel evolution of portraiture. This chapter 
describes the genre’s historical development, purpose, production and 
distribution processes, including the power relations underpinning the 
portrait’s ‘transaction’.  It also maps out some of the paradoxes surrounding 
what a ‘portrait’ is, what it seeks to capture, and its ambiguous position 
between ‘art’ and ‘document’. The portrait thus offers itself up as a fruitful 
medium through which to develop an approach that seeks to mediate 
between the art object and its social context. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the approach developed.  At the core of this is an 
iterative method characterised as ‘taking a line for a walk’.  A different 
conceptual frame is used to help structure each case study.  Within the 
frames the focus begins on the properties of the case study portraits, before 
widening out to consider the evaluative ‘talk’ about the images followed by a 
consideration of the institutional and organisational infrastructure within 
which the images circulate.  
 
In the process it draws on an extensive body of material both from outwith 
the discipline and from outwith academe. This includes art historical 
literature, but also newspaper articles, internet ‘blogs’, artist’s websites and, 
in chapter 7, commentaries produced by music journalists.  This material is 
used both as a ‘resource’, a source of information, but also as the ‘topic’ of 
enquiry, analysed critically for what it illustrates of the operation of the 
‘field’ and processes of consecration. As such this chapter therefore raises 
questions about the differential power relations at play in the evaluative 
process as well as drawing attention to some of the tensions between seeking 
social scientific ‘methodological rigour’, and the ‘aesthetic’ and subjective 
judgements being made at every stage.  
 
Chapters 5 – 7 comprise the three case studies.  Around the conceptual 
frames of the ‘death of the artist’ (Foucault, 1991a [1969]), and the “punctum” 
(Barthes, 2000 [1980]), two photographic self-portraits by Francesca 
Woodman are analysed in chapter 5.  The ‘line’ this chapter takes reveals the 
complex interplay between the material properties of the artworks and the 
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subjectivity, sought from, and read into the works.  It also illustrates the 
unfolding process of consecration of the works and the artist, revealing the 
power of key players, networks and institutions within the field. 
 
The ‘Abject Portrait’ is discussed in chapter 6.  Based on analyses of a self-
portrait by the artists Gilbert and George, and a photographic portrait of the 
twins Dresie and Casie, by Roger Ballen, this chapter demonstrates the ways 
in which even the most abject materials can effectively be absorbed by and 
gain value within the ‘field’.  But the analysis also suggest the potential ‘flip 
flop’ between an evaluation of the image as artwork and evaluation of the 
subjects of the image;  a ‘flip flop’ informed by the ‘aesthetic’ qualities of the 
image.  This case opens on to a consideration of how the power of the field to 
confer ‘recognition’ on the artist can parallel misrecognition of the subjects of 
the art. 
 
In chapter 7 the ‘aura’ and ‘authenticity’ of the portrait (and portrayed) in the 
‘age’ of digital production, distribution, (re-production) and consumption is 
explored through a ‘group portrait’ of the four members of the band Blur by 
Julian Opie.  An ‘art’ object intended for ‘mass’ consumption as a CD/record 
cover and promotional material, what the analysis reveals is the work’s 
ambiguities and ambiguous position.  As a record-cover the cartoon-like 
style of the digitally produced image itself leaves little scope for 
interpretation of meaning, but as a series of portraits the limited clues as to 
the ‘essence’ of the people portrayed potentially opens it up to the 
investment of a “beholder’s share” (Gombrich, 1980).  As an image produced 
by an ‘artist’ for a commercial commodity claims and counterclaims are 
made for the authority and authenticity of the image as an artwork.  As an 
image of a 1990’s pop group, parallel claims and counterclaims are also made 
for the ‘authenticity’ of the subjects of the image.   
 
The final chapter presents some tentative conclusions.  First, it is suggested 
that the case studies illustrate the value of an approach that includes an 
analysis of the material object in helping to ground and deepen 
understanding of the operation of the field. In effect it becomes a process 
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with an object.  Second, the specific focus on portraiture reveals the 
operations of power:  at the micro level of the production and reception of 
individual works, and in the constitution of the subjectivities of those who 
are portrayed in and through the portraits;  and at the macro level of the 
object’s circulation through the field.   But, third, what the attempt also 
points to is the continued evasiveness or elusiveness of the ‘in-itself-ness’ of 
the material object, insofar as this can be said to exist and can be articulated.  
What constantly resurfaces is the situated account of the viewer or the 
evaluative interpretations driven by actors who are themselves embedded 
within the field.  
 
The thesis thus demonstrates the mutual productivity of an approach that 
keeps in focus both the artwork and the context of production, distribution 
and reception.  While some methodological questions and dilemmas have 
still to be resolved, and particularly the continued fugitive nature of the ‘in-
itself-ness’ it argues that there is a value to and need for embedding the 







2. Sociology and art:  an object lesson   
2.1 Introduction  
 
“Painting is what it is. When its really good, it makes your eyes widen, your 
breath deeper.  You know you’re standing in front of something incredibly 
important about your existence but you don’t know why…It’s the instinctive 
nature of a visual encounter.” (Saville in Schama, 2005, p.128) 
 
“The task of social-theoretic thinking...is to seek ways of generating 
intersubjectively defensible conceptions of the relation of value-distanciating 
sociological analysis to value-affirming aesthetic appraisal and value-




In an introductory text, Inglis (2005a) suggests that the sociological study of 
art is primarily concerned with the relations between ‘art’ and ‘society’, that 
is in the ways in which “social relations and institutions impact upon the 
creation, distribution and appreciation of art works” (p.19).  This sociological 
engagement with the ‘context’, particularly the socially and historically 
contingent nature of ‘art’, the ‘artist’, and the constitution of the ‘art worlds’ 
has revealed much about the social processes of cultural production and 
consumption and particularly the power relations at play within these 
processes and practices.  Nonetheless, the discipline has been reluctant to 
engage with the art or cultural object qua object, to treat art as an ‘equal 
partner’, both as “a source of existential social knowledge that is of its own 
worth” (Harrington, 2004, p.3), and as a “dynamic medium in relation to 
historical process and to cultural and political change” (deNora, 2004 p.213).  
In particular sociology has tended to shy away from consideration of the 
object as the locus of intersubjectively meaningful ‘aesthetic’ experience and 
evaluative judgements.  That is, to understand art objects not wholly as 
illustrative of the relations of power that underpin discourses of aesthetics, 
but also to consider sociologically the power of the art object as generative of 
sensuous experience, the feeling, as Saville (in Schama, 2005) suggests of 
“standing in front of something incredibly important about your existence but you 
don’t know why”.  
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In part this avoidance has been based on concerns with disciplinary 
principles of value distance, and also the limits to disciplinary ‘expertise’ to 
make or presume to make judgements about the quality of the object 
(Harrington 2004;  Prior 2004;  Witkin 1997).   But this reluctance to engage 
directly with the object, to take artworks ‘seriously’, also, more 
fundamentally, reflects a critique and rejection of ‘humanist’ and 
‘universalist’ assessments of value and meaning.  As Brand and Korsmeyer 
(1995) note, the two presumptions that art's value transcends cultural 
differences and that the appreciation and constitution of "beauty, sublimity 
and artistic greatness" are universal qualities, have been challenged both by 
postmodernists and feminists. The feminist critique coalesces into the 
argument that: 
 
“The universal subject is historically situated (masculine, patriarchal, 
imperialistic); and that the concept of fine or high art along with the notion of 
artistic genius, is exclusionary both historically and conceptually." (Brand 
and Korsmeyer, 1995, p.8)  
 
Others have similarly drawn attention to the exclusionary force of an 
institutional framework that is not only gendered, but also classed and raced 
(Bourdieu, 2007 [1979];  Corse and Griffin, 1997;  hooks, 1995;  Murray and 
Murray, 2006). 
 
For some commentators, however, this reluctance to engage with the art 
object, in and of itself, and as a (shared) source of value and meaning, is an 
‘abdication’ of responsibility for what is a legitimate area of concern for a 
sociology of art1 (Harrington, 2004; Zolberg, 1997) and, to use Zolberg’s term, 
                                                
1 The name for the ‘sub-discipline’ delineating the boundaries of a sociological consideration 
of art as institution, process, discourse, object, is itself contested, in terms, for example, of 
whether it is ‘a’ sociology or references a plurality of approaches (Harrington, 2004), and, 
similarly, whether it should refer to ‘art’ in the singular or ‘arts’ in the plural to reflect the 
range of different ‘art’ forms (Harrington, 2004).    De la Fuente (2007), deNora (2004) and 
Harrington (2004) also argue against the use of the genitive of, as in the sociology of art or 
music, on the grounds that it separates out the art and society, and risks giving the social 
dominion over the art, rather than acknowledging their mutual constitution and their joint 
“cognition of the world” (Harrington, 2004).  A further distinction is between the use of the 
terms ‘art’, ‘artists’ and ‘artworks’ as opposed to the ostensibly more neutral terms of 
‘cultural’ forms, products, objects and producers (Inglis, 2005a).  For current purposes a 
pragmatic approach will be adopted, but one that serves the specific aims of the thesis to re-
centre the object contingently constituted as an art object, while fully recognising the social 
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‘insulates’ the sub-discipline from the very object of its enquiry.  In the 
context of a post-critical ‘return to value’, one which seeks to “establish a 
new discourse of value without a foundation in certainties or universals” 
(Wolff, 2008, p.5), and which recognises inequalities in access to the 
processes of value affirmation, what these commentators argue for is a 
synthesis, an approach which “seeks to reconstruct the best insights of 
metaphysical conceptions concerning value and meaning in art” (Harrington, 
2004, p.31) with sociological understanding and critique. 
 
To develop, as Harrington (2004, epigraph 2 above) suggests, a model of 
analysis in which “value-distanciating” sociological analysis is able to 
mediate between value-affirming aesthetic appraisal and social and political 
practice poses a number of questions. First, how to develop a method that 
engages with, and retains a balance between, the material qualities of the 
visual art object and its own affordances, and critical analysis of the social 
practices and institutions of art production, distribution and consumption? 
Second, whether and how to resolve the “antinomy” (Harrington, 2004) 
between ‘essentialist’ or ‘metaphysical’ and ‘social constructionist’ 
approaches to meaning and value.  Finally, what are the implications for 
sociology as a discipline?  While potentially contributing to sociological 
understanding (literally) beyond the picture plane, how can a sociology of art 
which seeks to take the object ‘seriously’, draw on and contribute insights 
from other disciplines, while, one the one hand, retaining its own intellectual 
‘specificity’, and, on the other avoiding ‘sociological imperialism’ (Crowther, 
1994;  Inglis, 2005b)?  
 
Before attempting in the following chapters to begin to explore these 
questions, it is necessary to first step back and briefly map out sociology’s 
engagement with ‘art’:  how the object of study has been defined2;  the 
                                                                                                                                     
and historical basis of that contingency. By the same token this will be located within ‘a 
sociology of art’, again to underline the focus of the study, and its specific concern with the 
visual art object.  Where however, other commentators define the sub-discipline in other 
ways this will be reflected in the text. 
2 Because the focus of this thesis is on visual images, and particularly images which have a 
concrete physical material existence (even if, as discussed in chapter 7, this concrete 
existence can be reproduced and reconstituted in different media and formats), the term 
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lineaments of a specifically sociological engagement over (and within time);  
and what distinguishes (or not) this engagement from that of other 
disciplines or approaches.   Second, to home in on the implications for 
sociology’s relationship to the individual art object or cultural product, and 
particularly the thorny issue of a properly sociological account of the 
experience and evaluation of the object i.e. its aesthetic properties.  Following 
on from this to consider arguments for a ‘synthesis’ or an in-between-ness, 
that is, a sociology of art which treats works of art in a way that: 
 
 “(1) Takes seriously the possibility of their intrinsic aesthetic value, while (2) 
recognising political values of democracy of access to cultural production and 
cultural valuation, but at the same time (3) seeks to gain a scientific distance 
from both aesthetic and political valuation by insisting on an intellectual ethics of 
clear distinction between empirical modes of discourse…and normative modes of 
discourse.” (Harrington, 2004, p.5) 
 
2.2 Sociologies of art:  framing the discipline 
2.2.1 The sociological field of vision 
 
“The sociology of art is the study of the practices and institutions of artistic 
production…it also discloses the ways in which these practices are embedded 
in and informed by broader social and political processes and institutions, 
with economic forces historically playing a particularly important role.” 
(Wolff, 1981, p.139) 
 
 “Sociology poses the question: in what ways do social relations and 
institutions impact upon the creation, distribution and appreciation of 
artworks.” (Inglis, 2005a, p.19) 
 
Although written 20-years apart, for both Wolff (1981) and Inglis (2005a) 
what frames (and legitimises) sociology’s engagement with ‘art’ is that, as a 
concept, a practice, an object, and an institution it is a social product, and 
therefore bound up “with processes of struggle and conflict between 
different social groups” (Inglis, 2005a, p.14). Sociological approaches thus 
“avoid[…] attempting to define art in terms of norms and essences of beauty 
valid for all time and all societies” (Harrington, 2004 p.15), but rather seek to 
draw attention to both the social processes by and through which objects 
                                                                                                                                     
‘object’ as used here may not be generalizable to other less physically static or fixed art 
products such as music, theatre, or even performance art (unless photographed and filmed).  
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come to be defined, experienced and evaluated as ‘art’, and the 
underpinning relations of power, including the political processes which 
would seek to ‘naturalize’ and ‘universalise’ these mechanisms.  
 
The sociological field of vision3 therefore encompasses the institutional 
frameworks and social processes by and through which ‘art’ is produced 
(concretely and discursively), distributed, received, consumed, experienced 
and judged. This includes the processes and practices through which 
individual objects (material, concrete, virtual or conceptual) are produced;  
the constituting and constituted role of the producer/’artist’, and the 
similarly constituted and constituting role of the 
spectator/viewer/consumer;  the market for and marketing of ‘symbolic 
goods’ (Bourdieu, 2004);  and the socially constructed grounds for 
experiencing and evaluating these goods.  Given this breadth no attempt is 
made here to provide a comprehensive overview of the different theoretical 
approaches and foci adopted by sociologists of the arts – whether in the form 
of social theories of art or sociology(ies) of the arts (for more detailed 
analyses see, for example, Alexander, 2003;  Chaplin, 1994;  Harrington, 2004;  
Heywood, 1997;  Inglis, 2005a;  Tanner, 2003;  Wolff, 1981;  Zolberg, 1997).  
Rather, the aim here will be to identify some of the key themes, particularly 
as they set in context some of questions around which the thesis is developed 
and, in particular, point up sociology’s “blind spot” (Becker et al, 2006), the 
art object. 
 
Wolff (1981) begins her analysis of approaches to the Social Production of Art 
with a discussion of the relationship between ‘social structure and artistic 
creativity’. Wolff’s starting point is that: 
 
 “All action, including creative action…arises in the complex conjunction of 
numerous structural determinants and conditions...Any concept of 
‘creativity’ which denies this is metaphysical…But the corollary…is not that 
human agents are simply programmed robots, or that we need not take 
account of their biographical, existential or motivational aspects…practical 
                                                
3 In relation to music, Martin (2006) too argues for a specifically sociological ‘gaze’, one that 
“generates a rather different discourse to that of musicology” (p.21). 
4 A period variously defined as starting and ending somewhere between 1400 – 1800 (see, for 
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activity and creativity are in a mutual relation of interdependence with social 
structures.” (Wolff, 1981, p.9) 
 
Her subsequent discussion on the relationship between structure and 
(artistic) agency in a number of respects mirrors the different within-
disciplinary emphases.  These can very crudely be distinguished between 
those sociological approaches which theorise ‘art’ (as institution, practice, 
object, discourse or experience) as in ways ‘reflective’ of wider social 
processes, i.e. as an expression of social structure, and those which see ‘art’ as 
in some ways ‘relatively’ (if not absolutely) autonomous, including the 
potential for art to have a constitutive or ‘shaping’ capacity on society 
(Alexander, 2003). As will be discussed below, this has particular salience at 
the level of the art object and what might be called the “sociology versus 
aesthetics” debate where the distinction is between ‘internalist’ approaches, 
focusing on form, technique, media, content and “aesthetic influences”, and 
‘externalist’ accounts of the ‘extra-aesthetic’ relationships between, artist, art 
work and social structures (Zolberg, 1997).  The following very briefly 
sketches out approaches to the field of cultural production, and the accounts 
of the social processes by which producers and works are constituted 
(consecrated) as artists and as artworks respectively.  Without wishing to 
create an artificial divide (and pre-empt a main focus of the study), for 
clarity, specific consideration of sociological approaches to the individual art 
object will be discussed in section 2.3 below. 
 
2.2.2 Disciplinary development 
The development of what Tanner (2003) describes as “the concept of art as an 
autonomous cultural domain” (p.4) is associated with the structural 
differentiation that marks the emergence of modernity.  Historically, in 
Western societies within the medieval (‘pre-modern’) social structure, artistic 
labour was largely a collective process based on guild workshops.  It was a 
form of cultural production bound up with the creation of artefacts not 
produced in and of themselves, but for other, often religious, purposes.  
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From the Early Modern period4 and its associated humanist philosophies, 
‘art’ emerges as a distinct sphere, embodied in the concept of the individual 
artist (potentially endowed with ‘genius’), creating and producing works 
whose value shifts from ‘cult’ value, in the service of religion, to ‘exhibition’ 
value for public consumption, largely divorced from a religious function 
(Benjamin, 1999a [1936]). 
 
This process of structural differentiation accelerates in the 18th and 19th 
Centuries with the development of, on the one hand, aesthetic philosophy 
which provides a discourse for articulating the experience and evaluation of 
art (Shusterman, 2006;  Tanner, 2003), and on the other, the changing 
institutional context.  This includes: the declining patronage system and 
increase in the commercial art market and dealership system; the 
development of the academy system for training new artists (White and 
White, 1993 [1965]) and of museums and galleries for the display and sale of 
art work;  changing technologies for (re) producing art e.g. the introduction 
of new pigments, printing and engraving techniques, and photography 
(Becker, 1984;  Fyfe, 1988;  Wolff, 1981);  and an expanded middle class 
audience for ‘art’ (Bourdieu, 2007 [1979];  DiMaggio, 1986).  
 
These developments perpetuate the differentiated field, but are not specific 
to the field.  As Inglis (2005a) notes, although ‘art’ has a history of its own, 
“that history is connected to and bound up with, the histories of other social 
institutions” (p.23).  In other words, as Bourdieu (2004) has argued, the field 
of cultural production is relatively autonomous from, but connected to other 
social fields, specifically the field of power by which it is dominated, and the 
economic field, in which the field of large scale (mass) production of 
‘popular’ culture is immured, but which the restricted field of ‘high culture’ 
seeks to disavow.  Further, as will be discussed below, the very process of 
‘autonomization’, of claims for art as ‘devoid of any determinants’, and an 
‘art for art’s sake’, is part of its social construction (Bourdieu, (2004; 2005 
[1992]).   
                                                
4 A period variously defined as starting and ending somewhere between 1400 – 1800 (see, for 
example Dewald (2004)). 
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The degree to which art worlds and art works reflect wider social processes, 
or, as in Bourdieu’s account, refract these processes, plays out in analyses of 
the art-society interface over and within time.  Vico, the early 18th Century 
Italian writer, for example, saw the art of a society as expressive of its soul 
(Inglis, 2005a). In France, Montesquieu, writing in the mid-18th Century, 
reflected on the changing aesthetic customs in the context of the rise and fall 
of the Roman state (Tanner, 2003). In the early 19th Century the German 
philosopher Herder argued that art should not be judged by a single 
standard, but understood in the context of its own period (Inglis, 2005a;  
Tanner, 2003).  Building on Herder’s analysis, Hegel argued that art works 
were the vehicle for the expression of the highest values, the ‘spirit’ 
(zeitgeist) of a given culture (Inglis, 2005a;  Tanner, 2003).5   Both Inglis and 
Tanner argue that it is the Hegelian vision, and the need to see art within its 
own time, which informed the subsequent development of both art history 
(such as in the work of Wölfflin, Panofsky, Hauser) and the sociology of art.  
 
Marxist analyses of the relationship between art and society aimed to expose 
the ideological nature of art and of art criticism (Wolff, 1981). Within this 
context art works are seen as the product of, and reflecting the material 
conditions of a society at a specific historical period (Inglis, 2005a;  Wolff, 
1981).  This draws on Marx’s analysis that “the mode of production of 
material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual 
life.” (Marx, (1993 [1859], p.2), that is, that the economic base of a society, 
shapes the socio-cultural ‘superstructure’. Further, for Marx “the ideas of the 
ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the 
ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.” 
(Marx, 1976 [1845/6]), emphases in original), thus enabling the dominant 
groups to naturalise the nature of the power they hold and represent it as in 
the interests of all groups (Inglis, 2005a).  Artworks are thus viewed as 
ideological to the extent that they are seen as representing these dominant 
ideologies (see for example, Berger, 1972;  Hadjinicoloau, 1978). 
                                                
5 However, as Harrington (2004) notes, for Hegel art’s moment has been, having been taken 
up into two higher forms of absolute spirit:  religion and philosophy. 
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This approach has, however, been criticised as reductionist, insofar as it 
implies that artworks are (merely or largely) channels for, or reflective of, 
dominant ideologies and lack their own ‘specificities and subtleties’ (Inglis, 
2005a, p.22).  More sophisticated (but still materialist) analyses have argued 
for art’s relative autonomy, that is, an ‘art world’ and artworks that may be 
mediated by, or indirectly expressive of, socio-economic conditions, but not 
wholly or directly.  Lukács, for example argued that each part of a society 
should be seen as part of the whole of that society, or ‘social totality’ (Lukács 
1971 [1923], in Inglis, 2005a;  Tanner, 2003).  This ‘totality’ shapes the nature 
of the constituent parts.  Rather than being directly shaped by the socio-
economic base, culture is indirectly affected by and affects other constituent 
parts in a series of mediations.  
 
Picking up this thread, the theorists of the Frankfurt school or institute 
(including Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and, less 
directly, Walter Benjamin), focused on the mediating role of culture between 
the individual and wider society (Dant, 2003).  For Adorno and Horkheimer, 
just as manufacturing industry generates things as products, so in advanced 
capitalist societies, the culture industry generates ideas as products (Adorno, 
1991;  Dant, 2003).   In his aesthetic theory6, Adorno  (2008 [1970]) argues that, 
with the coming of capitalism, artworks which previously had performed a 
religious function, become marketable commodities, acquiring for the 
bourgeois value as objects of contemplation.  Aesthetics as a discipline 
emerges to establish and legitimate this value.   The ‘fetishistic’ status of the 
artwork – that is its value over and above its use value, gives it a dual 
essence: being both ‘autonomous’ and a commodity.  For Adorno high art 
(primarily modernist art and music of the 19th and early 20th centuries) should 
preserve its autonomy from ‘life’, not in the sense of an ‘art for art’s sake’, 
but in the sense of “a fore-intimation of the possibility of real autonomy in 
social relations” (Harrington, 2004, p.166).  Insofar as an artwork strains 
toward autonomy, toward independence from society, it can constitute a 
                                                
6 This summary of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory draws extensively on Chaplin (1994) and 
Harrington (2004). 
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critique of that society. This degree of autonomy is achieved not at the level 
of content, but is embodied in the work’s form:   
 
“The unsolved antagonisms of reality return in artworks as immanent 
problems of form. This, not the insertion of objective elements, defines the 
relation of art to society.” (Adorno, 2008 [1970]), p.7)  
 
It also implies, for Adorno, that in the struggle to attain the work’s 
autonomy, the artist must transform artistic material such that it becomes 
unintelligible to the ‘masses’, and thus becomes resistant to the pull of 
exchange value (Chaplin, 1994). 
 
Although, as Chaplin (1994), Dant (2003) and Harrington (2004) note, 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s work exposes the “generalising tendency” of 
monopoly capitalism, as well as offering, in the example of the ‘high artist’ 
struggling to achieve an autonomous work, a model for ‘consciousness 
raised’ individuals living under the threat of totalisation (Chaplin, 1994), 
their distancing of art from popular culture and from the ‘masses’ has 
exposed their analyses to criticism.  In particular, their work has been 
criticised for its ostensible privileging of high art (Chaplin, for example, 
describes Adorno’s work as “an elitist aesthetic theory” (1994, p.36)), for its 
lack of discrimination of different forms of cultural products, or for 
differences within forms (such as within jazz music), and for its 
“idiosyncratic value judgements” (Harrington, 2004).  It has also been 
suggested that they “underestimated audiences’ capacities for reflexive self-
distanciation” (Harrington, 2004, p.171) and failed to recognise that a cultural 
artefact could be both art and entertainment (Dant, 2003).  
 
As noted earlier, the emergence of a separate social institution or sphere of 
specifically ‘artistic’ production has been linked to the historical process of 
differentiation and specialisation characteristic of modernity. Although 
beginning prior to the 19th Century (Tanner, 2003), it has been argued that this 
process accelerated from the mid-19th Century  (Inglis, 2005a;  Luhmann, 
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2000;  Schinkel, 2010).7  In his account of the genesis and structure of both an 
‘autonomous’ field of cultural production and reception or consumption, 
Bourdieu seeks to expose how the field both legitimizes and naturalizes 
bourgeois domination (Bourdieu, 2004; 2005 [1992]).  No attempt is made 
here to present a detailed account or critique of Bourdieu’s analyses (see, for 
example, Boschetti, 2006;  Bottero and Crossley, 2011;  Crowther, 1994;  
Dunn, 1998;  Fowler, 1994;  Prior, 2005;  Robbins, 2006). The aim rather is to 
set out some of the components of Bourdieu’s analyses, identifying those that 
have particular salience for the current context. 
 
Seeking an alternative to both subjectivist and objectivist accounts, Bourdieu 
developed a relational model to understand the operation and structure of 
the field of cultural production.  For Bourdieu, the ‘field’ is a social space 
“structurally homologous” to other fields but functioning independently 
according to its own internal logic.  The influence of other fields is indirect – 
‘refracted’ rather than reflected.  In relation to the field of cultural 
production, Bourdieu describes a model in which the field is located within 
and “dominated” by the field of power.  However, in terms of its internal 
‘hierarchization’ of products and producers, the field is relatively 
autonomous, split, internally, between the field of restricted production (the 
field of high art, or “production for producers”), and the field of large-scale 
production (Bourdieu, 2004).  This hierarchization ‘reverses’ the operation of 
the economic world: with greater symbolic capital accruing to those works 
and producers in the sub-field of restricted production, accompanied by an 
ostensible disavowal of economic interest.  The restricted field is supported 
by the social apparatus of museums, galleries and the academic and 
educational systems. By comparison, the sub-field of large-scale production, 
supported and sustained by the commercial sector, follows an economic 
model and targets a ‘mass’ or popular audience.   
 
The structure of the field of restricted production is dynamically shaped by 
positions and position-takings as producers and products (Rubio and Silva, 
                                                
7 As Tanner (2003) notes, the same processes influenced the emergence (and separation) of 
sociology and art history as disciplines. 
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2013) struggle for recognition, consecration, or prestige, the symbolic capital 
of the field.   For Bourdieu, the ‘authority’ to consecrate is not vested in 
individuals or institutions but, 
 
“…The field of production, understood as the system of objective relations 
between these agents or institutions and as the site of the struggles for the 
monopoly of the power to consecrate, in which the value of works of art and 
belief in that value are continuously generated.” (Bourdieu, 2004, p.78)   
 
What mediates the position-taking strategies of agents in the field is their 
‘habitus’, or their ‘feel for the game’, defined by Bourdieu as “a durable, 
transposable structure of dispositions…which generate and organize 
practices and representations” (Bourdieu, 1990a [1980], p.53, cited in 
Johnson, 2004, p.5).  The habitus is acquired and internalized through 
socialisation. It is, for Bourdieu, the mechanism by which external, objective 
social structures are reproduced and subsequently shape individual action 
(Dunn, 1998).  Within the field of cultural production, agents’ (unconscious) 
position-taking is structured by their individual habitus, their initiation into 
the practices and institutions of the field – what Grenfell and Hardy (2003) 
call the “group habitus” - and their belief or interest in the game and its 
stakes, the illusio (Bourdieu, 2005 [1992]).  As summarised by Lane: 
 
“Stylistic choices and aesthetic innovations can only be explained by taking 
into account the historically determined range of possible positions on offer to 
any artist and not by reference to ‘external’ factors such as social origin 
alone. Social origins may have a role...but only inasmuch as, incorporated 
into the structured dispositions of the habitus, they are mediated or ‘refracted’ 
through, ‘retranslated’ into the logic of the artistic field at a particular 
historical moment.” (Lane, 2005, p.38) 
 
In attempting to account for the ‘genesis’ of an ‘autonomous’ field of cultural 
production, Bourdieu describes two parallel movements.  On the one hand is 
the emergence of producers motivated by a ‘pure’ artistic intent, or ‘pure 
gaze’, independent of economic or political demands:  an art which 
privileges form over function.  Bourdieu describes the emergence of this 
‘pure gaze’ through his analyses of the work of the mid 19th Century French 
artists and authors Flaubert, Manet and Baudelaire. Their social 
backgrounds, internalized in their habitus, predisposed them to take up 
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certain positions within the artistic field (also made feasible because of their 
relative material advantages).  From these positions they rejected both the 
bourgeois art of the academy and politically engaged art, and created new 
positions for themselves in the newly created field of restricted production, 
producing ‘disinterested’ art.  The formalist emphasis of the ‘pure gaze’ has 
subsequently become the basis of both the autonomy and legitimation of the 
field.  It is the grounds for the acquisition of symbolic capital on the part of 
the producers, even at the expense of economic capital: 
 
“...The affirmation of the primacy of form over function, of the mode of 
representation over the object of representation, is the most specific of the 
field’s claims to produce and impose the principles of a properly cultural 
legitimacy regarding both the production and the reception of the art work.” 
(Bourdieu, 2004, p.117) 
 
As this implies, the other side of the equation is the emergence of an 
‘aesthetic disposition’ among consumers.  That is, a way of perceiving art 
that enables consumers to decode works according to the values of the 
artistic field, to adopt, a similarly ‘disinterested’ disposition.  This capacity or 
competence is neither natural nor universal, but a form of cultural capital 
acquired through an unequally distributed process of cultural transmission, 
which serves to legitimate and perpetuate that inequality.  As Bourdieu 
argues in his analysis of ‘taste’: 
 
“The denial of lower, coarse, vulgar, venal, servile – in a word, natural, 
enjoyment, which constitutes the sacred sphere of culture, implies an 
affirmation of the superiority of those who can be satisfied with the 
sublimated, refined, disinterested, gratuitous, distinguished pleasures forever 
closed to the profane. That is why art and cultural consumption are 
predisposed, consciously and deliberately or not, to fulfil a social function of 
legitimating social differences.” (Bourdieu, 2007 [1979], p.7) 
 
 
For Bourdieu, the field of cultural production, as internally structured, and in 
its dominated position in the field of power, serves to legitimate, naturalize 
and reproduce bourgeois domination. In contradistinction to this ‘conflict’ 
model Howard Becker’s (1984) analysis of ‘art worlds’ is not concerned to 
examine how this world may function to perpetuate inequality, but how the 
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model of co-operative collective effort required to produce artworks, which 
he identifies within this world, can be used as a framework for the 
sociological investigation of “collective actions and the events they produce” 
(Chaplin, 1994, p.169). 
 
Becker’s analysis draws on the institutional theories of art of analytical 
philosophy (Harrington, 2004), specifically the work of Danto (1964) and 
Dickie (1975).  For these theorists what distinguishes art from non-art is the 
decision by the social institution, the art world, to confer status on these 
works (Harrington, 2004). That is, only the institution (and those within the 
institution, such as artists, critics, agents etc.) have the authority to, in 
Bourdieu’s terms, ‘consecrate’ an object as ‘art’, whether it is a men’s china 
urinal in the case of Duchamp’s fountain, first exhibited in 1917, or Andy 
Warhol’s multiple plywood replicas of Brillo boxes (1964).  For Becker, 
sociological analysis is only concerned to observe which members of the art 
world are treated as capable of ‘conferring status’.  
 
Distinguishing between the concepts of the ‘world’ and the ‘field’, Becker 
(Becker and Pessin, 2006) argues that the latter describes the arrangements 
for making art as if they were a field of forces in physics – “caricatures”, 
rather than “real flesh and blood people” whose relations are primarily those 
of domination, based on competition and conflict (p.277).  The concept of 
‘world’ (which Becker argues is more empirically grounded than that of the 
‘field’), “contains people, all sorts of people, who are in the middle of doing 
something which requires then to pay attention to each other” (Becker and 
Pessin, 2006, p.277 – 278)  – it focuses on the collective activity of all those 
who contribute to the activity. Summarising the different questions each 
concept poses Becker argues that:  
 
“The basic question of analysis centered [sic] on ‘world’ is: ‘who is doing 
what with who that affects the resulting work of art?  The basic question of 
analysis centered on field seems to me to be:  who dominates who, using what 




Thus, for Becker art is a social process, characterised by a division of labour 
and the social relationships involved in the production process (including the 
shared process of socially producing an aesthetic).  Within this world artists 
are constrained by four sets of social relations:  shared conventions and 
norms;  technologies and media of production (e.g. the introduction of oil 
paint, new pigments etc.);  patrons, sponsors and art markets;  and public 
reception and tastes (Becker, 1984;  Harrington, 2004).  Becker does 
acknowledge that conventions can change, just as he recognises “political 
shifts and struggles within the art worlds” (Becker, 1984, p.152).  His interest, 
however, is in the process of change – the different types of networks of 
relationships that get formed, by and through which participants respond to 
change. 
 
Although Becker recognizes the political processes at play within the art 
world, according to Chaplin (1994), by adopting an empirical approach 
critical of theory that would give the artist relative autonomy and treat art as 
a special case, Becker has effectively taken a political position, one which 
means that “he makes no judgements about art whatsoever” (Chaplin, 1994, 
p.173).  In his later work, however, Becker’s position viz-a-viz the art object 
has shifted, to the extent that he and his fellow authors acknowledge that 
“there has always been a blind spot in the sociology of art:  any discussions 
of specific artworks” Becker, et al, 2006, p.1).  In his own contribution (in 
relation to jazz music), Becker describes how he considered, but ultimately 
decided not to include a sociological analysis of a famous jazz work, as an 
example of an analysis of the “work itself” (Becker, 2006).  This, however, 
was not because of the ‘work itself’, and the complexities of addressing 
(sociologically) its sensuous properties, per se, but because it required 
“detailed knowledge of the work and of the organized context in which it 
was made” (Becker, 2006, p.27). 
 
Other empirical analyses of the processes by which art worlds are 
constructed and sustained, are to be found, for example, in the work of 
DiMaggio.  In his analysis of the institutionalisation of ‘high culture’ and 
‘high cultural institutions’ in 19th Century Boston, DiMaggio (1986) describes 
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the process of ‘sacralization of art’ by Boston’s “cultural capitalists”.  
DiMaggio (1987) also examines the systems for classifying artworks.  
However, in developing a systematic theory of genre development and 
differentiation, DiMaggio rejects consideration of the works’ thematic 
content to focus on two processes that come together in “artistic classification 
processes”:   
 
“Processes by which genre distinctions are created, ritualized and eroded, and 
processes by which tastes are produced as part of the sense-making and 
boundary-defining activities of social groups.” (DiMaggio, 1987, p.441) 
 
 
What is largely missing from these accounts of ‘art worlds’ or ‘fields’ is the 
differential distribution and exercise of power in defining what constitutes 
‘art’, the ‘artist’, criteria of evaluation and genre and canon formation based 
not on socio-economic status or class, but on the fluid and overlapping 
markers of identity such as gender, race and ethnicity and sexual orientation 
(Battersby, 1994;  Brand and Korsmeyer, 1995; hooks, 1990, 1995;  Jones, 2002;   
Nochlin,  1989, 1999;  Pollock, 2003 [1988], Wolff, 1990, 2006). Further, at the 
point of consumption or reception of the individual artworks, there is a need 
to reflect on arguments for polysemic readings by the ‘viewers’ or ‘readers’ 
(Barthes, 1977 [1968]), as well analyses of, on the one hand, the signifying 
properties of artworks (Barthes, 1985 [1957];  Hall, 2003 [1997];  Rose, 2003) 
and on the other, their discursive function - constitutive of, and constituted 
by, subjectivities and identities (Butler, 1993, 2006 [1990];  Foucault, 1998 
[1976], 2006a [1966], 2006b [1969]; Hall, 2003 [1997];  Mulvey, 1975;  Rose, 
2003). This, to paraphrase Prior (2005), calls for an “alternative post-modern 
approach”. 
 
Insofar as the ‘art world’ and the disciplines of art history and sociology 
emerged from the structural differentiation characteristic of modernity, post-
modernity has been characterised as emerging from a process of de-
differentiation, articulated as: 
 
“The post-modern attempt to drain the aura from the work of art...in the post-
modernist refusal to separate the author from his or her oeuvre or the 
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audience from the performance;  in the post-modernist transgression of the 
boundary between literature and theory, between high and popular culture, 
between what is properly cultural and what is properly social.” (Lash, 1988, 
p.312) 
 
As a term, post-modernism first emerged in the 1970s when it was associated 
with the overshadowing of the architecture associated with high modernism 
by a more playful style (Harrington, 2004;  Harvey, 1992).8  As a social theory 
its emergence is associated with Lyotard’s (1984 [1979]) analysis of the ‘post-
modern condition’ and what he perceived to be the ‘loss of credibility’ of the 
grand or meta-narratives and the shift, in terms of the legitimation of 
knowledge, toward a “plurality of languages”.  Specifically in relation to art 
and aesthetics, the post-modern, for Lyotard, is that which, in the modern: 
 
“Puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself;  that which denies 
itself the solace of good forms…that which searches for new presentations, not 
in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the 
unpresentable…the work [the artist/writer] produces are [sic] not in 
principle governed by pre-established rules…Those rules and categories are 
what the work of art itself is looking for.” (Lyotard, 1984 [1979], p.81) 
 
 
Whether as a concept, or ‘problematic’ (Burgin, 1986), what post-modernism 
is or what it describes has been contested. No attempt is made here to 
explore or critique the concept but rather to acknowledge that it is intimately 
connected with late 20th century early 21st century theorising and practice in 
relation to art, aesthetics and visual culture.  As summarised by Harrington: 
 
“Postmodernism in art theory is associated with the dissolution of ideas of 
internal progressive development in artistic language…It is associated with a 
discrediting of prejudices in favour of ‘depth’, ‘purity’, and ‘authenticity’ in 
art over and against surface, play, eclecticism and hybridization between 
genres, forms and materials.  It is associated with the dissolution of binary 
oppositions between ‘high culture’ and ‘low culture’ and a blurring of art’s 
                                                
8 Felski (1995) makes a distinction between the (gendered) nature of modernity as a 
construction of historical time, and modernism as an aesthetic category to describe texts 
sharing particular unifying features produced between 1890 and 1940.  Harvey (1992) too 
makes explicit the distinction between modernity, emergent from the 18th century and 
associated with the Enlightenment, and “cultural modernism”, an early 20th century response 
by artists to “a new mythology” “as to what the eternal and mutable might be about in the 
midst of all the ephemerality, fragmentation, and patent chaos of modern life” (p.18).  The 
following, however, reflects the terms used by the relevant authors cited. 
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boundaries into popular culture and the mass media.” (Harrington, 2004, 
p.21) 
 
These themes of plurality, the breaking down of boundaries, of post-
modernism’s “acceptance of [...] ephemerality, fragmentation and 
discontinuity” (Harvey, 1992, p.44), and its distinguishing characteristics 
such as ‘dispersal’, ‘indeterminacy’, ‘surface’, ‘absence’ and ‘performance’ 
(Hassan, 1985, in Harvey 1992), play out across the case studies discussed in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 
In the push and shove over and within time in sociology’s engagement with 
‘art’ the individual artwork or art object has been the site of acts of 
commission and omission.  Not only are works engaged in a ‘struggle’ for 
position within the field of other art objects (Rubio and Silva, 2013), they 
have also struggled, qua objects with their own affordances, to achieve an 
object position within the discipline of sociology.  Yet, if as Rubio and Silva 
(2013) contend, artworks operate both “within social forces, and as social 
forces in themselves” (p.174), then arguably, their capacity to “actively shape 
how the field is organized” could extend from the field of art to the 
sociological field.  It is to the position of the object’s location in this field, and 
the potentialities this may offer, which is the focus of the remainder of this 
chapter. 
 
2.3 Facing the art object:  problematics for a sociology of art 
2.3.1 How has sociology engaged with the art object? 
As sketched out in the previous sub-section, for sociology, ‘art’ as a subject 
for disciplinary consideration has been constructed as an institution, 
illustrative of wider social process and, or, as embodying, within its very 
fabric, its practices, its processes and its ‘products’, wider social processes, 
specifically relations of power.  As a corollary, it is conceptualised as a ‘field’ 
that serves to reproduce these unequal relations between dominant and 
dominated social groups.  However, being relatively autonomous it also 
contains within it the potential for subversive or oppositional practices and 
readings.    
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In this concern to reveal the social and historical contingency of ‘art’ as an 
institution, the art object qua ‘material’ object with sensuous properties, has 
occupied a problematic position.  There is, in fact, no shortage of sociological 
or social theoretical analyses of art works (see for example, Berger, 1972;  
Foucault, 2006a [1966]), 2011 [c1971];  Hadjinicolaou, 1978;  Raphael (1980 
[1933];   Simmel, 2005 [1916];  Smith and Jenks, 2000, 2006;  Witkin 1995, 1997, 
2005).  But while valuable and insightful in their different ways in 
illuminating different social processes, these analyses are largely 
‘centripetal’, that is from social theory to art, with the artwork serving “as no 
more than an indicator or springboard for understanding extra-aesthetic 
aspects of society” (Zolberg, 1997, p.9), rather than ‘centrifugal’, that is where 
the artwork is afforded the capacity to be a “source of existential social 
knowledge that is its own worth” (Harrington, 2004, p.3).    
 
Thus, Simmel’s discussion of portraits by Rembrandt, aims to focus on the 
paintings themselves, but primarily to argue that what they reveal is the 
emergence of a new form of individuality, one displaying the historical 
dimensions of the represented person, rather than, as in the Early Modern 
period, the individual’s apparently timeless qualities (Simmel, 2005 [1916]; 
Scott and Staubmann, 2005).  In fact, as Wolff (2008) points out, although 
Simmel refers to 32 paintings by Rembrandt in the course of his argument, 
these appear to be largely incidental to his wider project of focusing on the 
singular to reveal the wider historical moment.   
 
Max Raphael’s (1980 [1933]) Marxist account does aim to give more focused 
attention to the artworks. In seeking the development of both a sociology of 
art which would relate the art work to the socio-economic stage of society in 
which it was constructed and, dialectically related to this, a ‘science’ of art 
which would systematically analyse the art work’s internal nature, Raphael 
sought to develop a method that recognised the relative autonomy of works 
of art and the social contexts of their production (Chaplin, 1994).  In his 
analysis of works by Picasso, for example, Raphael’s aim was to “investigate 
the material and ideological conditions that have influenced him [Picasso] 
and how he has reacted to them in his art” (Raphael, 1980 [1933], p.166). He 
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does this through a back and forth between an account of individual 
paintings and Picasso’s position within, and response to, contemporary 
bourgeois society.  Underpinning his approach Raphael aimed to justify 
visual art’s liberatory potential and although, according to Chaplin (1994), 
his belief in the critical function of a radical art practice, continues to make 
him relevant to “critical artists”, the images themselves are at risk of being at 
the service of this wider, though nonetheless, important project. 
 
From a different, and later 20th Century perspective, Witkin too seeks to 
develop a strategy for analysing individual paintings in ways that reveal 
something about the wider social formations in which they are produced 
(Witkin, 1995, 1997, 2005).  From a starting point that views works of art as 
‘semiotic systems’, Witkin, aims to examine the link between art and social 
structure at the level of ‘styles’ of art, that is the presentational codes or 
principles “governing the selection of aesthetic elements in realizing a given 
level of abstraction in a work of art” (Witkin, 1995, p.26).  The concept of 
abstraction is important for Witkin, for whom it describes the level of 
‘autonomy’ and distance between the ‘ideational’ process and ‘contact 
relations’.  Positing  (following Hegel) a developmental model, Witkin 
suggests a lower level of abstraction (between, for example, maker and 
object) in ‘archaic art’, a higher level in Early Modern ‘perceptual realism’, 
and with modernist abstract art “a more or less autonomous subjectivity is 
realized” (Witkin, p.1995, p.13).  Witkin develops his arguments through his 
analysis of a number of paintings including van Eyck’s The Marriage of 
Giovanni (?) Arnolfini and Giovanna Cenami (?) (1434) and later works by 
Cezanne (Witkin, 1995) and Manet, including Olympia (Witkin, 1997).  Witkin 
argues that while the presentational codes of ‘perceptual-realist’ art 
represented social interaction from the perspective of the individual, the 
modernist presentation codes emergent in the work of Cezanne and Manet, 
“comprehend[…] social experience as constitutive of the subject, as 
constituting an intrasubjective rather than an intersubjective order” (Witkin, 
1997, p. 107-8).  The aesthetic strategies employed in Manet’s Olympia, for 
example, such as ‘flatness’ and juxtaposed, unrealistic views of figures or 
objects, are seen, by Witkin as art’s response to a social world in which 
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intrasubjective experience is problematic: a social world in which the 
gendered ‘values’ of (economic) motive or instrumentality are in conflict 
with the solidarity and value-governed domestic sphere.   
 
Again, while Witkin’s approach opens up analysis at the level of the artwork 
itself, the image still has the air of being an argument for, or illustration of 
something outside itself, the painting Olympia, for example, “subverts and 
deconstructs” the cultural configuration of bourgeois ideology, and the 
contemporary critical reaction to the painting reflects an inability to meet the 
“semiotic provocation” of modernity’s “corruption of value” (Witkin, 1997). 
 
Sociologists Smith and Jenks (2006) have questioned approaches which 
“seek[..] to explicate the imagery, content and manner of production of 
works of art through reference to their social context” (p.157) and seek to 
retain the focus on painting as “the genuine subject”.  Their response, 
however, as in the case of their analysis of Manet’s Olympia (1863-5)9, is to 
draw on complexity theory (not, it should be noted, aesthetic theory or 
theories of art) to examine the, arguably, ‘extra-aesthetic’ question of how the 
painting socially informs and develops what it is to see.  The sensuous 
properties of the image as painting (outwith an analysis of the relationship 
between colour and form), and its capacity to be “a source of existential 
knowledge that is of its own worth” (Harrington, 2004, p.3) again perhaps 
remains underexplored. 
 
As noted above, for some commentators the reluctance to engage with the 
object in and of itself is sociology’s “blind spot” (Becker, et al, 2006;  De la 
Fuente, 2007).  The privileging of a social theorising of art that imposes its 
own conceptual frameworks and fails to see art in its own terms and as its 
own discourse has also been criticised by commentators such as Heywood 
                                                
9 Although outwith the scope of the thesis there would be a value in exploring why and how 
one painting becomes an ‘icon’, not just within the field of art but (and perhaps because of 
its iconicity in this field), in the ‘field’ of social theorizing.  A number of commentators have, 
for example used Manet’s Olympia to articulate or illustrate their arguments for the 
emergence of a particular historical or social formation, or for what it expresses of discourses 
of race or gender or the constitution of the subject or subject position (see for example, Clark, 
1985;  Foucault, 2011 [c. 1971];  Pollock, 1999;  Smith and Jenks, 2006;  Witkin, 1997). 
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(1997) for whom “some social theorising is socially destructive, both of art 
and, ultimately, perhaps of, theory” (p.5). 
 
The hesitancy, or oscillation on the part of sociology to address the art object 
in its own terms, appears to hinge on three interconnected problems:  first, 
how to define and ‘talk’ about the ‘art’ object;  second, how to treat works of 
art in a way that takes seriously the possibility of their intrinsic value, while 
also engaging in political critiques of received ideas of aesthetic value 
(Harrington, 2004);  and third, following on from this, how to face the art 
object in ways that do not breach disciplinary boundaries of value 
distanciation on the one hand (and retain value neutrality, in the Weberian 
sense (Heinich, 1997 [1996];  Danko, 2008)) and, on the other, do not risk 
straying into disciplinary areas outwith sociology’s purview.  Each of these 
issues will be briefly explored in turn, before examining calls for some form 
of ‘synthesis’. 
 
2.3.2 The elusive object  
 
 “The work of art is an object which exists as such only by virtue of the 
collective belief which knows and acknowledges it as a work of art…A 
rigorous science of art must…assert the possibility and necessity of 
understanding the work in its reality as a fetish: it has to take into account 
everything which helps to constitute the works as such, not least the 
discourses of direct or disguised celebration which are among the social 
conditions of production of the work of art qua object of belief.” (Bourdieu, 
2004, p.35)  
  
"An ordinary object elevated to the dignity of a work of art by the mere 
choice of an artist." Duchamp, (or possibly Breton) on ‘readymades’ 
(http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/Readymades-of-Marcel-Duchamp.pdf. 
Accessed 23 May 2015) 
 
For sociology the ‘art’ object is, to use a cliché, both a topic and resource.  As 
already intimated in section 2.2, the processes by which an object comes to be 
defined as ‘art’, and the associated social construction of the hierarchies of 
high ‘art’ and popular culture are at the heart of sociology’s engagement 
with the field of cultural production.  In fact, for an anthropologist such as 
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Gell (1998), what distinguishes a specifically sociological account of ‘art’ is 
precisely this concern with “the institutional recognition of art objects” (p. 
12). So, for example, in his earlier work Becker (1984) locates the definition of 
an object as ‘art’ within the ‘art’ institution itself. 
 
The problem for sociologists seeking to engage with the artwork qua artwork 
“in itself” (Becker, 2006), is that they “are caught up in the object they would 
take as their object” (Bourdieu 2005 [1992], p.296).  The very terms used to 
characterize, perceive and evaluate the object are socially and historically 
situated, and it is these “social conditions of production of the work of art 
qua object of belief” (Bourdieu, 2004, p.35) that, for Bourdieu constitute the 
authentic ‘topic’ for the sociological gaze. As Born (2010) notes in relation to 
Bourdieu’s account of Flaubert, he “insistently refuses to address the art 
object and its aesthetic properties, and to allow them to play a part in the 
unfolding analysis” (p.178).  Further, Bourdieu’s ‘sociological theory of art 
perception’ (2004), focuses on the social processes which structure 
perception, ‘art competence’ and the capacity to ‘decipher’ the meaning of a 
work of art, but it does not offer a sociological perception of the 
artwork/object. 
For those sociologists who would seek to recuperate the object, such as those 
described in section 2.3.1 above, the process by which these works (such as 
Olympia) become ‘art’ is left largely unaddressed.  For others such as Blau 
(2001) and Harrington (2004) ‘art’ is defined in terms of its characteristics of 
sensuousness and capacity to communicate ideas in imaginative form.  
 
Arguably, what links these ‘sociologies’ is a conceptualisation of art’s 
‘specificity’, whether approached as an institution or as an object.  Wolff 
(1983) suggests that the idea of the ‘specificity’ of art has been used in three 
senses.  First, it is used to describe the historical separation of artistic activity 
from other areas of social life, and the associated specialisation of aesthetic 
modes of perception. Second, the concept is understood to describe the 
relative autonomy of art in relation to socio-economic factors, that is 
although art is understood as a social product, ideology is mediated through 
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the specific codes and conventions of artistic representation. The third usage 
is to refer to the specific characteristics of art, an approach that recognises the 
distinctive properties of art, but rejects notions of essentialism and 
universality.  Notwithstanding the potential argument that ‘specificity’ as 
applied to art is an effect of ideology, it is in the latter sense that 
commentators such as Harrington (2004), and also Blau (2001) use the term.  
 
The notion of the specificity of art appears to be at the core of Harrington’s 
(2004) call for a sociology of the arts that takes seriously the possibility of 
artworks’ intrinsic aesthetic value.  For Harrington this specificity implies 
that works of art can possess “aesthetic value in themselves and do not 
possess value only in virtue of different social perspectives of valuation” (2004, 
p.101, emphases in original).  Thus, aesthetic judgements, while different 
from scientific statements and moral norms insofar as they cannot be deemed 
to be true or false, or right or wrong, do have their own validity, over and 
above the views of ‘asserting’ agents (Harrington, 2004).   This call to take 
aesthetic value ‘seriously’ is however, perhaps the biggest stumbling block to 
sociology’s engagement with the artwork or art object.  
 
2.3.3  Art and ‘Aesthetics’ 
 
“Beauty is made up of an eternal invariable element, whose quantity it is 
excessively difficult to determine, and of a relative, circumstantial element, 
which will be…whether severally, or all at once, the age, its fashions, its 
morals, its emotions.” (Baudelaire, 1995, [1863] p.3) 
 
No attempt is made here to present an historiography or archaeology of 
‘aesthetics’.  Some brief comments are, however, included here because of 
the relevance of this discourse to considerations of sociology’s engagement 
with, or distance from the art object.  In particular, the apparent oscillation 
between, on the one hand, a desire to engage with aesthetics to further 
understand the art or cultural object, qua object, and its relation to wider 
social processes, but at the same time a hesitancy or disquiet both about 
addressing questions of value as part of the sociological project, and about 
the extent to which the concept of aesthetics itself both articulates and 
disguises or renders invisible relations of power.  
 49 
As a discipline, aesthetics has been practised not as a branch of art history or 
criticism but of philosophy, engaging with questions regarding the nature of 
art, aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgement (Wolff, 1983).  The term 
‘aesthetic’, however, has been described as a “vague, polysemic, contested 
and shifting signifier” (Shusterman, 2006 p.237).  This ambiguity stems both 
from the complexity and contested nature of the notions of art and beauty 
with which the concept has become inextricably linked and because of its 
own “complicated, heterogeneous, conflicted and disordered genealogy” 
(Shusterman, 2006, p.143).   
 
Although ‘traditional aesthetics’ originated in the 18th Century (Wolff, 1983), 
its genealogy can be traced back to Plato’s theories of beauty and art, the 
latter being regarded as a pale imitation of the ideal rational Forms, for 
which beauty, by contrast is an exemplar. Aristotle attempted to redeem art 
by arguing for the cognitive value of mimesis as a means of learning. Aristotle 
also introduced principles for formalistic analysis and evaluation of art 
works – criteria, which were independent, of and not reducible to, “ontology, 
epistemology, psychology, morality and politics” (Shusterman, 2006 p.238).  
 
In the context of ancient philosophy ‘art’ encompassed skill or knowledge. 
The subsequent narrowing of its application just to modern conceptions of 
fine art emerged with the development of the concept of the aesthetic in the 
work of predominantly German philosophers from the mid-18th Century. In 
his summary Shusterman (2006) describes “three distinct axes” for 
understanding this emergent concept.  First, the work of Baumgarten, 
writing in the 1750s who construed aesthetics, (and coined the term) as a 
general science of sensory perception (aesthesis) – including, but not confined 
to the perception of beauty, and which extended beyond art, to encompass 
nature and daily practices.  Second, Kant’s aesthetics as a theory of taste that 
emphasises beauty and the sublime in nature and in art, a judgement which 
is subjective, but ‘disinterested’, and therefore universal.  In addition, for 
Kant “beautiful art is possible only as a product of genius”, that is born of a 
unique creator, whose “genius is the inborn predisposition of the mind 
through which nature gives the rule to art” (Kant, in Robbins, 2006, p.14).  
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The third of Shusterman’s axes is Hegel’s aesthetics as the philosophy of art, 
a science dealing only with ‘artistic beauty’ (specifically excluding natural 
beauty), and which was concerned with the high truths expressed in art.   
 
Mirroring the comment by Baudelaire (1995 [1863]) at the beginning of this 
section, one of the fundamental debates is between those who argue for the 
‘ineffability’ of art, for its meaning and value to ‘transcend’ the social and 
political, and those, at the other extreme who argue that all meaning and 
value is, effectively, socially and historically contingent.   
 
Given the nature of these problematics, sociology’s own responses reflect 
different orders of argument within the discipline, such that it is perhaps 
more appropriate to speak not only of "multiple aesthetics" (Felski, 2005) but 
multiple sociologies.  
 
Wolff (1983), in fact, distinguishes four positions in the “Sociology versus 
Aesthetics” debate.10  First, a position that defends the specificity of the 
aesthetic and rejects the incursion of ‘extra aesthetic’ social factors in the 
evaluation of art.  A contemporary example might be the work of Zangwill 
(2002), for whom aesthetic pleasure and experience are human universals 
and the main criteria for judgement (cross culturally) is correctness and 
consistency.  
 
A second position asserts the social and ideological construction of art, but a 
view that art, or ‘good’ art transcends its conditions of production, (for 
example, Adorno (1976 [1962]) in Zolberg, (1997).  
 
Third, are those approaches that argue, against concepts of immanence or 
transcendence, that the production, reception and assessment of artworks are 
always and only (or primarily) socio-historical events.  Wolff includes here 
the work written in the 1970’s by Hadjinicolaou (1978), but this approach 
could, in different ways, encompass feminist and post-colonial critiques of 
                                                
10 For the current purposes the order of these four ‘positions’ does not follow that set out by 
Wolff. 
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the naturalising and ‘masculinist’ discourse of traditional aesthetics, with its 
assumptions of male creative ‘genius’ (Battersby, 1994), a male ‘gaze’ 
(Mulvey, 1975) and a universalist conceptualisation of beauty, which is, 
rather, socially and historically contingent and rendered synonymous with 
the white female body (Jones, 2002). From this perspective traditional 
aesthetics has functioned as “an ideology of control” and a strategy of 
exclusion (Jones, 2002, p.220): of women artists from the ‘canon’ of ‘great’ 
artists (Nochlin, 1989; Parker and Pollock, 1981; Pollock, 1999); of an 
alternative gaze; of different forms of creativity (hook, 1990; Murray and 
Murray, 2006);  and of different conceptualisations of ‘beauty’.     
 
Bourdieu’s (2005 [1992]) argument that the discourse of the ‘pure aesthetic’, 
of a ‘disinterested’ gaze and a functionless work is a particular experience of 
a work of art “situated in social space and historical time” (p.285) and the 
“properties of an experience which is in fact the product of privilege” (p. 289) 
could also be positioned crudely within this third ‘position’.  For Bourdieu 
this situatedness also implies that not only aestheticians but also 
theoreticians of the aesthetic may be unwittingly engaged in the struggles 
that, in Bourdieu’s terms, yield the meaning and value of the work.  
 
From yet another perspective Becker’s (1984) analysis of ‘Art Worlds’, 
discussed earlier, could be crudely included here.  For Becker (1984) 
aesthetics and the ‘work’ aestheticians do are among the “questions of social 
organization” with which his study of 'Art Worlds’ is concerned.  For Becker 
‘aesthetics’ “is an activity rather than a doctrine”, it is a system that provides: 
 
 “A basis on which people can evaluate things in a reliable and dependable 
way, makes regular patterns of co-operation possible…aesthetic value arises 
from the consensus of the participants in an art world.” (Becker 1984, 
p.134)  
 
From this perspective a sociologically based theory of aesthetics would be an 
"idle exercise", “since only aesthetics developed in connection with the 
operations of art worlds are likely to have much influence in them” (Becker, 
1984 p.145).  Against Becker’s approach Zolberg (1997) has argued that by 
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leaving out questions of evaluation, and assuming consensus Becker also 
risks implicitly leaving out issues of power – of exploring why certain art 
forms or genres come to be more highly valued than others. For Harrington 
(2004) Becker’s accounts (and by extension other accounts which focus on 
systems and processes) can say nothing about aesthetic content – the factors 
that make objects meaningful, nor aesthetic norms, which, for Harrington are 
“of a different order both from wider social mores and from the institutional 
structures that shape artists’ careers” (p.37).   
 
This alludes to the fourth, and Wolff’s preferred position in her 1983 work, 
which argues for (the development of) a sociologically informed theory of 
the aesthetic that takes account of the social production and reception, but 
also attempts to account for the specificity of art.  Harrington (2004) similarly 
argues for a mediating position that takes seriously the possibility of intrinsic 
aesthetic value at the level of the object and the political dynamic of context. 
In effect, it is argued that it is not just ‘aesthetics’ as an articulation of social 
relations of power to which sociology should attend, but the power of art, as 
sensuous and meaningful experience, as productive of ‘self and 
subjectivities’ (deNora, 2004) and its potential to be ‘empowering’ or  
“subversive and critical” (Blau, 2001).  
 
In its engagement with both the individual art object and the social context in 
which and of which it is a part, the following chapters explore the potential 
and problems of a synthesis of positions ‘three’ and ‘four’ in Wolff’s (1983) 
summary.  There is, however, a further ‘position’ that reflects the on-going 
development of both the sub-discipline and wider sociological endeavour 
since Wolff’s earlier work, that is the mutually constitutive nature of the art 
or cultural object.  Hennion’s (2007) discussion of the role of objects as 
‘actants’ or co-producers in the expression of taste is one articulation of this, 
drawing as it does on Actor-Network-Theory (ANT).  Developed initially 
within science and technology studies in the 1980’s, this seeks to break down 
the (artificial) distinction between the social and natural, to argue for the 
‘agency’ of both human subjects and non-human objects – or ‘actants’ - 
linked together through networks or associations, creating ‘assemblages’.  It 
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is a ‘method’, which allows ‘things’, including (by extension) artworks to 
‘strike back’ (Latour, 2000;  2005), that is for objects to effectively have parity 
in attempts to understand how networks are built, stabilise and change:  it is 
not, for example about the social construction of art, but about how the social 
is ‘reassembled’ (Latour, 2005) through the networks of ‘actants’.  Thus, 
Hennion (2007), in his critique of theories of the social construction of taste, 
describes the process of ‘co-formation’ of both the amateur and the object:  a 
process by which the individual becomes reflexively aware of the object, and 
by which the objects “advance…their power to make themselves more 
present” (p.105).  In this account “objects are not already there, inert and 
available at our service, they deliver themselves, unrobe themselves, impose 
themselves on us” (Hennion, 2007, p.105-106).  Thus ‘taste’ is not to be 
explained by hidden social causes, nor as imminent to the object, but: 
 
 “A collective technique whose analysis helps us to understand the ways we 
make ourselves sensitized to things, to situations and moments, while 
simultaneously controlling how those feelings might be shared and discussed 
with others.”(Hennion, 2007, p.97)  
 
‘Taste’ is therefore effectively ‘co-produced’ between the amateur and the art 
object. In other words, as Hennion remarks, “beautiful things only offer 
themselves to those who offer themselves to beautiful things” (2007, p.106). 11 
 
2.3.4 Disciplinary boundaries and principles:  value-distanciation versus 
value-affirmation 
There are, arguably, at least two ‘disciplinary’ boundaries to consider in the 
turn to the art object: within sociology, and between sociology and other 
disciplines, specifically, in this context, art history. 
 
With regard to the first, the study of art as a ‘cultural’ institution and 
artworks as products of that institution fits within the different sub-
disciplinary approaches delineated by Wolff (2005) and Inglis et al (2007).  
On the one hand, it can be located within the broad ‘sociology of culture’ 
                                                
11 Although not about aesthetics or ‘taste’ per se, Mitchell (2005) similarly explores the ways in 
which ‘pictures’ have agency in the sense that people respond to them as if they were alive 
and, in Mitchell’s terms, driven by desires and appetites. 
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approach, which, according to Inglis et al (2007), draws on existing 
sociological concepts and methods to investigate cultural issues such as 
consumption patterns.  
 
On the other hand, it can be situated within a more narrowly defined 
‘cultural sociology’ as a particular type of sociology associated with the 
American sociologist Jeffrey Alexander. The ‘Alexander paradigm’ focuses 
on human meanings, symbols and cultural structures (Inglis et al, 2007).  It is 
an approach that, according to Inglis et al is “a special sort of conceptual and 
methodological enterprise” (2007, p.10). Thus Eyerman (2006) seeks a shift 
towards a “meaningful” sociology of the arts: 
 
“One in which creation and imagination are central components...an 
interactionist, non-mechanistic model of imagining and experiencing, as well 
as making, where meaning is conceptualized as an emergent property in the 
interaction between subject and object.” (Eyerman, 2006, p.32) 
 
In very general terms the current thesis is located within broader sociology of 
culture ‘paradigm’ rather than the ‘Alexander paradigm’. 12   
 
The focus on the art object also opens onto to the potential for blurring, if not 
crossing, the disciplinary boundary between sociology and art history. 
Accounting for the historical emergence of the different fields of vision of the 
two disciplines Tanner (2003) (drawing on Mannheim) describes the ways in 
which the two ‘institutional locations’ of sociology and art history led them 
to see largely the same objects in different ways.  According to Tanner, art 
history has been centrally concerned with questions of aesthetic value, and 
is: 
 “Characterised by ‘authentic’ painstaking and direct engagement with the 
art object, and by an interest in artistic individuality both of particular 
artworks and of artists as manifested in the constructive role of form.” 
(Tanner, 2003, p.13)  
 
                                                
12 It is acknowledged that there are also further disciplinary boundaries between a sociology 
of art and ‘cultural studies’ (see Wolff, 2005) and also studies of material culture, but here 
the main focus is on the overlaps and disjunctures with the disciplines most closely 
associated with the specifically visual ‘art’ object. 
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Sociology, on the other hand, is concerned with the context of an object, not 
its intrinsic aesthetic values: 
“Sociology by definition seeks to understand the object above all in terms of 
its functional contribution to social processes, and to define the period being 
studied in terms of its characteristic social structure, the groups which 
compose that structure, and which produce and use the works of art in 
question.” (Tanner, 2003, p.14, citing Mannheim, 1982) 
 
While perhaps these characterisations may have been broadly consistent 
with the practice of the two disciplines, particularly in the first half of the 20th 
Century when Mannheim was writing, in the recent past two developments 
have perhaps made the boundaries less distinct.  On the one hand, the 1960s 
saw the emergence of ‘the new art history’ (Alpers, 1977;  Rees and Borzello, 
1986).  Associated in its early stages with the work of the Marxist art 
historian T.J Clark, Rees and Borzello (1986) see it as reflecting the impact of 
feminist, Marxist, structuralist and psychoanalytic ideas on the discipline.  In 
place of an approach to the artwork which focused on issues of style, 
attribution, establishing authenticity and meaning, the new art history 
sought to locate the art object within its particular social and historical 
context, to view the artwork “like any other event, [as] a piece of history” 
(Alpers, 1977).  This was accompanied by a desire to question and demystify 
the process of artistic creation, the processes by which art is constituted as 
‘art’, and a rejection of the art historian’s own claims to be ‘value free’, and as 
a corollary, increased reflexivity on the role of art historians as ‘makers of 
knowledge’ (Alpers, 1977).  In the process, the disciplinary discourse shifted: 
‘style’, ‘genius’ and ‘connoisseurship’ and ‘quality’ were replaced by terms 
drawn from social science discourses such as ‘ideology’, ‘patriarchy’, ‘class’ 
(Rees and Borzello, 1986). In reversing the process of beginning with the 
artwork and looking outwards, to looking from society to the art it produces, 
this approach, for Rees and Borzello, risks shifting the pendulum too far, 
“too much stress on the social aspect of art ignores the qualities which make 
it art rather than something else” (1986, p.8). 
 
On the other hand, within sociology there is evidence of a reverse yearning 
among some theorists for an orientation toward the art object which 
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recognises that paintings are political, but not wholly so, that although 
socially ‘produced’ they retain some element of specificity and autonomy. 
For these sociologists, there is, in Harrington’s terms, an aspiration for a 
synthesis between the value distanciation methods of the social science and 
the value affirming “impulses” of the humanities  (Harrington, 2004;  Wolff 
1983;  Zolberg 1997).   
 
In the light of art history’s own ‘cultural turn’, this raises questions about the 
boundaries between a critical art history and sociological critique.  It also 
requires being alert to arguments that suggest that engaging with questions 
of aesthetic judgement is outwith the purview of sociology, at best as an “idle 
exercise” (Becker 1984), or at worst, breaching a perceived founding 
principle of value-distanciation. Harrington (2004) and Zolberg (1997), for 
example, locate sociology’s reluctance to engage with aesthetics at the level 
of the object as a function of the discipline’s desire to avoid the “evaluative 
posture” associated with humanistic disciplines (Zolberg, 1997). Witkin 
(1997) suggests that this ‘nervousness’ is also due to the lack of 
methodological resources and specialist expertise available to sociologists to 
tackle the artwork itself.  This perhaps mirrors Becker’s (2006) own later 
concerns, described above, about analysing the artwork ‘itself’. 
 
Further, as discussed earlier, an account of power, as the use of the discourse 
of the aesthetic to represent and legitimise class (gender and race) interests, 
in determining differential access to the processes which define ‘art’, and in 
particular in relation to the processes by which valuation and meaning are 
attributed and the validation given to those assessments, must be central to a 
sociological account of the arts. But in the shift towards an approach that 
seeks to redress the balance from a consideration of the ‘extra-aesthetic’ to 
one that, at least partially, ‘gives back’ a degree of autonomy to the art object, 
there is a risk of losing sight of aesthetics as power.  In place of analyses of 
aesthetics as a function of power and the artwork as a “fetish” (Bourdieu, 
2004, 2005 [1992]), Harrington (2004), for example, seeks to reclaim some 
sense of the potential ‘universality’ of value affirmation, particularly by 
recourse to the notion of “intersubectively generalizable defensibility” (p.5).  
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But while Harrington seeks to retain the partial autonomy of aesthetic 
valuation from questions of social power, it is Bourdieu’s analysis that 
reveals that aesthetics is cogent precisely because of what it reveals about the 
operation and legitimation of unequal power relations. While theoretically it 
may be possible to argue that validity claims and the grounds for those 
claims are outwith extra-aesthetic influence, that is outwith claimants’ 
"immediate subjective situation", in practice, as Prior (2004) notes, the claims 
of some groups are given lesser validity than others, precisely because of 
extra-aesthetic factors.   
 
Wolff  (2006, 2008) attempts to address this in her argument for a ‘grounded 
beauty’ one informed by criteria of judgement that are “ideally”:  
 
“The product of reflexive deliberation in the context of communities of 
interpretation...[being clear] that the communities in play are not free-
floating...but are always grounded in structures and institutions of relative 
and differential power.” (Wolff, 2008, p.25) 
 
For Wolff a synthesis of ideological critique and aesthetic judgement can be 
achieved through “reasoned dialogue in the context of community” (Wolff, 
2006, p.151), an approach which foregrounds “the complex intersection of the 
aesthetic and the political as they relate to questions of gender…so that the 
mechanisms of representation are likely to be exposed” (p.155).   In an 
‘application’ of this ‘principled aesthetic’ to 20th Century English art, Wolff, 
argues: 
“...It is not a question of the ‘right’ criteria for aesthetic judgement...the 
important project is to make transparent the grounds for judgement as well 
as the possible interests invested in evaluations…A principled aesthetics, 
explicit about the cultural context of judgements, takes English art on its 
own terms without absconding from the broader, more challenging questions 
of the value of art.” (Wolff, 2008, p.50 - 51) 
 
What arguments such as that posited by Wolff (2006, 2008) and Harrington 
(2004) leave unresolved are what such approaches would ‘look’ like, in what 
ways they would be specifically sociological, and how they would, in practice 
redress fundamental power differentials.  
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2.4. Achieving a synthesis? 
Notwithstanding the problematics of a specifically sociological account of the 
art object, as has been noted throughout, there has been a call to engage with 
the artwork itself, and an increasing  “confidence” to overcome a hitherto 
“blind spot” in relation to “the concrete work that aesthetic factors perform 
in social life” (Blau, 2001;  Born, 2010;  De la Fuente 2007;  Eyerman, 2006;  
Harrington 2004;  Heywood, 1997;  Rubio and Silva, 2013;  Smith and Jenks, 
2000, 2006;  Witkin, 1995, 1997, 2005;  Wolff, 2006, 2008).  
 
Commentators such as Bowler (1994), Harrington (2004), Wolff (2006;  2008) 
and Zolberg (1997), who explicitly argue for the validity and value of a 
sociological engagement with issues of judgement, experience and meaning 
at the level of the art or cultural object, make the case that strict value 
neutrality on the part of the researcher is neither entirely achievable nor 
wholly desirable.  On the one hand, as Bowler (1994) argues, and Bird (1979) 
demonstrates, choices of what to study, who or what is included (or 
excluded) in the study of art and art practices, even what constitutes ‘art’ are 
based on value or aesthetic judgements, albeit implicit ones, on the part of 
the researcher. On the other hand, Harrington (2004) argues that in the 
sociology of the arts “value judgements should be allowed to come into 
play” but in ways that do not undermine “scientific impartiality” 
(Harrington, 2004, p.5).  This is based on the assumptions that for the 
sociology of the arts to be “truly ‘meaningfully adequate’ to its subject it 
must involve some evaluative engagement with the normative contents of its 
subject” (Harrington, 2004, p. 38) and that value judgements about works of 
art, as noted above, can have “intersubjectively generalizable defensibility” 
(2004, p.5).  To maintain value distance, however, necessitates both an 
engagement in political critiques of received ideas of aesthetic value and 
maintaining a distance from “acts of normative advocacy about art” 
(Harrington, 2004, p.5).   
 
For Harrington (2004) and Wolff (1983) the challenge is to achieve a 
sociology of the arts and of aesthetics, which neither seeks to account for 
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aesthetic experience and evaluation by resort to essentialist or universalist 
characteristics, nor to reduce explanations solely to extra-aesthetic factors. In 
effect, the ‘specificity’ of art necessitates a ‘specificity’ of sociological 
understanding; one which, in Harrington’s terms, “fosters an understanding 
of art in which art objects and practices are experienced as value-relevant 
sources of sensuous knowledge” (2004, p.207). 
 
As commented above, what is largely missing from Harrington’s (2004) 
account is how to generate this understanding empirically. By bringing 
together both theory and empirical research, Born (2010), does make a 
concrete attempt to produce a synthesis between ‘the social and the 
aesthetic’, with a view to providing a “non-reductive account of the aesthetic 
in theorising cultural production” (p.172).  Drawing on recent anthropology 
Born identifies five “themes” with a view to ‘reinventing’ an explanatory 
theory of cultural production:  aesthetics and the cultural object;  the place of 
institutions;  agency and subjectivity;  questions of history, temporality and 
change;  and problems of value and judgement.  Illustrating her approach by 
reference to her own empirical work in relation to the field of contemporary 
music and BBC television output, Born’s analysis seeks to bring together 
both the object, qua object, issues of “authorial subjectivity”, institutional and 
social context, the historical context of ‘genres’ of work, which individual 
objects may both reflect but also be generative of in terms of aesthetic and 
formal conventions, and questions of value and judgement.   
 
2.5 Returning the gaze 
What this very schematic overview of sociology’s engagement with ‘art’ and 
the art object illustrates is that while addressing the ways “social relations 
and institutions impact upon the creation, distribution and appreciation of 
artworks” (Inglis, 2005a, p.19) is seen as appropriately within the sociological 
gaze, historically, the art object as an object ‘in itself’ has been its 
(comparative) ‘blind spot’.  Latterly, however the object is increasingly 
coming into focus.  In part through wider disciplinary (and inter-
disciplinary) developments such as Actor Network Theory, which seeks to 
give parity to ‘non-human’ things as ‘actants’, but also through what Wolff 
 60 
(2008), calls a ‘post critical’ return to value.  As the work of Born (2010), for 
example, demonstrates, attempts are being made to work through what an 
approach combining an understanding of the cultural production of ‘art’, 
and the power relations at play, together with a way of understanding the art 
object “as [a] value-relevant source[s] of sensuous knowledge” (Harrington, 
2004, p.207) would look like.  
 
Blau (2001) in her discussion of pieces of contemporary artwork argues that 
they are about “between-ness”:  “between different groups, races, genders, 
nations, generations and historical periods” (p.189), they are also about an 
invocation of the Other.  "Between-ness", for Blau, is a “conceptual 
companion” to the de-centred Self of contemporary theory who or which has 
replaced the Kantian ‘I’.  The metaphor of ‘between-ness’ is perhaps a useful 
one for understanding what commentators such as Bowler (1994), 
Harrington (2004), Wolff (1983) and Zolberg (1997) aspire to in their call for a 
combined approach to understanding aesthetics with sociological 
understanding and critique.  
 
It is within this emergent endeavour of achieving a ‘synthesis’, or a ‘between-
ness’ that the current thesis is situated – a tentative step at exploring how this 
might be approached empirically in the context of visual art.  Through 
analyses of five images drawn from 20th century portraiture, the aim is to 
explore a sociology of the art object which recognises these images’ social 
embeddedness, but also that they can be generative of their own affordances.  
In effect the aim is to open up the space for an exchange of gazes between the 
art object and sociology.  Although very exploratory, and in many ways 
raising further questions, it is suggested that the study has a contribution to 
make not just to a sociology of art, but potentially to the discipline as a whole 
in its parallel concerns with the relationships between the ‘social’ and the 
‘material’. Potentially too, it may contribute to questions posed by other 
disciplines concerned with the art object. 
 
As intimated, the focus for the analysis will be examples from the art 
historical genre of portraiture.  The nature of this genre, and the rationale for 
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3. Face Value:  The case of portraiture 
3.1  Introduction 
 
“The portrait image, and the writing on portraiture provides modern men 
and women with a visual thinking through of the place of humans in human 
society…” (Soussloff, 2006, p.4) 
 
As noted in chapter 1, the focus on portraiture as a site of sociological 
investigation, and specifically for examining sociology’s ambivalent 
relationship to the art object, emerged not from art but from madness.  It 
arose from a recognition that many of the images which I had been 
examining with a view to understanding visual representations of mental 
illness were ‘portraits’. That is, visual images not just in the vernacular 
(Western European) sense of being representations of people’s faces, but also, 
‘portraits’ as understood and constituted through the disciplinary lens of 
(similarly Western European) art history as being: 
 
"…Art works, intentionally made of living or once living people by artists, in 
a variety of media and for an audience." (Brilliant, 2002 [1991] p.8)  
 
Further examination of the ‘genre’ revealed both the complexity beneath 
portraiture’s surface simplicity and its fundamental sociality, as a material 
(or virtual) art object, comprising, in its content, an “intentional” 
representation of (or allusion to) a ‘living or once living’ person or group of 
people, produced from a putative engagement between an ‘artist’ and a 
‘sitter’ and circulating within a field of cultural production.  
 
As this begins to suggest, portraiture is “a genre characterised by paradox” 
(Steiner, 1987). The portrait, as both an artwork and a representation of a 
presumed ‘living or once living person’, raises particular issues with regard 
to questions of value affirmation and the attribution of meaning, slipping 
between: consideration of the portrait as a record of the person imaged;  the 
skill with which an artist has ‘caught’ the individual;  and as an object of 
‘beauty’ in and of itself.   
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This “oscillation between art object and human subject” (Brilliant, 2002 
[1991], p.7), is also manifest in the ways in which the genre has been 
conceptualised as a medium reflecting changing constructions of identity 
and subjectivity, but also as constitutive of social and sexual difference and 
of difference on the basis of race and ethnicity (Brilliant, 2002 [1991];  Doy, 
2002;  Gabara, 2004;  Jones, 2006;  Pollock, 2003 [1988];  West, 2004;  Woodall, 
1997a). 
 
If the term ‘portrait’ refers to the content of the image, then portraiture refers 
to the process of production, distribution, display/consumption (and 
categorisation) of the image. Pointon (1993), exploring portraiture’s 
discursive function in 18th Century England, defines it as both a concept and 
process:   
 
“Denot[ing] all those practices connected with the depiction of human 
subjects and the theorization, conceptualization and apprehension of portrait 
representation.” (Pointon, 1993, p.1) 
 
These processes of portraiture are in Pointon’s terms ideological and 
institutionalised.  They are constitutive of both individual identity and 
subjectivity, and of national identity, through the physical ‘embodiment’ of 
portraits in the (literal) institution of National Portrait Galleries (Barlow, 
1997;  Pointon, 1993;  West, 2004). 
 
As this implies, relations of power play out through and within portraiture 
as object, practice and mode of representation, influencing and influenced 
by:  differential access to the tools of representation;  the ‘subjectivities’ 
included and excluded from the picture plane;  the capacity to control one’s 
self-representation;   the social and aesthetic conventions and codes which 
influence the manner of visual representation;  and the power to attribute 
meaning to both the image and the subject in and of the image.  As Gabara 
(2004) notes, in the context of an analysis of the portraiture of the 20th Century 
Brazilian artist Mário de Andrade:  
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 “Portraits demand a definition of identity that nevertheless is troubled by the 
necessary influence of the perceiver’s perception of the subject.  The blurred 
boundaries of identity cause additional problems for the mimetic function of 
portraiture, which at its base depends upon the notion that viewers will be 
able to recognize the subject portrayed...However, within this notion of 
recognition, the determination of who can and cannot be the subject of 
portraiture is itself a highly coded and hierarchical one.” (p.36) 
 
As an art form “which plays out technologies of power” (Pointon, 2013, p.60) 
and offers a “visual thinking through of the place of humans in human 
society” (Sousslof, 2006, p.4), portraiture is therefore an important field for 
sociological consideration, albeit one that has, hitherto, received scant 
attention. It is not possible here to fully develop a sociology of portraiture 
(though clearly this is an area for possible future exploration), rather this 
chapter explores some of the characteristics and complexities of the portrait 
and portraiture which make it a productive genre for exploring sociology’s 
engagement with the art object. 
 
A summary description of the historical evolution of the portrait is followed 
by an outline of the paradoxical nature of portraiture and the shifting 
conceptualisations of what such images purport to represent.  This is 
followed by a brief account of the transactional nature of the portrait;  the 
inter (and intra) subjective relationships, at the micro level, between artist, 
‘sitter’ and ‘viewer’. The penultimate section widens the perspective to draw 
attention to the ‘macro’ processes of portrait production and display.  The 
chapter ends with a brief summary of the issues raised. 
 
3.2 The portrait’s biography 
The following sketches out the portrait’s ‘origins’.  It draws largely on art 
historical scholarship and literature, with all that this implies for the framing 
of the discourse.  It is not however intended in the current context to 
critically analyse this material but to use it primarily as a resource. 
 
3.2.1 Etymology 
Seraller (2007) suggests that the root of the term ‘portrait’ or to portray is the 
Latin protrahere meaning ‘to draw forth or reveal’.  Schneider (1994) also 
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refers to an older synonym “counterfeit”, from the Latin contrafacere, to 
imitate.  The Italian for portrait, ‘ritratto’ comes from the verb ‘ritarre’ which 
means both to portray and ‘to copy or reproduce’ (West, 2004), and, until at 
least the mid 17th Century, could apply to the visual reproduction of any 
object.  By the 16th Century (in Italy at least) art theory was positing a 
distinction between imitation or ‘imitare’ and portrayal (‘ritarre’).  The former 
referred to the application of the artist’s skill and critical faculties in 
rendering visible “the ideal character of things” (Woodall, 1997a, p.1).  
Ritarre, by contrast was seen as a mechanical exercise producing a mere copy 
of external appearances.  According to Woodall (1997a), initially these two 
were not mutually exclusive, it was possible to produce both an 
individualized resemblance and an ‘ideal’, an exemplar of virtue.  
Contiguous with the promotion of the status of the artist, art works were 
subsequently theorised as “ideal imitation as opposed to mechanical 
reproduction” (Woodall, 1997a, p.16). But, as both Woodall and Serraller 
(2007) imply, in terms of practice (as opposed to theory), for portraiture this 
meant resolving the contradiction proposed between producing a lifelike 
depiction and the ‘abstract ideal’.  As summarised by Panofsky: 
 
“A portrait aims by definition at two essentials...On the one hand it seeks to 
bring out whatever it is in which the sitter differs from the rest of 
humanity…and this is what distinguishes a portrait from an ‘ideal figure or 
type’.  On the other hand it seeks to bring out whatever the sitter has in 
common with the rest of humanity…and this is what distinguishes a portrait 
from a figure forming part of genre painting or narrative.” (Panofsky, in 
West, 2004, p.24) 
 
As suggested above, initially the term ‘portrait’ could be used to include not 
just images of humans but also animals, buildings and even saints (Woodall, 
1997a). According to Schneider (1994), it was André Félibien who, in the 
1670’s, suggested that the term ‘portrait’ be reserved for the likenesses of 
humans, while ‘figure’ be used for images of animals, and ‘représentation’ 
for plants and inorganic matter.  Schneider suggests that not only does this 
mark the end of the medieval “symbiosis” between animals and humans, but 
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that Félibien’s hierarchy also implies that the term individualisation could 
only be used in connection with humans.13 
 
3.2.2 The portrait’s evolution 
 
“The first significant clusters [of self portraits] date from the tenth century.  
The faces may not be especially naturalistic, but that does not prevent the 
images in their entirety being informative, idiosyncratic and particularized.” 
(Hall, 2014, p.18) 
 
Art historical commentators suggest that, geographically, the portrait has 
been a largely Western European art form, reflecting socially and historically 
contingent ideas of individuality (Pointon, 2013;  West, 2004;  Woodall, 
1997a).14  Although generally regarded as an invention of the Renaissance 
(both representations by artists of others and self-portraiture) it has a much 
older history (Berger, 2001a;  Hall, 2014;  Schneider, 1994; West, 2004), with 
roots in Roman wax effigies of the dead and Greek sculptural busts 
(Serraller, 2007; West, 2004).15  According to Serraller (2007) while there are 
‘pre-historic’ representations of the human body, it was the Greeks who 
produced the first “individualized” sculptural portraits around the first half 
of the 5th Century BCE.  These were “individualized” because they were the 
images of “mortal heroes” – an earthly record of a dead person. Berger 
(2001a) makes a similar point in relation to the Fayum (or Faiyum) portraits. 
Painted in Roman Egypt around the late 1st century BCE or the early 1st 
century CE, these were portraits intended to be attached to the mummy of 
                                                
13 Félibien has also been credited with formulating the ‘hierarchy of genres’, although it 
existed in the Italian Renaissance.  In a lecture delivered to the French Royal Academy of 
Painting and Sculpture, published in 1667, Félibien argued that the genre of highest worth 
was history painting, including painting with religious, mythological or allegorical subjects.  
Next came portraits, landscapes and still life (see Edwards, 1999).  According to West (2004), 
portraits were second only to history painting if they represented distinguished or heroic 
individuals, that is, they provided an alternative to history painting in providing the viewer 
with a model for emulation. 
14 It is not within the scope of the current study to explore non-European depictions of 
‘individuals’, but, again, it may be productive in a broader based sociology of portraiture to 
compare whether and in what ways identifiable human figures are represented in image 
form outwith the Western European ‘tradition’ (see, for example, Gell, 1998;  Pinney, 1997).   
15 Woodall (1997a) includes among the ‘founding’ portraits, Narcissus who wasted away 
entranced by his own reflection in a pool, the Maid of Corinth who drew the silhouette of 
her lover around the shadow cast by his head on a wall, and, in Christian iconography, the 
image of Christ imprinted on a cloth pressed against his face by Saint Veronica. 
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the person they portrayed. For Berger, these portraits have an “individuality 
[which] feel[s] like our own” (Berger, 2001a, p.53).  
 
Focusing primarily on self-portraiture, Hall (2014) argues that, contrary to 
the art historical canon, “naturalistic portraiture” did not entirely disappear 
between the fall of the Roman Empire and the Early Modern period. 
Although much of the surviving medieval ‘portraiture’ focuses on attributes 
or symbols of position, rather than facial specificities, Hall argues that there 
is evidence from at least the 10th Century of a developing body of self-
portraiture.   
 
However, the ‘standard’ art historical narrative is that the 15th Century is the 
key turning point in the ‘rebirth’ of portraiture (Pointon, 2013;  Schneider, 
1994;  Serraller, 2007;  West, 2004;  Woodall, 1997a). This was the period that, 
according to Woodall, saw the  “adoption of intensely illusionistic, closely 
observed facial likeness, including idiosyncrasies and imperfections, to 
represent elite figures, including artists themselves” (Woodall, 1997a, p.1).  
On the one hand this parallels changing concepts of individuality and 
identity (and the emergence of the bourgeois homo clausus (Elias, 1994 [1939]).  
On the other hand (but relatedly), it points to the increasing 
professionalization and individualization of artists (see also chapter 2 
above).16 
 
Schneider (1994), for example, argues that the period 1420 – 1670 comprised 
the “Golden Age” of the individualised portrait, effectively setting the 
ground rules or conventions for portraiture for the following centuries.  
These include the production of individual, group or family portraits, 
composed as full-length and three-quarter length as well as  ‘head and 
                                                
16 The religious struggles between the Protestant Reformation and Catholic Counter 
Reformation, in the 16th Century (the Counter Reformation Council of Trent was held 1545 – 
1563) has also been implicated in the development of art over this period.  The Reformation 
was largely hostile to religious imagery, encouraging a move toward more secular subject 
matter.  The Counter Reformation supported religious imagery within the context of the 
Church (West, 2004). 
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shoulder’ portraits, presented in profile (hieratic, suggestive of dignity) and 
full face (suggestive of direct address)17 (Schneider, 1994).   
 
According to West (2004), the first treatise on portraiture was published in 
1548 by Francisco de Holanda.  Gombrich (1972), however, argues that the 
first detailed discussion of the theory of portrait painting was written over 
one hundred years later by Roger de Piles in 1708.  
 
As historical overviews of the genre suggest, despite its ‘Golden Age’ ending 
in 1670 (Schneider, 1994), portraiture as an art form and process has 
persisted, even under the pressure of early 20th Century modernism when its 
basis in mimesis, in an assumed relationship between a signifier and 
signified was disrupted by, for example, ‘portraits’ by Picasso and Matisse 
(Buchloh, 1994; Pointon, 1997;  van Alphen, 1997;  West, 2004). As argued by 
Buchloh (1994):  “the portrait as a pictorial category seems to renew itself and 
its heads…almost instantly after decapitation” (p.53, emphasis in original).  
 
Despite this, what constitutes a ‘portrait’, and the meanings and evaluative 
criteria applied to it as a representation of an ostensibly “living or once living 
person”, that is, what constitutes a ‘good likeness’, has changed within and 
across time.  This reflects not just changes in artistic practices and 
conventions but in the conceptualisations of, and ways for visually 
representing (and arguably, constituting) the individual, the self, subjectivity 
and identity; conceptualisations which are contemporaneous to the 
production of the portrait as well as historicized readings.  As West argues: 
 
“Portraits are not just likenesses, but works of art that engage with ideas of 
identity as they are perceived, represented, and understood in different times 
and places.” (West, 2004, p.11) 
 
The next sub-section explores some of the parameters and paradoxes that 
distinguish (or blur) what constitutes a (good) portrait. 
 
                                                
17 For a discussion of the fluidity of meaning attached to profile and full frontal depictions of 
the human form see, for example, Schapiro (1973).  This is also referred to in chapter 6. 
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3.3 The portrait’s paradoxes 
3.3.1 The portrait’s offer 
 
“So each day, I released a few more inches of the seething cascade of bones...A 
few wretches were still intact. To these [the artist] hadn’t given a great deal 
of attention;  they were no more than fire fodder. All but one.  And he, I could 
have sworn was a portrait – a crescent shaped scar on his brow made this 
almost certain.  His bright hair streamed like a torch…It was the most 
extraordinary detail of medieval painting that I had ever seen.  What in this 
single detail had pushed him this immense stride beyond his time?” (Carr, 
1984, p.60) 
 
The quote above is from a fictional account of a conservator uncovering a 
medieval fresco in an English country church.  The narrator distinguishes 
between the ‘fire fodder’ of the damned depicted on their way to hell, and 
one figure whose particular features stood out to suggest a portrait. This 
ostensible capacity for painting (or sculpture or other representational 
media), to depict a human face in a way that is, in Hall’s terms, “informative, 
idiosyncratic and particularized” (Hall, 2014, p.18) such that it provokes in 
the viewer a sense of a concrete person (with an individual history and 
‘identity’) outwith the picture plane, is fundamental to portrait’s specificity.  
Yet, even within this confine the portrait is marked by a series of paradoxes.  
 
Fundamental to the portrait’s specificity is the intended relatedness in some 
way to a concrete external referent:  an identified or potentially identifiable 
(nameable) individual.  According to Brilliant, for example, “referentiality...is 
a basic requirement for portraits” (Brilliant, 2002 [1991], p.125) .   
 
In art historical terms these are ‘autonomous’ portraits as distinct from 
images that may use models to depict figures, but where the model is not the 
intended ‘subject’ of the image (West, 2004).  Thus, although the models for 
Manet’s Olympia (discussed in chapter 2) have been identified as Victorine 
Meurend and Laure (surname unknown) (Pollock, 1999) it is not (in art 
historical terms) a portrait of these two women.   For Gadamer this is the 
portrait’s “occasionality” – that is, the portrait’s meaning, particularly its 
relationship to the person represented, is not solely read into the image, 
rather: 
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“The meaning and contents are determined by the occasion for which they are 
intended…the portrait is related to the man represented, a relation not just 
dragged in but expressly intended in the portrait itself...this occasionality 
belongs to the work’s own claim and is not something forced on it by its 
interpreters.” (Gadamer, 2006 [1975]), p.138) 
  
In addition to a putative referentiality, the portrait’s ‘offer’ is that it should 
contain an element of ‘likeness’ (Woodall, 1997a), yet what constitutes 
‘likeness’ and ‘identity’, shifts within and across time (West, 2004). 
 
Thus, notwithstanding these two axes of referentiality and resemblance, 
defining what constitutes a  ‘portrait’ proves to be elusive and shifting.   A 
part of this is the problem of providing an account that is not historicized, or 
reflects later theoretical interpretations. Woodall (1997a), for example draws 
attention to, and critiques, dualist conceptions, such as that by the art 
historian Jacob Burckhardt writing in the mid-nineteenth century.  
According to Woodall, commentators such as Burckhardt sought to interpret 
portraiture through the prism of the Cartesian distinction between mind and 
body and between object-subject and objectivity-subjectivity.  This 
perspective Woodall argues, sanctions and naturalises the ahistorical 
masculine bourgeois object and field of vision.  In its place the contributors to 
the collection edited by Woodall (1997b) produce their own (late 20th century) 
interpretations that challenge this dualist conception and the relations of 
power it reproduces, to present an understanding of the portrayed self as 
“formulated through relationships between subjectivities which are 
themselves socially produced” (p.18).  In a parallel vein, Pointon (1993) 
argues for portraits as a discourse:   
 
“A politics of representation in which the historical human subject is not a 
separate identity from the portrait depiction of him or her, but part of a 
process through which knowledge is claimed and the social and physical 
environment is shaped.” (p.1)  
 
Thus the ‘portrait’ as a representational practice, an art object, an image and 




The following draws attention to some of the complexities of what otherwise 
could be considered to be one of the most self-evident of genres.   
 
3.3.2 A living or once living person? 
As already noted, for Gadamer, (2006 [1975]), the portrait’s intended 
relationship to a concrete individual is what ‘occasions’ the portrait.  In 
Maynard’s (2007) terms the purpose of the portrait is to “display”, to make 
visible in object form a human subject, this is its “intentional affordance”.  
According to Brilliant (1987) “some evident, recognizable connection 
between the visual image and an actual person is necessary for the artwork 
to be considered a portrait at all” (p.171). 
 
Seen through this prism, portraits point or draw attention to an existent (or 
once existent) subject with a “unique essence”, even if the portrait sign is not 
similar to the referent (Steiner, 1978). However illusory or abstract, this 
referential or  ‘indexical’18 connection to a concrete person should create the 
sense of being in the presence of the subject (Brilliant, 2002 [1991];  Steiner, 
1978;  West, 2004).  Thus, according to Brilliant (2002 [1991]) even when the 
portrait is “freed from all forms of descriptive reference to physical 
appearance [it can retain] its categorical status as an intentionally exclusive 
sign of a named individual” (p.155).   
 
What this also alludes to is the significance not just of a physical presence 
outwith the portrait, but an individual identifiable by a specific ‘name’.  As 
Steiner (1978) suggests, the ‘name’ may be used to reference both the subject 
of the artwork and the artwork (see for example Roger Ballen’s photograph 
of ‘Dresie and Casie, Twins, Western Transvaal’ discussed in chapter 6 below 
(figure 6.2)).  This arguably works to reinforce the assumed equivalence 
between the representation and its referent.  As Fisher (1984) argues, the 
titles of art works connote as well as denote, that is, they tell the viewer “how 
                                                
18 This refers to C.S Pierce’s distinction between:  the icon which looks like the thing it 
represents, or stands for its object in virtue of some shared quality;  the index, which draws 
attention to something outside of itself, or denotes some relationship to the image and its 
referent;  and the symbol, a sign, that by convention is connected to a particular object 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/ accessed 23 Nov 2014). 
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to look at a work” (p.292).  In relation to representational portraiture Fisher 
suggests that the titles say something about the work, the sitter and the 
artist’s intentions.   Leaving aside the problem of historical (or even 
contemporary) portraits where the ‘name’ is effectively meaningless as an 
index when a viewer is not aware of the person to whom it putatively refers19, 
the title/naming of the work/subject is no guarantor of the concreteness of 
the relationship between the image and the referent.  On the one hand, as 
Brilliant (2002 [1991]) points out, ‘portraits’ of ‘Homer’ and of ‘Shakespeare’ 
circulate, despite the fact that the physical existence of the former (let alone 
‘his’ physical form), is unknown, and debates continue about the authenticity 
of images of the latter.20  In these cases it is not just a case of fitting a name to 
a face, but finding a face to fit a ‘name’.  On the other hand, two ‘portraits’ by 
Roy Lichtenstein, painted in 1962, demonstrate the fluid, if not wholly 
arbitrary relationship between face and name.  The two images represent an 
identical man in a jacket and bow tie in Lichtenstein’s trademark ‘cartoon’ 
style; one is entitled ‘portrait of Allan Kaprow’, the second is called ‘portrait 
of Ivan Karp’.21  
 
The assumed indexical relationship between the image and a named external 
referent – portraiture’s “mimetic referentiality” (van Alphen, 1997) - perhaps 
reaches its apotheosis with photographic portraiture, where the chemical 
production process of analogue photography itself implies an external 
presence;  in Barthes’ terms, ‘the thing has been there’ (2000 [1980], p.76). 
Mimetic representation in general, and photography’s specific claims to 
                                                
19 In response to a comment that his portraits of the Medici were not a good likeness, 
Michelangelo is reported to have responded “what will it matter in a thousand years time 
what these men looked like?” (cited in Gombrich, 1972, p.2). This suggests too that the 
balance between the aesthetic and the referential in portraiture (Steiner, 1978) may shift over 
time and space, as the recognition of the subject recedes and the ‘art’ takes prominence.  
20 In March/April 2009, for example, the proposal that a painting known as the Cobbe 
Portrait was a contemporary portrait of Shakespeare and a more ‘authentic’ likeness than 
other extant portraits generated media debate. See for example: 
http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2009/mar/10/shakespeare-cobbe-portrait (accessed 
14 Nov 2014) A similar debate emerged in May 2015, with the discovery of yet another 
image claimed to be an ‘authentic’ likeness 
(http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/jonathanjonesblog/2015/may/20/the-
shakespeare-code-garden-book-portrait-discovery-art-symbols (accessed 24 May 2015). 
21 Both of the ‘named’ people are concrete individuals.  Allan Kaprow, was a performance 
artist who coined the term a ‘happening’;  Ivan Karp was an art dealer instrumental in the 
emergence of Pop Art.   
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capture an objective external reality, have been subject to extensive analysis 
as part of wider critiques of realist epistemologies which would argue for an 
unmediated access to the ‘real’ beyond representation. It is not possible to 
adjudicate between or to do justice to these arguments here, but what 
commentators such as Tagg (1988) and Hand (2012), for example, argue in 
the context of photographic representation is that objective reality is not 
revealed by photography but, at the level of meaning, discursively produced 
and ideological in form  - that is, the “rhetoric of indexicality” (Tagg, 1988), 
has effects of power.  This line of critique also has implications for issues of 
‘authenticity’, both of the image and the subject of the image - which are 
examined further in the following case studies.  
 
Late 20th Century examples of explicitly ‘imaginary’ portraiture could perhaps 
be read as a way of acknowledging critiques of both the capacity to access an 
unmediated external reality and the fixity of identity. The photographic 
work of Cindy Sherman, such as her ‘Untitled Film Stills’ from the 1970s in 
which she ‘plays’ female characters from fictional films might come within 
this category (Jones, 2006;  van Alphen, 1997;  West, 2004).22  It might also 
encompass the work of Lynette Yiadom-Boakye, shortlisted for the 2013 
Turner prize on the basis of her “imaginary” portraits of black subjects.  
 
Given that the referentiality of the portrait has been brought under pressure, 
what of the portrait’s second, and linked axis, that of ‘resemblance’? 
 
3.3.3 ‘Leal Souvenir’ (loyal remembrance)23 
 
“…Portraits are images of persons that fulfil one or more of the following 
features: 1. Likenesses; 2. Psychological characterizations; 3.  Proofs of 
presence or ‘contact’; 4. Manifestations of a person’s ‘essence’ or ‘air’.”  
(Freeland, 2010, p.49) 
 
                                                
22 It should be noted that Freeland (2010) argues that Sherman’s works are not ‘portraits’ in 
the sense that they do not use the portrait form “from an interest in probing the nature of the 
person” (p.267). 
23 Inscription on a portrait by van Eyck (Tymotheos), 1432 (in Schneider, 1994, p.13). 
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“If personhood were not to have a separate, distinct existence, or if it cannot 
be properly demonstrated, then nothing but an arbitrary connection between 
an image, qua portrait and some named individual need be represented.” 
(Brilliant, 2002 [1991], p.171) 
 
Such is the strong assumed relationship between the subject of the image and 
his or her visual representation, that the perceived quality of the image qua 
image is at risk of being overshadowed by the perceived quality with which 
the image is considered a good ‘likeness’ of the external referent.  According 
to Woodall, for Aristotle, for example, portraiture epitomised representation 
in the sense of making present again, the pleasure of the portrait residing in 
“the process of identifying a likeness with what it is perceived to be like, of 
substituting something present for something absent” (Woodall, 1997a, p.8). 24  
 
But the nature of this ‘likeness’ captured pictorially slips and slides between 
a reflection of a physical, exterior likeness – a mimetic reproduction of the 
individual – and, or, the capturing of an inner essence, something that goes 
beyond the surface features of an individual.  Sousslof (2006) describes this 
as the “functional dialectic” in portraiture between, on the one hand, “the 
truth claims of an indexical exteriority or resemblance” and the claim to 
represent an interiority or spirituality; the essence or “’air’ [that] expresses 
the subject“ (Barthes, 2000 [1980], p.109). The emergence of this ‘dialectic’, 
evident too from accounts of the term’s etymology, draws attention to the 
reciprocal relationships between aesthetic codes and conventions, the 
technology of representation, changing social relations, including the status 
of the artist from the 15th Century, and conceptualisations of self, identity and 
individuality drawn from contemporary and subsequent Western 
metaphysics and philosophy.  It is about reproducing the specificity of an 
individual, their ‘identity’ or ‘likeness’, in a context in which what these 
concepts mean and how they are articulated in and through artistic 
representations at any one point in time are historically specific and 
ideologically determined (Pointon, 1993;  West, 2004).  
                                                
24 In his analysis of ‘The Imaginary’, Sartre (2004 [1940]), for example, compares the different 
means for conjuring up the image of his absent friend ‘Pierre’:  “mental representation, 
photograph, caricature:  three very different realities appear… From beginning to end, the aim is the 
same:  to make present the face of Pierre, who is not there.” (p.18) 
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As already noted, however, without going back to historical sources it is 
difficult to uncouple whether the assumed shifts in emphases reflect the 
mutual constitution of contemporaneous ideas and images or later 
constructions of intellectual and aesthetic reciprocity.  Further, while 
attempting to illustrate shifts over time it is acknowledged that any one 
‘period’ will contain multiple, co-existing images that may suggest other 
narratives. 
 
With these caveats in mind, what an art historical overview suggests is that 
from the 15th Century to at least the 19th Century portraiture has been marked 
by three key antinomies. First, between a concept of ‘likeness’ as ‘type’, an 
abstracted view of likeness, relating to social role, such as early monarchical 
portraiture, where the focus may be on symbols or insignia of authority, 
rather than on veracity of physical appearance25, and ‘likeness’ in the sense of 
being to some degree a ‘copy’ of the sitter’s external features.   
 
Second, between a representation of the subject’s ‘ideal qualities’ to 
“emphasise the dignity and grandeur of the human being, suppressing 
Nature’s irregularities” (Lomazzo, writing in 1584, quoted in Schneider, 
1994), and transcending “the coarseness of living bodies” (Vasari, c1568, 
quoted in Berger, (1994)), to a ‘warts and all’26 representation of an 
individual.27  
 
Third, between a focus on the sitter’s external features versus the face as an 
index of the mind, that is the artist’s skill in capturing or revealing the inner 
essence or ‘air’ of the individual.  This emphasis on the assumed revelatory 
(as opposed to solely ‘documentary’) capacity of the portrait, is, however, not 
immanent to the portrait, but historically specific, associated with the social 
and political emergence, from the 15th Century, of the bourgeois ‘individual’. 
                                                
25 See, for example, the Ditchley Portrait of Elizabeth 1 painted by Marcus Gheeraerts the 
younger c.1592 
http://www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/portrait/mw02079/Queen-Elizabeth-I-The-
Ditchley-portrait (accessed 2 Nov 2014). 
26 The paraphrase of an expression attributed (by Horace Walpole in 1764) to Oliver 
Cromwell to his portraitist Peter Lely. 
27 Similar shifts are described by Daston and Galison (1992) in relation to scientific images.  
Again this parallel could be a fruitful area for further exploration.  
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Conceptualised as unitary, monocular or ‘perspectival’ the external form is 
the signifier of the unique, individual essence (van Alphen (1997).  Van 
Alphen, for example, argues that the “bourgeois self depends on a specific 
mode of representation for its authenticity” (1997 p.241) and that it is 
precisely this “belief’ in the unity of the signified and signifier that mimetic 
representation affords which authorises the originality or uniqueness of both 
the subject and the artist.  
 
Theoretical critiques (philosophical, psychoanalytical, social and political) 
from at least the late 19th Century of the unitary, centred subject (Hall, 2004), 
are seen as being mirrored in 20th and 21st Century portraits. These are read as 
disrupting the assumed connection between signifier and signified or as 
articulating the fragmented and decentred self (Buchloh, 1994;  Jones, 2006;  
van Alphen, 1997).  The portrait, in effect, becomes an intellectual and 
aesthetic vehicle for exploring, articulating and exposing the ideological 
function of the unitary self.  As summarised by Feldman (1994), the “human 
image becomes a pawn for [artists’] formal and epistemological 
investigations” (p.10).  
 
So, for example, early 20th Century ‘modernist’ portraits by Picasso and 
Matisse have been described as replacing the mimetic ‘mirror’, with the 
“multiple values of the mask” (Solana and Potts, 2007), even as they retain 
some elements of ‘resemblance’ to the sitters (see also, Buchloh, 1994;  
Bürger, 2008 [2006];  Feaver, 2007;  Klein, 2001, 2007;  Pointon, 1997;  van 
Alphen, 1997;   West, 2004).   
 
Later in the 20th Century the serial portraits of ‘celebrities’ by Andy Warhol, 
have been interpreted as “vacating” both the sitter’s and the artist’s 
subjectivity (Buchloh, 1994;  van Alphen, 1997).  Thus, for Buchloh (1994), the 
work of Warhol (and Lichtenstein) is “not only emptied of all individuality 
of painterly performance but of any remnants of interiority and privacy of 
the self as sitter” (p.62).  Through this prism, the works are seen as 
representing the self reduced to ‘simulacrum’ (Baudrillard, 1984), to surface 
without depth (Buchloh, 1994; Foster, 2012;  Moorhouse, 2007;  Steiner, 1987; 
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van Alphen, 1997). While, on the one hand, interpreted as a critique of the 
commodification of the self in late-capitalist consumer society (Buchloh, 
1994; Foster, 2012), as Klein (2007), notes, this emphasis on surface over 
depth returns the focus in the portrait to “where it all began”.   
 
The fragmentation of the self, the breaking down of the bourgeois sealed off 
homo clausus (Elias, 1994 [1939]) and Cartesian distinction between mind and 
body (Woodall, 1997a) has also opened on to a ‘post-modern’ portraiture of 
the abject and the ‘grotesque’, and a focus on the ‘body’ rather than the 
head/face (Erdrich, 2007;  Feldman, 1994;  Jones, 2006;  Meskimmon, 1996;  
Warr and Jones, 2000;  West, 2004).  Associated with feminist self-portraiture 
(but not exclusively so, see, for example, chapter 6 below), it brings into the 
portrait’s frame not just bodies which “force us to question the designations 
of beauty in relationship to the grotesque” (Erdrich, 2007, p.48, on the work 
of Jenny Saville), but also ‘sitters’ who are otherwise excluded from formal 
portraiture (such as Nan Goldin’s images of the New York counter-culture).  
It also draws attention to the ‘performative’ nature of portraiture.  Jones 
(2006), for example, in her discussion of photographic self-portraiture 
describes, the emergence of “an exaggerated mode of performative self-
imaging that opens up an entirely new way of thinking about photography 
and the racially, sexually and gender-identified subject” (p.40).  
 
The concept of the ‘performative’ is used not only in relation to readings of 
contemporary portraiture, which may be influenced by, for example, the 
theoretical thinking of Judith Butler (1993;  2006 [1990]), but also in relation 
to interpretations of historical portraiture to describe a conscious ‘self-
fashioning’ (Greenblatt, 1980) of visual ‘identity’.  Berger (1994), for example, 
seeks to replace what he describes as ‘physiognomic’ interpretations of Early 
Modern (Renaissance) portraiture that attempt to read the face of the sitter as 
an index of the mind, with a theory of “posing”.  This seeks to recuperate the 
role of the sitter and the act of portrayal in the production of a self-
representation. What the image presents is not the representation of an inner 
life, but a performance of an inner life, fabricated for an anticipated observer;  
 79 
not the face as an index of the mind, but the mind’s capacity to make the face 
an index of the mind: 
 
 “The portrait creates a referential illusion. What it pretends only to reflect 
and refer to is in fact something that it constitutes. Thus it represents the 
three-way diachronic transaction between painter, sitter and observer in a 
purely fictional field.” (Berger, 1994, p.99) 
 
This sense of the knowing construction of identity is also indirectly alluded 
to in Maynard’s (2007) analysis of portraits as display, that is as images not 
only intended to make their subjects visible, but for this intent to be 
recognised;  they are depictions of people in the act of displaying themselves 
and aware of being looked at and being seen.28  Although accompanied by a 
sense of dismay this also resonates with Barthes’ account of the experience of 
being photographed:  
 
“I constitute myself in the process of ‘posing’…I transform myself in advance 
into an image…I lend myself to the social game, I pose, I know I am posing, I 
want you to know that I am posing…’myself’ never coincides with my 
image.” (Barthes, 2000 [1980], p.10–12)  
 
For Pointon (1997), what defines portraiture is this oscillation between the 
fictitious and the referential:  
 
“It is this coming together of the blatantly fictitious and the empirically 
truthful that epitomises the double-edged quality of portraiture.” (p.193)  
 
It should, however, be noted that, from different perspectives, both the 
theorising of a decentred self, and its implications for portraiture have 
themselves been subject to critique.  Freeland (2010), for example, rejects the 
idea of the “fallen self” and argues that an analysis of portraits that appear to 
articulate this fall or disappearance, such as those by Warhol and Gerhard 
Richter, reveals that they retain more of the ‘traditional self’, a self with 
“autonomy and responsibility”, than meets the eye.  From a different 
                                                
28 Parallels can perhaps be drawn here with Cooley’s (1956 [1902]) concept of the “looking 
glass self”, which extends beyond the “mere mechanical reflection of ourselves”, to 
encompass “an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another’s 
mind” (p.184). 
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perspective, the argument has been made by those traditionally excluded 
from portraiture, such as black artists and sitters (Doy, 2002;  Gabara, 2004;  
Pointon, 2013), that the concept of the decentred self may work to further 
disadvantage and exclude female and black artists.  Doy cites Hartsock 
(1990) who asks:   
 
“Why is that just at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced 
begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than 
objects of history, then just then the concept of subjecthood becomes 
problematic?” (p.163)  
 
In this context, Doy (2002) argues that women and black artists want to 
preserve the self-subject situated “in community where dialogue and inter-
action takes place” (p.43;  see also hooks, 1990). 
  
3.3.4 The (loss of) face 
 
“It simply is a fact about humans that we are visual animals with a strong 
interest in identifying and re-identifying the faces of others. This is so 
important that a part of our brains is actually hardwired for the task.  And 
other brain parts are geared toward recognizing the facial expression of 
emotions.” (Freeland, 2010, p.189) 
 
“[What] Rembrandt…intends to show us above all is our powerlessness in 
the ‘face’ of physiognomies.  A face, he will demonstrate, is a machine for 
exteriorising – exchanging, universalising – subjectivity...This is what the 
arrangement of nose, ears, eyes, cheeks, mouth and chin...was evolved to do: 
to make the sensory apparatus of each individual respond to the apparatus of 
others;  to make the ‘features’ into signs.” (Clark, 2014, np) 
 
As already touched upon, as a corollary to the shifting perceptions of 
‘likeness’ and ‘resemblance’, is the shifting significance of the face as the 
index of the subject’s identity (physical or otherwise).29   
 
As illustrated in the quote from Freeland (2010) above, biological or 
psychological theories have been drawn on to account for why “faces figure 
                                                
29 Social theorists have also drawn on the metaphor of the face;  Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988 
[1980]), concept of ‘faciality’, for example (see Bogue, 2003) and  the concept of the ‘visage’ in 
Levinas (see Davis, 2004).   
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so prominently in the history of visual portraiture” (p.188). Brilliant (2002 
[1991]), for example, argues that portraiture’s significance may in fact stem 
from the need at an early stage for a child to recognise its mother’s face for its 
survival30,31. Gombrich (1972), in his analysis of “the perception of 
physiognomic likeness in life and in art” (p.1), explores the issue of portrait 
likeness, or ‘physiognomic constancy” from the perspective of perceptual 
psychology.  For Simmel (1959 [1901]) what gives the face its “aesthetic 
significance” is its capacity to merge “such a great variety of shapes and 
surfaces into an absolute unity of meaning” (p.277). Furthermore, Simmel 
argues, it achieves this through an “aesthetic synthesis” of “anti- 
individualistic“ symmetry and individuality: 
 
“As a whole, it [the face] realizes individualization;  but it does so in the form 
of symmetry, which controls the relations among the parts.” (Simmel (1959 
[1901], p.280) 
 
It is, however, physiognomy, based as it is on the premise that a person’s 
‘character’ or ‘soul’ can be read from their physical features, which has the 
longest history in accounting for the significance of the face. Although 
described as an “ancient science” (Gage, 1997), the first attempt to codify the 
‘semantic’ possibilities of facial appearance, or what Clark (2014) alludes to 
as the brain’s capacity to “make the ‘features’ into signs”, is Charles le 
Bruin’s A Method to Learn to Design the Passions, published in 1667.  Drawing 
on Descartes’ account of the ‘passions’ and their external signs, Le Bruin 
attempted the first systematic study of human expression.  The book became 
a standard manual for painters for over 100 years (Freeland, 2010;  Gombrich, 
                                                
30 Lacan’s conceptualisations of the ‘mirror stage’ and the ‘screen’ have also been called upon 
as ways of theorizing and interpreting portraiture (see for example, Meskimmon, 1996;  
Sousslof, 2006).  It is through the ‘mirror stage’ that a young child comes to (mis)-recognize 
itself as an individual subject or self – that is as a “specular self’, even as it feels powerless 
and fragmented (Hall, 2004;  Lacan, 1977 [1949]).  The development of this stage is 
preparatory to the recognition of the other, that is to becoming a “social I”.  The ‘mirror 
stage’ is used by Lacan both to describe an observed phenomenon of infant development 
and as a metaphor for the construction of the subject.  The Lacanian concept of the ‘screen’ 
(Lacan, 1981 [1964]) describes the process by which we are self-constituted and constituted 
in relation to the gaze of others, The Other (see for example, Erdrich, 2007;  Foster, 1996;  
Jones, 2006).  
31 The significance of facial recognition cannot be explored here, but see for example, Peterson 
and Rhodes (eds) 2006;  Tistarelli et al (2007). 
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1972).  Over the period 1789 – 1792 the theologian Johann Casper Lavater 
published his Essays on Physiognomy, in which he set out a system for 
interpreting character from physical characteristics.  In 1806 the Scottish 
anatomist and surgeon Charles Bell published his Anatomy of Expression in 
Painting which included his own drawings of faces expressing different 
emotional states or expressions.  His work was also influential on artists and, 
according to Freeland (2010), on Charles Darwin. 
 
The thread connecting this historical meshing of the ‘scientific’, ‘aesthetic’ 
and ‘moral’ is the assumption that the portrayed face reflects not just identity 
in terms of physical features, but can be ‘read’ as an index of something 
beneath, whether articulated as ‘soul’, ‘passions’, ‘moral character’ or 
‘emotion’.   The use of the face/physical features as a ‘sign’ of moral or 
ethical worth, which underpinned the work of Lavater in particular, is 
described as having had a “pernicious” influence on Kant, who perpetuated 
the racial and ethnic stereotypes to which Lavater’s physiognomic influence 
lent itself (Freeland, 2010).  Gage also draws attention to the work of Francis 
Galton (the “father of eugenics” (Gage, 1997)) who, in the late 19th Century, 
attempted to codify ‘types’ through the development of composite 
photographs made by superimposing photographic negatives. He began 
with photographs of prisoners with a view to developing a taxonomy of 
criminal ‘types’, that is, identifying facial ‘likeness’ as a form of social control 
(see also Edwards, 1990;  Tagg, 1988.  See also chapter 6 below).  
 
In the 20th and 21st century the primacy given to ‘face’ has been challenged 
within portraiture, and as a challenge to portraiture. This has been either 
through the absence of face and/or through a focus on the ‘body’. 
 
Brilliant (2002 [1991]), for example, draws attention to portraits in which the 
‘subject’ is reduced to just a few “physiognomic characteristics”, (as in 
Salvador Dali’s representation of Mae West), or where there is no immediate 
relationship between object and image and the connection is textual rather 
than one of physical ‘likeness’ (as in Francis Picabia’s “Portrait of Marie 
Laurencin”).  For Brilliant, although reflecting the artist’s vision of the 
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subject, rather than a descriptive reference, such images retain their 
categorical status as portraits understood as “intentionally exclusive sign[s] 
of a named person” (Brilliant, 2002 [1991], p.155).   
 
According to Buchloh (1994) among post Second World War (American) 
avant-garde artists, however, the aim of non-objective representation was not 
to perpetuate but to “undo the category at all costs”.  The “signal gesture”, 
for Buchloh, was Robert Rauschenberg’s 1961 telegram mailed to his dealer 
with the text: “This is a portrait of Iris Clert if I say so.   Robert Rauschenberg”.  
For Buchloh (1998), this both: 
 
“Shifts the representation of subjectivity into the register of the performative 
declaration…but…also asserts that the very principle of subjectivity is one of 
instantiation and iteration…the subject as a continuous performative 
process.”  (p.157, emphasis in original) 
 
The loss of face, in effect, signals not only a change in representational 
practice but also the parallel shift (discussed earlier) in conceptualisations of 
subjectivity itself.  This extends into 1960’s and 1970’s Pop Art, in which, for 
Buchloh (1994;  1998), the “refusal of the genre” is expressed as an absence of 
people, or a vacating of subjectivity altogether.   Using the imagery of the 
comic strip, Lichtenstein, for example, produced a series of ‘self portraits’, in 
which the ‘head’ or ‘face’ is replaced either by a mirror above an empty t-
shirt or a piece of plywood, or perforated Swiss cheese (Buchloh, 1994).   
 
In her discussion of the portraiture of late 20th Century ‘post modern’ artists, 
West (2004), describes what she sees as a shift from the “iconic properties” of 
portraits, to “indexical ones”32, that is, away from artists portraying 
themselves or others in a representational way, toward a referential allusion 
(not dissimilar to the early 20th Century images by Picabia and Dali described 
by Brilliant (2002 [1991]).  West cites the example of Tracy Emin’s work, 
Everyone I have ever slept with 1963 – 1995 (1995), a tent, including mattress 
and light, with the appliqued names of all the people Emin had shared a bed 
                                                
32 See footnote 18 above for a summary of Pierce’s distinction between the ‘icon’, ‘index’ and 
‘symbol’. 
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with up to that point.33 According to West (2004) this work is self-referential 
but avoids the emphasis on the (assumed) relationship between a physical 
likeness and character.  
 
If one response to (or articulation of) the de-stabilising of subjectivity is to 
de-face the portrait, the other response has been to look away from the face 
to the body.  As already alluded to, as part of a feminist political critique of 
the unitary bourgeois subjectivity, and associated masculinist and 
heterosexist aesthetics of (female) beauty (see, for example, Berger 1972; 
Brand and Korsmeyer, 1995;  Duncan, 1993 [1973];  Jones, 2002, 2006; 
Meskimmon, 1996;  Nochlin, 1999; Pollock, 2003 [1988]) the focus in women’s 
self-portraiture for example, has not just shifted from the face to the body, 
but the subversive “monstrous” or “grotesque” body (Erdrich, 2007;  Jones, 
2006;  Meskimmon, 1996;  Ross, 1997;  Russo, 1994).  West (2004) also draws 
attention to the work of (male) artists such as Chuck Close and Bruce 
Nauman which aims to objectify body parts, and hence de-familiarise the 
image.  It could also include the work of John Coplans, whose series of self-
portraits comprised his own (aging) naked body. Hammer (2007) notes of 
Coplans’ work:   
 
“Although the titles inform us that the artist himself is the model, the head, 
the primary indicator of inner states and personal identity, is the one element 
that is always left out.” (p.90) 
 
3.3.5 ‘Being’ portrayed 
Perhaps because of the complexity and ambiguity of what the portrait 
‘captures’ it has become a site on which ontological questions have been 
played out.  Gadamer, for example, argues that portraits contribute to an 
increase of being:  “What is represented comes into its own in the picture.  It 
experiences an increase in being” (Gadamer, 2006 [1975], p.146).  Jones 
(2006), in her discussion of technologies of self-representation, however, 
argues that while these may “condition[…] our experience of 
ourselves…[they] can never fully contain or explain the depths of embodied 
                                                
33 The work itself was destroyed in a warehouse fire in 2004. 
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human experience” (p.40).  While these authors suggest the potential for the 
portrait to increase, or fail to fully capture ‘being’, for Barthes (as touched 
upon earlier), photographic portraits mortify the self: 
 
“The Photograph (the one I intend) represents that very subtle moment, 
when to tell the truth, I am neither subject nor object, but a subject who feels 
he is becoming an object:  I then experience a micro-version of death…what I 
see is that I have become Total-Image, which is to say, Death in person.” 
(Barthes, 2000 [1980], p.14) 
 
For Tagg (1988) though, (in his critique of Barthes assumptions regarding the 
indexical nature of photography), the self neither dies, escapes or increases 
through representation, but is effectively produced through and by 
representation:   
 
“What exceeds representation…cannot, by definition be articulated.  More 
than this, it is an effect of the production of the subject in and through 
representation to give rise to the phantasy of this something more.” (1988, 
p.4). 
 
Again it is not possible here to do justice to these arguments, but perhaps 
even more than the other dimensions discussed these examples serve to 
capture the portrait’s fugitive qualities, its capacity to offer up readings, 
while at the same time denying closure or fixity.   
 
3.4 The portrait’s transaction 
Underpinning the dimensions of ‘likeness’ discussed above, is portraiture’s 
distinctive (and socially and historically dynamic) transactional quality:  in 
the relationship between artist and sitter;  between image and spectator;  and 
as a business transaction and communal enterprise (Pointon, 1993).  
Relations of power, including, for example, on the basis of class, gender, race 
and sexual orientation, mediate each dimension.  The artist-sitter 
relationship, for example, reflects the changing social status of the painter – 
from ‘craftsman’ (sic) to ‘artist’ and the social status (e.g. class, gender, 
ethnicity, race, sexuality) of the person portrayed as well as the personal 
relationship between artist and sitter  (Berger, 2001a, 2001b;  Rosenthal, 1997; 
West, 2004). The relationship also informs who has control over the way an 
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image is realized, to flatter or idealize, for example, or to stress signs of 
“ugliness and extremes” (West, 2004, p.38). As Pointon (2013) notes, “the 
power to impose a shape on oneself is an aspect of the more general power to 
control identity” (p.61).  This factor may be related to the ‘ownership’ of the 
product, that is whether the sitter commissions the portrait or where they are 
used primarily as a model for expressing an artistic idea.  In addition is the 
complex relationship between the socially and historically situated (and 
constituted) ‘observer’ (Crary, 1992), and the image both as an ‘art’ work, 
and as the representation of another socially and historically situated (and 
constituted) human subject (Pointon, 1993).  As will be discussed in the 
context of the case study images below, this can result in a ‘flip flop’ between 
an evaluation of the image qua ‘art’, and an evaluation of the imaged qua 
social subject.  
 
The following examines the purposes and production of portraiture as a 
product or commodity.  A number of these themes are explored in more 
depth in the case studies. 
 
3.4.1 The subject in the portrait:  Who is (and is not) portrayed  
 
“The production of portraits is, at once, the production of significations in 
which contending social classes claim presence in representation, and the 
production of things which may be possessed...the rise of the photographic 
portrait…belongs to a particular stage of social evolution:  the rise of the 
middle and lower classes towards greater social, economic and political 
importance…To ‘have one’s portrait done’, was one of the symbolic acts by 
which individuals from the rising social classes made their ascent visible to 
themselves and others.” (Tagg, 1988, p.37) 
 
As the quote from Tagg above underlines, the ‘who’ (and who is not) in the 
portrait reflects changing social and power structures and the development 
of new technologies and practices of representation.  As a result, historically 
the social position of those portrayed has changed over time.  Summarising 
this very crudely, from being primarily representations of monarchical and 
aristocratic patrons (and power), from around the 15th Century, the genre 
expands to include portraits (individual, family, group) of the rising 
bourgeoisie, and from the mid 19th Century, with the development and 
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commercialisation of photographic portraiture, the rising lower and middle 
classes (Tagg, 1988).  The 20th and 21st Century sees, on the one hand, a 
burgeoning of ‘celebrity’ portraiture (see chapter 7 below). On the other, as 
part of the critique and fracturing of the bourgeois subject, this period also 
sees the representation and self-representation in portraiture by and of those 
previously excluded from the picture plane or who, historically, have been 
represented as the pacified, racialised, sexualised or exoticised ‘other’ 
(Brilliant, 2002 [1991];  Gabara, 2004), or the ‘monologic’ object of knowledge 
(Edwards, 1990;  Tagg, 1988). 34  As part of this attempt, by and on the part of 
the ‘subaltern subject’ (Murray and Murray, 2006) to (re)claim their own 
“presence in representation” (Tagg, 1988), the portrait has been used as a site 
for asserting and shaping identity by women (see, for example, Doy, 2002;  
Erdrich, 2007;  Garb, 2007;  Jones, 2006;  Meskimmon, 1996;  Posner, 1998), 
black artists and sitters and those subject to colonial conquest (Doy, 2002;  
Gabara, 2004; Jones, 2006), and by others who transgress the ‘normative’ 
(Bourguignon, 2000;  Cąkirlar, 2011;  Gutiérrez-Albilla, 2008). The 
implications of this move within portraiture and its potential capacity to be 
both subversive and subverted are discussed further in chapter 6.  
 
3.4.2 The portrait artist  
Running in parallel has been the shift in the social status of the artist, and 
with it control over the image.  As suggested earlier, the development from 
(at least) the 15th Century, of an increased self-consciousness is accompanied 
by the emergence both of the ‘autonomous’ portrait and the (quasi) 
autonomous, professional artist, undertaking commissions from a 
broadening range of sitters (West, 2004).  As a number of commentators note, 
what emerges from the transaction between artist and sitter is a negotiated 
image, reflecting contemporary aesthetic conventions and codes for 
representing ‘likeness’, the artist’s “intentions” and means of expression 
                                                
34 There is a history of portraits of what West (2004) describes as “the unknown and the 
underclass” such as portraits of servants, slaves, the ‘insane’ and ethnographic portraiture.  
For critiques of these representations of ‘otherness’ (West, 2004) see, for example, Best (2011) 
and Pointon (2013) on slave portraiture;  Brilliant (2002 [1991]) and Gabara (2004) on the 
implications of the ethnographic gaze;  and, for examples and commentaries on images of 
madness, Gilman (1982),  Klein (1998),  Kromm (1985, 1987) and Sullivan (1977). 
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(Maynard, 2007), and the sitter’s “individual requirements” (Schneider, 
1994). From the late 19th Century and early 20th Century, accounts suggest a 
significant shift in the balance of power toward the artist and away from the 
sitter.  The early 20th Century is seen as a period when portraiture “broke 
free” (Alarcó and Warner, 2007) from the traditional ‘contract’ between artist 
and sitter. In place of concerns with producing a ‘good likeness’ and with 
mimetic representation, artists used sitters (including from their own social 
circle and families) as ‘motifs’ through which to explore their own psyches or 
formal concerns (West, 2004).  Portraits that are felt to be key in signalling 
this shift are Picasso’s portraits of the author and collector Gertrude Stein 
(1906), and of his dealer, Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler (1910).  The former, with 
its “mask” like face drawing on Iberian art (Brilliant, 2002 [1991];  Giroud, 
2007) was criticised at the time for not looking like Stein.  According to 
Brilliant, however, the image articulates Picasso’s capacity for “Analytical 
verisimilitude…[he] was able to see and paint her as she was and would be” 
(Brilliant, 2002 [1991], p. 152).35  Picasso’s cubist image of his dealer, described 
as “one of the great icons of modernism” (Pointon, 1997), is the point at 
which, according to Brilliant:  
 
“Picasso’s analysis of the formal properties of Cubism took precedence over 
the manifest recognisability of the subject, and the artist’s gaze was clearly 
the focus of representation.” (Brilliant, 2002 [1991], p.152) 
 
This shift arguably pushes the boundaries of what constitutes an image as a 
portrait.  Pointon, for example, suggests that although viewers “struggle” to 
“recognise” Kahnweiler in the image: 
   
“It is not…resemblance or likeness that persuades us that Picasso’s canvas 
represents Kahnweiler…we must depend upon naming, upon 
conventions…and upon the intervention of Kahnweiler’s voice to realise the 
image as portrait.” (Pointon, 1997, p.196)  
 
                                                
35 As Stein herself said:  “for me, it is I, and it is the only reproduction of me which is always I, for 
me.” (quoted in Giroud, 2007, p.30) 
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In other words, the portrait comes to be constituted not (just) by its content, 
but the extra-aesthetic context in which it is located – a theme that will be 
returned to throughout the following chapters.  
 
3.4.3 The artist as portrait 
Self-portraiture has a long history; Hall (2014) for example, begins his 
‘cultural history’ of the sub-genre from the middle ages, but draws attention 
to its foundations in antiquity.  As an art object the self-portrait has served a 
number of functions: a means of advertising the artist’s skill;  of reinforcing 
the artist’s status;  and an opportunity to experiment with form.  In addition, 
it provides artists with an opportunity to explore issues of identity, a means 
for “rendering…the self in and through technology” (Jones, 2006, p. xviii), 
untrammelled by the complexities of the two-person artist-sitter transaction 
(Freeland, 2010).  Freeland (2010) argues that the self-portrait gives artists 
“more freedom to capture both what they see and what they want to project 
about the inner self” (p.156).  Self-portraiture is, therefore, something of a 
special case, in which the artist is both subject and object of the work 
(Cummings, 2009;  Freeland, 2010;  Hall, 2014).   
 
According to Cummings (2009), self-portraiture “remakes” the subject into 
an “indivisible trinity”:  the work of art;  the image of the artist/creator and 
what they believe or sense about themselves;  and how they choose to 
present themselves. This capacity to “render”, explore, and to construct, or 
“self-fashion” an identity in and as a work of art (Cummings, 2009), may be a 
contributory factor in artists use of self-portraiture as a tool to explore their 
psychological states and the complexity of identity and autobiography (West, 
2004).  In particular, as noted above, it has been used to expose and challenge 
the white male hegemonic gaze, including by women, black and gay artists.  
 
As a number of authors have noted, however, for these artists “to produce 
meaning, they must use the dominant codes” even if they use them in 
“alternative ways” (Meskimmon, 1996).  In order for these “alternative 
ways” not to perpetuate the objectification of the subject of the portrait Doy 
(2002) argues that it requires women and black self-portraitists to undertake 
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a “complex negotiation” between “objectifying (making an object through 
labour) and subjectifying (allowing the subject to become visible)” (p.49).  
It also implies that viewers too read these images in “alternative ways”. As 
both Doy (2002) and Gabara (2004) note (and as Barthes (1997 [1968]) argues), 
works are open to different meanings on the part of the (socially and 
historically located) viewer – meanings that may not correspond to the 
artists’ meanings.   
 
The next sub-section explores the “imaginary transaction” (Brilliant, 2002 
[1991]) between the viewer and the portrait/portrayed. 
 
3.4.4 The viewer’s share  
 
“Making portraits is a very purposeful activity;  it is undertaken with the 
viewer in mind...the portraitist always has to keep someone other than the 
subject in mind.” (Brilliant, 2002 [1991], p.40)  
 
“I see another.”  (Sousslof, 2006, p.120) 
 
At the micro level of the production of the art object the foregoing has drawn 
attention to three of the portrait’s transactional or intra- and intersubjective 
dimensions.  First, the subject of the portrait (whether the artist him or her 
self or another ‘sitter’), and their capacity for ‘self-fashioning’, that is to 
attempt to present themselves as they wish to be seen (Berger, 1994; 
Maynard, 2007).  Second, is the role of the artist, drawing on, developing (or 
actively subverting) historical and socially specific conventions and codes or 
‘schema’ of representation (Brilliant, 2002 [1991];  Gombrich, 1980), 
including, the codes which constitute the genre ‘portraiture’. Third, the 
relationship between sitter and artist, including the relations of power that 
may determine or influence whether, and how, the subject is portrayed.  The 
fourth dimension is the viewer of the image, located within a social and 
historical context that will not necessarily (and perhaps rarely) be 
contemporaneous with the context of production.   
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For Nancy (2006), “the portrait is a painting organized around a figure” 
(p.221), there is, however, an argument for saying that, in a number of 
respects the portrait is a painting (or photograph, or sculpture etc.) that is 
(also) organized around an implied ‘spectator’.  The viewer is the putative 
‘beholder’, for whom the ‘sitter’ (and artist) ‘performs’, but they also have a 
constitutive role.  First, the viewer contributes to the ‘recognition’ of the 
image as a ‘portrait’.  Second, by projection or imputation, it is the viewer 
who also contributes to the ‘recognition’ (or denial) of the subject(ivity) of the 
portrayed.  As Sousslof (2006) suggests, the concern with ‘recognition’ (as 
opposed to “absolute identification”) turns the issue of resemblance into a 
matter of viewing, rather than something that resides solely within the 
portrait.  Assumptions of interiority or essence are, as Sousslof (2006) also 
argues, a projection from the viewer, rather than imminent to the portrait.  
While this “beholder’s share” (Gombrich, 1980) may draw on the viewer’s 
own experience, this experience is socially and historically located. This also 
influences the viewer’s capacity for evaluation:  of the portrait qua ‘art’ 
object, of the subject of the portrait and the subjectivity of the portrayed.  As 
is discussed below, particularly in chapter 6, ‘recognition’ of the ‘art’ can be 
accompanied by a ‘misrecognition’ (Honneth, 2004;  Sayer, 2005), or denial of 
the person-hood of the subject of the art.  Thus, for Sousslof (2006), while the 
portrait can be based on an ‘ethics’ dependent on recognition, identification 
and resemblance, it can also generate misrecognition, assimilation and 
illegibility. 
 
3.5 ‘The Face Business’36:  The portrait as product 
To act as a counter to the more abstract accounts of the tension between 
mimesis and essence discussed earlier, Pointon (1993) suggests that while 
acknowledging the “mystery of characterization” in a Gainsborough portrait: 
 
“We should be aware that the conditions in which the artist worked, his 
preoccupations and practical anxieties were often no more directed toward 
character and personality than towards satisfying the more prosaic demands 
of the genre.” (p.47) 
 
                                                
36 Thomas Gainsborough quoted in Gage (1997). 
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This section draws attention to some of the more “prosaic demands” of the 
portrait as a product or commodity.  Focusing first on the functions of the 
portrait, it touches on the different media of production and reproduction 
and practices of circulation and display.   
 
3.5.1 The portrait’s ‘purposes’ 
 
“Aesthetic value – the perceived quality of the portrait as a skilful, inventive 
or beautiful work of art – has only rarely been the primary inspiration in the 
commissioning, display and reception of portraits.” (West, 2004, p.44) 
 
Because of its slippery quality between ‘art’ and document, it is perhaps not 
surprising, as West notes, that the functions of the portrait have tended to 
take precedence over the form. In addition to their (secondary) purpose as 
works of art, portraits have, in fact, had a number of different functions (or 
uses).  At an intimate level the ‘talismanic’ quality of portraits (Schneider, 
1994; West, 2004), their capacity to stand (in) for the person portrayed, to 
make the absent present, has meant that portraits have functioned as, or 
substitutes for, the person.37   Miniatures or paintings of intimates could be 
used as tokens of affection or gifts, or as an exchange between potential 
intimates when, historically, used in marriage negotiations. Simons (1997), 
describing Early Modern images of men, for example, describes how 
‘friendship portraiture’ functioned as a record of male homosocial bonds, 
representing physical closeness and complex links amongst men, including 
between the sitter(s), viewers and artist.  
 
Relatedly, the portrait can also function as a memorial or commemoration, 
“preserving the likeness of men after their deaths’ (Schneider, 1994, 
paraphrasing Dürer), or, in West’s terms, providing both “a trace of a body 
and a stimulus to memory” (2004, p.65).  As noted earlier, it has been 
suggested that the origin of the portrait can be found in funerary imagery, 
including, for example, Ancient Roman wax effigies (Schneider, 1994; West, 
2004). These were subsequently replaced by more durable marble statuary, 
                                                
37 See also section 3.3.3 above. 
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which, according to Pointon (1993), became the root form of depictions of the 
human head. 
  
The less positive face of this substitutive power of the portrait is illustrated 
by the destruction or defacement of the image when an individual falls from 
grace.  This may be in the context of a personal relationship (Pointon, 1997), 
or when the authority of a powerful figure is challenged, for example the 
destruction of statues of political figures or the defacement of hoardings 
(Brilliant, 2002 [1991];  Schneider, 1994). 
 
More problematic is the portrait’s function as biography and document. The 
idea that a portrait can be an effective medium for imparting information 
about an individual’s life was common from at least the 16th Century 
onwards, reflected in the use of portrait illustrations to accompany written 
accounts.  Documentary implies both a contemporaneous account of events 
as evidentiary proof, as well as material subsequently used as historical 
‘data’.  With regard to the former, Schneider (1994) argues that portraits 
painted between the 15th Century and the end of the 17th Century should be 
seen in the context of the development of empiricism.  Their apparent 
“underlying rationalistic impulse” reinforced by the demand for portraits to 
be “true to life and the subjects’ verifiable, criteria…derived from the 
practicalities of ‘rational’ Roman Law” (Schneider, 1994, p.26). One 
manifestation of the use of portraits as historical material might be the 
‘Grangerized’ texts or illustrated histories popular in the 18th Century 
(Pointon, 1993).38  
 
West (2004), however, draws attention to the problematic nature of using 
portraits as documents (contemporary or historical), because, as she notes, 
“the imaginative and interpretive aspects of all portraiture make it resistant 
to documentary reductivism” (West, 2004, p.59).  Freeland (2010) too, in her 
critique of ‘narrative theories of self’ argues that: 
                                                
38 Named after the Rev. James Granger who, in 1769 published a ‘biography’ of England 
illustrated with engraved portraits.  Grangerized (or extra-illustration) texts subsequently 
came to refer to books that included interleaved illustrations inserted from other published 
sources added by the reader or collector (Pointon, 1993). 
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 “There is something different, about what we say in constituting ourselves 
and what we actually do when we go out and show ourselves to others in the 
world.” (p.191, emphases in original) 
 
Assumptions about the ‘documentary’ function of portraiture in effect 
reproduce the tension between portraits as mirrors of an external reality or 
the representation of an ‘ideal’ or essence: or between the facts of an event 
and the meanings or values intended to be conveyed (or read into an image).    
 
At a more ‘public’ level portraits, or collections of portraits function to 
illustrate, reinforce, or constitute a family dynasty or lineage and legitimate 
succession.  They can also serve as objects of inspiration or emulation, such 
as collections of illustrious men (sic), scholars or clerics, for example, or 
(physically) ideal women or ‘beauties’, or as a record of the ‘star quality’ of 
celebrities (West, 2004). Historically, they were also a means for expressing 
power or prestige – a demonstration of the will or claim to power on the part 
of Early Modern ruling princes or, subsequently, the rising bourgeois 
(Schneider, 1994; West, 2004).  
 
As discussed in chapter 7 below, in the 20th and 21st century portraiture has 
been used to (literally) sell celebrity (as in the case example of a record 
cover).  As noted earlier it has also been used (or at least interpreted as being 
used) to expose and subvert the ‘spectacular society’ of post second world 
war Western consumer capitalism, and the “total commodification of the 
image of the subject” (Buchloh 1994, p.63).  
 
3.5.2 (Re-) Production processes 
Although many of the art historical analyses focus on painted or 
photographic portraits, a range of different media have been used for the 
production and reproduction/distribution of portraits. These include, in 
addition to painting, drawing, statuary and photography, prints (including 
caricature and posters), coins and commemorative medals, banknotes and 
stamps, and on objects such as mugs, plates, postcards and other objects 
(West, 2004).  Different media of production have implications for the 
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(ostensible) ‘democratisation’ of portraiture (see, for example, Tagg, 1988).39  
Different media of production also generate different ‘truth claims’, not only 
in terms of the assumed veracity of the image as a ‘likeness’ of, or 
resemblance to, the subject of the portrait, but also the ‘authenticity’ (or aura) 
of the image as ‘art’ (Benjamin (1999 [1936]).  Chapter 7 below explores a 
number of these issue in the context of the use of digital technologies to 
produce and to re-produce images.   
 
Finally, in a manner analogous to Becker’s (1984) account of Art Worlds, 
Pointon (1993) describes the commercial and communal nature of the ‘face 
business’ both in terms of commissioning/selling, but also in the production 
process itself, involving a range of other skills and professions. In the 20th 
Century Andy Warhol’s ‘Factory’, the studio in which he and his assistants 
produced many of his silk-screen prints, is an explicit recognition of the 
communal nature of the production of a ‘Warhol’.  The paradox of the 
factory-like production processes to produce ‘authentic’ or ‘unique’ works is 
also explored in more detail in chapter 7. 
 
Pointon argues that art market conditions are influential on the conventions 
of the genre “contributing to the development of a visual grammar and 
determining our access to the image” (Pointon, 1997, p.194). In addition, as 
part of the ‘restricted field’ of ‘high’ art40 portraiture is also supported by the 
social apparatus of museums, galleries and the academic and educational 
systems (Bourdieu, 2004).   
 
3.5.3 Institutions of display  
According to West (2004), portraits were intended for display, to be seen in 
the “public domain”.  The “times and spaces” of portrayal are themselves, 
                                                
39 Whether and what distinguishes such portraits, or in fact the 21st century equivalent the 
mobile telephone ‘selfie’, as or from ‘art’ clearly raises a number of other issues touched on 
in chapter 2 above.  Brilliant (2002 [1991]), for example, raises some of these problems in his 
description of the requirements of US passport photographs.  Although not specific to 
portraiture, Bourdieu’s (1990b [1965]) discussion of photography as a “middle-brow art” 
may also be relevant here. 
40 Again, notwithstanding the difficulties of the defining characteristics (outwith the social 
processes of consecration) of portraits that are ‘art’ and those which are images of ‘living or 
once living’ named (or potentially so) individuals, but not (consecrated as) art.  
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productive of meanings specific, as Pointon (1993) argues, to “those times 
and spaces” (p.13). Portraits and portrait galleries in aristocratic or 
monarchical ‘spaces’ could, for example, function to constitute dynastic 
lineage, in 18th bourgeois interiors collectively they could function to make 
visible wealth, power and social position (Pointon, 1993; see also Hallett, 
2012, for an account of the commissioning and display of the “Streatham 
Worthies”).  Outwith the ‘private’ spaces of the (aristocratic, monarchical or 
bourgeois) ‘home’, portraits were also displayed in exhibitions and in shop 
windows.  Pointon (1993), for example, describes how, in the 18th century, the 
Royal Academy annual exhibition was dominated by portraits, despite the 
greater significance of history painting in the hierarchy of genres (see 
footnote 13 above).  The ‘times and spaces’ will thus determine the ‘publics’ 
who have access to the images, and whether what is on view is a whole 
collection or individual portraits.  
 
The formation of the National Portrait Gallery (NPG) in 1856 and the Scottish 
National Portrait Gallery (SNPG) in 1889, extended portraiture’s ‘public’ 
while corralling it as a medium to document, frame or constitute a national 
history or identity (Barlow, 1997;  Pointon, 1993;  West, 2004).41 
 
The NPG was initiated, under the impetus of Thomas Carlyle and Lord 
Stanhope, with the aim of exhibiting ‘eminent persons in British history’. 
Initially those portrayed had to have been dead for 10 years42 and to represent 
“persons who are most honourably commemorated in British history as 
warriors or statesmen, or in arts, in literature or in science” (Lord Stanhope 
in his speech to the House of Lords in March 1856, quoted in West, 2004, 
p.48).  It was not the aesthetic qualities of the images that were the criteria for 
inclusion, but the qualities, or worthiness of those represented and the 
‘authenticity’ of the portraits, that is portraits of individuals painted of them 
in their lifetime.  As Barlow (1997) notes, both the criteria of ‘authenticity’ 
and of individual ‘worth’ created problems for the NPG. As discussed in 
                                                
41 The NPG was among, if not the first national portrait gallery.  The American Portrait 
Gallery, for example, was not founded until 1962, opening its doors in 1968. 
(http://www.npg.si.edu/inform/visit.html.  (accessed 12 May 2015). 
42 It was only in the 1960s that portraits of the still living were allowed into the gallery. 
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chapter 7 below, this tension continues into the 21st Century, when, in 2001, a 
number of the NPG trustees expressed doubts about the appropriateness of 
purchasing a set of portraits of the band Blur, produced by the artist Julian 
Opie.  Media reports at the time suggested that the discussion centred on 
whether the band members were sufficiently famous and would pass the test 
of time.   
 
Notwithstanding these tensions, Pointon (1993) notes that what the (State 
sponsored) national gallery created was a “narrative of national progress 
through portraiture”, an ostensibly scientifically verified but selective, or 
approved version of a predominantly English history of progress. 
 
To the present day, contemporary artists continue to produce portraits, as 
evidenced by the annual portrait award (controversially43) sponsored since 
1989 by the petroleum company BP (who took over the sponsorship of the 
exhibition from the tobacco company John Player & Sons). ‘Blockbuster’ 
exhibitions either of, or including portraits continue to be held by UK 
museums (including, but extending beyond the National Portrait Galleries).  
At the same time there is a continuous stream of art historical publications 
exploring the genre (see for, example, Cummings, 2009;  Freeland, 2010;  
Hall, 2014;  Pointon, 2013;  Schama, 2015).  This suggests not only the genre’s 
on-going process of construction, but also, the continued engagement with 
the portrait – in other words, it still ‘sells’.  
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has described the historical evolution of the portrait and of 
portraiture in the Western European context, and drawn attention to some of 
                                                
43 In Autumn 2014 for example, protests were being held in London against BP’s sponsorship 




Although touched on here, and particularly in chapter 7, the changing nature of patronage 
in the context of this genre and the role of industry and business as commissioners of 
portraits and as sponsors of portraiture exhibitions (and the potentially mutually reinforcing 
ideological functions this serves) is a further area for a more broadly based sociology of 
portraiture to consider. 
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the provocations and paradoxes of the ‘genre’. It has, for example, 
underlined the portrait’s ambiguous position between a document, a 
representation of a ‘living or once living’ human subject, and an art object, 
articulating aesthetic codes and conventions.  Further, this chapter has 
described how the two defining characteristics of the portrait: its assumed 
relatedness to an external referent and the ‘likeness’ or ‘resemblance’ it is 
intended to capture, are fluid and contested. The portrait has, for example, 
played into the complex relationship between the ‘real’ and the perceived, 
including self-perception.  At the same time the concept of ‘likeness’ slips 
and slides between capturing physical resemblance and ‘inner essence’.  In 
the 20th and 21st century these parameters have been put under increasing 
pressure in the face of the shifting theories and politics of identity and 
subjectivity.   
 
As this implies, the portrait and portraiture are fundamentally transactional, 
and mediated by relations of power at every stage.   This transaction occurs 
at the micro level of the relationship between socially and historically located 
artist and sitter. It also occurs between art object/subject of the art object and 
a socially and historically located ‘viewer’, for whom artist and sitter 
‘perform’, but who also has a constitutive role in terms of both the object – as 
‘art’ and as ‘portrait’- and the subject portrayed. At the ‘macro’ level the 
portrait is a product, produced collectively and circulating and reproduced 
in a field of cultural production.  What perhaps makes the portrait distinct is 
that among the institutions of display are National Portrait Galleries which 
serve not (just) to consecrate the works as ‘art’ but, arguably, to consecrate a 
specific national identity.   
 
The portrait as object and portraiture as a system and process are thus, as 
suggested at the beginning of this chapter, a “politically invested genre” (van 
Alphen, 1997) and one which, as Buchloh (1998) argues, encompasses both 
the “pictorial and the epistemic” as well as the ontological.  As such, the 
portrait should offer itself for and contribute to sociological investigation.  
This implies an analysis at the level of the art object “in itself” (Becker, 2006) 
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and its location and circulation within the field of cultural production. The 
next chapter outlines the methods adopted here to begin such an exploration. 
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4. Taking a line for a walk:  outlines of a method 
4.1 Introduction:  A betwixt and between-ness 
Chapter 2 set out some of the dimensions of, and debates within, the 
sociology of art(s). In particular, attention was drawn to the ambiguous place 
of the art object within the sociological field of vision. In very crude terms 
two broad approaches have been adopted within the sub-discipline.  One 
approach has been to analyse the institutional processes by which art objects 
are produced – both in the sense of physically produced, distributed, 
consumed/received and interpreted but also politically and discursively 
produced and productive.  Less attention is given to the art object in and of 
itself, and its own potential ‘productivity’. A second approach has been to 
undertake detailed analysis of the art object but with a view to illustrating or 
revealing some (pre-determined) extra-aesthetic dimension such as socio-
economic relations or changing conceptualisations of subjectivity.  As also 
noted in chapter 2, there have been calls for a move toward some form of 
‘synthesis’; one allowing for an analysis of the work’s sensuous properties 
and capacity to generate meanings and a shared evaluative engagement, 
combined with sociological understanding, analysis and critique of the social 
and political processes which impact upon the “creation, distribution and 
appreciation of artworks” (Inglis, 2005a, p.19). One of the questions this 
raises is how to apply this ‘synthesis’ empirically in relation to individual art 
objects.  
 
It was suggested earlier that one response might be to develop an analytical 
method that was both centrifugal and centripetal. That is, a method that both 
works out from the art object, with a consideration of its material properties 
and generative capacities, to the wider social context of its production, 
distribution/circulation, reception/consumption including evaluation and 
interpretation, and centripetally from this wider social context back to the art 
object.   
 
The following sets out the attempt to develop and apply such an approach 
(albeit not a fully worked out ‘methodology’). The aim is to describe and 
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respond to the art object (qua object) and its sensuous properties of colour, 
shape, internal form and content, and in a way that acknowledges its 
capacity to provoke or generate affordances (Gibson, 1986 [1979]), 
recognising that these would change over time, space and the locatedness of 
the ‘viewer’/’spectator’.  But also doing so in a way that respects disciplinary 
boundaries by avoiding unwarranted evaluative judgements as to the 
‘quality’ of the object.  Running in parallel is an analysis that locates the 
object within the field of cultural production, including the processes by 
which the object becomes consecrated (Bourdieu (2004) (or is disavowed) as 
art.    
 
The additional component for the purposes of the thesis is the use of 
portraiture as a medium to explore the potential for such a ‘synthesis’.  As 
already alluded to, the choice of this genre was initially contingent – a result 
of my own shifting concerns from ‘madness’ to ‘art’.  But, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, this genre proved particularly fruitful because of its own 
complexities and paradoxes; its own centrifugal and centripetal forces: 
 
“[The portrait] represents specific, existent subjects whose significance 
normally lies in their place in the extra-artistic world…At the same time, it is 
a self-contained work of art, valued even when its subject can no longer be 
identified.” (Steiner, 1987, p.173) 
 
Thus the portrait and portraiture necessitate consideration not just of the 
‘politics’ of the processes of consecration of the art object but also the politics 
of normative evaluation of the subject portrayed.   
 
The method therefore aims to encompass a way of capturing and analysing 
three dynamics and their interplay: the visual image; the subject(ivity) 
portrayed in and through the image; and the image’s trajectory as an ‘art’ 
object in and through the field of cultural production. 
 
One of the difficulties this presents is that it positions the study between a 
number of disciplinary, theoretical and, by extension, methodological stools. 
The aspiration to focus both at the micro-level of the visual image and its 
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location and constitution within ‘macro-level’ social structures and processes 
(Inglis, 2005a), mean that in disciplinary terms the thesis comes somewhere 
between visual studies/visual sociology and the sociology of arts, and 
between the sociology of arts and (new) art history, as well as (as intimated 
in chapter 2), between cultural sociology and the sociology of culture(s).   
 
In other words it is not necessarily about achieving ‘synthesis’ but working 
in a space of ‘between-ness’ (Blau, 2001).  First, it is concerned with the visual 
image as both a potential ‘end in itself’, its capacity to be “experienced as [a] 
value-relevant source[s] of sensuous knowledge” (Harrington, 2004, p.207), 
(albeit that this is itself socially and historically specific), and for what it 
contributes to an understanding of the specifically social processes within 
which it is located, constituted (and potentially constituting) and generative 
of ‘meanings’.  Second, by focusing specifically on the body of images which 
come to be constituted as ‘art’, it calls for, on the one hand, a consideration of 
the qualities of form, colour, content, proportion etc., or what Rose (2003) 
summarises as ‘compositional interpretation’ associated with art historical 
‘connoisseurship’.  On the other hand, is the parallel need to critically 
understand the ‘social [and historical] genesis’ (Bourdieu, 2005 [1992]) of the 
‘good eye’, that is the structure and operation of the field of cultural 
production within which art and artists are ‘consecrated’.  Finally, as images 
of ‘people’, the study implies some consideration of the relationship between 
the visual image/art object and subjectivity. In response to this ‘between-
ness’ a more exploratory methodological approach is called for: one that does 
not easily fit into the more ‘orthodox’ accounts of social research processes 
setting out the ‘research design’, sampling frame, data collection and 
analytical framework (see for example, Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). 
 
4.2 Taking a line for a walk: outline of a method 
The artist Paul Klee described drawing as:  
 
 104 
“ [taking] An active line on a walk, moving freely without a goal.  A walk for 
a walk’s sake.” 44  
  
While more purposive than Klee’s description of drawing, in the absence of a 
methodological ‘road map’ or ‘toolkit’, the approach adopted here has 
elements of this sense of exploration and responsiveness – it is iterative, 
rather than rigidly pre-determined in advance. This, it is argued, is not to 
deny or ignore the need for rigour, transparency and reflexivity, but to be 
open to seeing, reading and ‘listening’ to the images:  an active subject and 
an active object, taking a line for a walk. 
 
4.2.1 Mapping out a direction of travel 
A number of analysts have sought to map out a multi-dimensional approach 
as a way of grasping the complexity of the art or cultural object.  As 
discussed in chapter 2, Born (2010), for example, sets out five themes 
underpinning her principles for a sociology of art that, she argues will offer 
“a non-reductive account of the aesthetic in theorising cultural production” 
(p.172).  Griswold (1987), within a broader based sociology of culture 
approach, argues that to be “complete and persuasive”, cultural analysis 
needs to include four key elements:  the intentions of creative agents (the 
socially determined constraints and influences which shape the cultural 
outputs); the reception of cultural objects, including over time;  the analyst’s 
comprehension of the “internal structures, patterns, and symbolic carrying 
capacities of the cultural objects” (p.5); and explanation, the connections the 
analyst makes between cultural objects and the external world, mediated by 
an understanding of reception and intention.  While the approach developed 
for the current study contains elements of both of these ‘frameworks’ or 
‘principles’, a more pragmatic approach has been adopted one that it is felt is 
more suited to the exploratory nature of the thesis.  This draws broadly on 
the work of Corse and Griffin (1997), which although based on an analysis of 
a literary work, combines multi-dimensionality with comparative simplicity.   
 
                                                
44 http://www.art-quotes.com/auth_search.php?authid=57#.Vae6ZkXq2nc (accessed 16 July 
2015). 
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In their analysis of the changing status of the novel Their Eyes Were Watching 
God by Zora Neale Hurston, Corse and Griffin (1997) attempt to develop a 
framework for understanding the valuation of art objects in ways that take 
the objects seriously in themselves as well as their place in the social world.  
Arguing that “a complete understanding of cultural valorization requires 
attention to both context and content” (p.199), they describe three processes 
at play in canon formation and cultural valorization:  evaluative criteria;  
interpretive strategies;  and the institutional and organizational environment.  
From their account of the changing fortunes of the novel Corse and Griffin 
reveal the social and historical fluidity of these processes over time and 
space. Although their analysis still suggests an object buffeted by social and 
political determinations, rather than having its own ‘affordances’, their 
attempt to link context (the social and institutional environment) and the text 
as ‘read’ (the evaluative criteria and interpretive strategies adopted by the 
book’s “reviewers”), is felt to provide a productive starting point for the 
approach attempted here.  
 
Following the example of Corse and Griffin, the thesis takes a case study 
approach, using qualitative methods (primarily textual analysis of visual and 
documentary material). This allows for an iterative exploration of a small 
number of images, the subjectivities constituted in and through the images, 
and the complex relationships between the images and the social and 
historical contexts in and through which they are produced and productive.   
 
This approach was initially ‘piloted’ in relation to two portraits (not 
reproduced here), one by the early 20th century painter Henri Matisse of his 
wife (The woman with the hat (1905)), and a self-portrait painted in the late 20th 
Century by the artist Jenny Saville (Reverse (2002-03)).45  Building on the 
learning from the pilot analysis each of three case studies discussed here 
broadly comprises, first, a description of the conceptual ‘frame’ which 
informed the context of and for selecting the case study images.   Second, an 
account is given of each case study image’s colour, form and content, 
                                                
45 The analysis was included in an unpublished paper:  “Face value:  Toward a new sociology 
of the arts and its objects”, produced as the end of first year report in October 2008. 
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drawing both on my own reading (as analyst), but also informed by 
published accounts. The aim of this stage was to draw out each image’s 
‘internal narrative’, but also their ‘affordances’.  Third, the analysis describes 
the contemporaneous and subsequent evaluative criteria by which the 
properties of the images have been assessed and the ‘textual meaning’ 
attached, including drawing on artists’ own accounts, where available, 
indicating the values or qualities and meanings which they perceive in their 
work.  Importantly this included not just an account of evaluations of the 
image, but of the imaged, drawing attention to issues of subjectivity and the 
power to control one’s (re)presentation of self.  Fourth, to consider the 
institutional and organisational infrastructure within which the images and 
their evaluation are produced (and re-produced) circulated, received or 
consumed and appraised. 
 
In the spirit of taking a line for a walk, this overall structure has been 
interpreted flexibly to reflect and respond to issues that emerged in relation 
to each of the case study portraits – issues which, as the next section 
describes, were generated by the images rather than necessarily anticipated 
in advance. 
 
4.2.2 Selecting the images 
Two dimensions (if not explicit ‘criteria’) have informed the selection of 
images for in-depth analysis. Both dimensions combine, in their own way, an 
element of ‘chance’, if not ‘randomisation’, as well as a subjective element 
which undoubtedly informed the ‘coming to consciousness’ or ‘given to be 
seen-ness’ of specific images.  
 
The first dimension is the conceptual ‘frame’46 for each case study. Although a 
central concern of the thesis is with giving the art object its own space, 
allowing the work a generative capacity, there is a pragmatic need to 
                                                
46 The term ‘frame’ is not used here in Goffman’s (1986 [1974]) sense of “frameworks of 
understanding” or ways for organizing experience, but more in the spatial sense, of marking 
out a particular conceptual space in which to consider the images. As also with ‘frameworks 
of understanding’, however, different concepts could undoubtedly have been used to 
provide the prism through which to view the same images. 
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construct initial boundaries to the analysis.   These ‘frames’, however, were 
not pre-determined in advance of the thesis, nor were the images selected to 
reinforce or critique the particular framing concepts, though this may have 
emerged in the course of consideration of the particular images. The frames 
do though have a degree of social theoretic salience, as well as salience to 
portraiture.  This allows for a back and forth between what the images offer 
the ‘frames’, and what the ‘frames’ offer the images. 
 
For chapter 5 the conceptual frame is the ostensible ‘death’ of the subject 
(Foucault 1991a [1969]), but also Barthes’ (2000 [1980]) analysis of “punctum” 
and “studium”. This arose primarily out of preliminary social theoretic 
reading but also a parallel reading of the literature around portraiture, and 
particularly (as outlined in chapter 3), the apparent ‘vacating of subjectivity’ 
(Buchloh, 1998;  van Alphen, 1997) read into portraiture of the late 20th 
Century.  It gains added piquancy when it emerged that the artist, Francesca 
Woodman, whose works are discussed in this chapter, had committed 
suicide in her early 20s.   
 
Chapter 6 is a response to the concept of the ‘abject’, outlined in Kristeva’s 
(1982) discussion of the Powers of Horror.  This particular ‘frame’ emerged 
from a chance remark by one of the thesis supervisors in response to a 
Woodman image.  This provoked an exploration of the concept, and a 
consideration of how it could be used to understand portraits that might 
represent “abject subject matter” (Ben-Levi et al, 1993) or be read as 
transgressive in some way, such as in the work of Gilbert and George and 
Roger Ballen’s photography. This analysis unexpectedly opened on to a 
consideration of apartheid and the position of ‘poor whites’ in South Africa.   
 
Questions of ‘authenticity’ and ‘aura’ (Benjamin, 1999 [1936]) which frame 
the third case study discussed in chapter 7 - Julian Opie’s image of the band 
Blur - arose from an interest in considering the implications of digital 
production and reproduction on both art, and on the ‘aura’ and ‘authenticity’ 
of the subject of the art.  Secondarily, it was also a personal response to the 
‘dark’ atmosphere of the ‘abject’ case study.  It was felt that there was scope 
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for the inclusion of a (subjectively, materially and substantively) ‘lighter’ 
image, but one that still allowed the exploration of significant themes.   This 
too had its unexpected affordances, exposing the role of institutions, such as 
the National Portrait Gallery in London, in conferring ‘authenticity’ not just 
on images but on the subjects in the images – an exposé wholly 
unanticipated when the image was chosen for inclusion. 
 
The selection of the specific images again combines a degree of ‘chance’ and 
subjective remembering:  a postcard, for example, seen in an office (Opie’s 
image of Blur), or an exhibition attended (Woodman), or the recall of an 
image, albeit mis-remembered (Ballen’s image of Dresie and Casie in chapter 
6). 47 
 
Although not determined at the outset, the selection of images provides the 
opportunity for some within-case study comparison.  In chapter 5 two self-
portraits by Francesca Woodman are discussed and compared.  The double 
self-portrait by the artists Gilbert and George and the double portrait of the 
twins Dresie and Casie by Roger Ballen in chapter 6 provide a way of 
comparing portraits which, in different ways, are potentially ‘transgressive’.  
The detailed reading of the portraits in the course of the case study reveals 
some of their similarities as well as their differences.  The final case study, 
detailed in chapter 7, focuses on one image comprised of four portraits – one 
for each of the members of the band Blur.  This provides a within-image 
comparison. 
 
All of the images have been institutionally consecrated as ‘art’ works.  This of 
course immediately begs the question, alluded to in chapter 2, about the 
processes that constitute works as ‘art’. Arguably, the selection of these 
works serves to reproduce these processes of institutional consecration.  It is 
hoped, however, that by exploring responses to the works that these 
processes are exposed, allowing them to be subject to critique. 
                                                
47 As discussed in chapter 6, I initially believed that the image of the twins Dresie and Casie 
was by the American photographer Diane Arbus who was active in the 1950’s and 1960’s. It 
was only further investigation that revealed its ‘back story’ as an image by Roger Ballen 
made in South Africa in the 1990’s. 
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They were also all produced in the latter half 20th Century and all draw on 
photography at some stage in their production.  The selection of images from 
the late 20th Century was primarily a practical decision;  it circumscribed, to a 
degree, the historical context and allowed engagement with comparatively 
contemporary theoretical concerns – concerns that have their parallels in 
portraiture  (see chapter 3).  
 
The focus on photography or photographic portraits was also emergent 
rather than purposive.  It may, however, reflect the ubiquity of the medium 
for contemporary representational (and even non-representational) art.  As 
discussed both in chapter 3, and in the relevant case studies, photography 
generates its own ‘regimes of truth’ (Hand, 2012;  Tagg, 1988). This may limit 
the generalizability of aspects of the discussion to portraits (or art works) in 
other media.  However, it should be noted that the analytical framework was 
developed around two ‘pilot’ images (referred to earlier) both of which were 
paintings in oils. This may suggest that the framework, if not the discussion 
of particular images may have wider applicability.  
 
4.2.3 Reading the images 
As discussed in chapter 2, there have been attempts within sociology to focus 
on the art object, but the tendency has been to view them as embodying or 
illustrative of wider social processes (see for example, Smith and Jenks 2000, 
2006;  Witkin, 1995, 1997).  Zolberg (1997), describes a number of studies 
focusing on particular art objects or genres which, while useful in pointing 
up aspects of social process or their role in social symbolism, do not address 
the art or cultural object for its own sake - attention remains on context rather 
than text.  Wolff’s (2008) analysis of the appraisal of 20th Century English art 
similarly tends to focus on the discourse about the images, on the social 
context of critiques, rather than the object itself.  “Visual methodologies” 
(Rose, 2003) which do provide a structure for “interpreting” visual images, 
such as semiotics, for example, psychoanalysis and discourse analysis, are 
also, arguably, albeit in different ways concerned with ways of drawing 
attention to, understanding or explaining something beyond (though 
produced by and through) the image:  signifying practices, desire, the male 
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gaze, the production of subjects/subjectivity (Chaplin, 1994;  Rose, 2003).  
Blau (2001) who does make an attempt to combine an understanding of the 
institutional context of art with an analysis of the artwork, qua artwork, 
nonetheless does not provide a systematic method for talking about the 
images. 
 
The focus in the thesis on the portrait, the portrayed and the social processes 
of production, circulation and reception also (again) suggests the need for a 
degree of methodological eclecticism for ‘reading’ the image. Thus, the 
descriptions of the individual images draws on art historical considerations 
of colour, form, shape and content.  In addition, although not a systematic 
analysis of the images as signs, reference is made to the indexical nature of 
portraiture, but also, from Barthes (2000 [1980]), the concepts of ‘studium’ 
and ‘punctum’ (see chapter 5).  The discursive function of images in 
producing or constituting subjectivities (of the subject in the image and 
through the positioning of the viewer) is touched upon throughout the case 
studies. Psychoanalytic accounts inform the conceptual frame of the abject, 
but the ‘gaze’ of the Other from Mulvey, (1975) and Lacan (1981 [1964]), also 
play out across the analysis.  Berger’s (1972) early work on Ways of Seeing 
provides a way of thinking through the ways in which images achieve 
“ideological” effects.  Bourdieu’s (2004) analysis of the field of cultural 
production, while not a ‘method’ as such, provides the prism through which 
to understand the constitution of images and creators as ‘art’ and ‘artists’.   
 
There is undoubtedly a risk that with methodological eclecticism comes 
theoretical incommensurability (for example, drawing on art historical 
discourses to analyse the individual art object, while also wanting to 
critically examine the implication of these discourses for ‘producing’ the 
work as an ‘art’ object).  Yet, it is argued, one of the areas that the study set 
out to explore was whether and how, it was possible to look to produce a 
coherent account for all the ‘work’ that images do at the ‘micro’ level and at 
the macro level.  The case studies are that line being taken for a walk. 
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In addition to problems of theory and method, there is, also the problem of 
presenting the description of an image in words. Barthes describes this as the 
“uneasiness of being a subject torn between two languages, one expressive 
and the other critical” (Barthes 2000 [1980], p.8).  This is perhaps unavoidable 
given the medium of presentation - a thesis is about words and argument, 
but the need to ‘talk’ about the images perhaps risks obscuring the images 
themselves.  It is hoped that by including images within the text, not as 
“objective evidence”, as commentary on others’ use of text and image, or as a 
“new literary form” (Chaplin, 1994), but as sensuous objects and domains of 
knowledge in their own right (at least to a degree), the artworks are enabled 
to exercise their own (partial) ‘agency’.  
 
The images themselves have been downloaded from the internet for 
inclusion in the thesis (and in the process changed in size and scale).  The 
implications of reproduction processes on the ‘aura’ and ‘authenticity’ of 
artworks is discussed in more detail in chapter 7.  It is, however, the case that 
the very method used is both a means for examining the issues and an 
example of the very issues requiring examination. 
 
4.2.4 Seeing the wider landscape 
Extending the prism from the image to the ‘wider landscape’ through which 
the line travels (to extend the metaphor), involved the analysis of a range of 
documentary material. This includes sociological material to inform an 
understanding of the discipline’s engagement with ‘art’ (discussed in chapter 
2) and to inform the conceptual framing for each study.  In addition the 
project draws on art historical theory and analysis, both in general, in 
relation to portraiture as a genre, and in relation to particular 
artists/artworks.  For the analysis of individual works the data sources 
extend to what, in other contexts, would be called ‘grey literature’. This is 
material not published in peer reviewed contexts (‘academic’ journals, books 
etc.), but includes, for example, newspaper art criticism or reviews of 
exhibitions, commentaries by individuals on their own or ‘non-academic’ 
webpages, ‘blogs’, as well as artists’ own websites.  Falling between the two 
might be ‘popular’ histories of, for example ‘Brit pop’, discussed in chapter 7.  
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The range of material was identified from citations in the literature, ‘Google’ 
searches, LexisNexis and Factiva newspaper searches, links in exhibition 
reviews or guides, and other sources driven by the particular image under 
consideration. The analysis of the documentary material comprises primarily 
broad brush ‘content analysis’ to identify ‘themes’ across and within the 
material. 
 
Some of the images, particularly those by Gilbert and George (chapter 6) and 
Julian Opie (chapter 7), generated a considerable amount of material. In part 
this is illustrative of the very consecration processes the study was also 
seeking to document, particularly when the image itself, as in the portrait of 
the band Blur, discussed in chapter 7, is problematically poised between ‘art’ 
and ‘pop’.  The documentary material, however, also raises three linked 
methodological issues.  First, it begs questions about who and what gets 
written about and in what fora, and who is excluded from the record. In the 
case of Opie, for example a lot of newspaper articles have the air of product 
placement – generated at times of exhibitions of his work.  While, on the one 
hand there is a practical need for accessible documentary sources, this does 
raise the problem that the absence or presence of commentary cannot be 
taken as a sign for the absence or presence of value, but may be a sign of 
differential power in the process of evaluation and access to media for 
dissemination. Second, and relatedly, as Bird (1979) suggests, the readiness 
of documentary sources reflects contemporary aesthetic discourses and 
judgments and should therefore be treated both as a resource and critiqued 
as a discourse. That is, it is necessary to use the material as a topic in itself to 
be examined critically, but also a resource to be ‘mined’.  Where possible, the 
material drawn on here has been used as a resource primarily for descriptive 
purposes, but approached more critically when used to understand the 
context for the reception of a particular image. 
 
The third issue this opens on to is how to assess or adjudicate the quality of 
the documentary material – particularly in relation to what was described 
above as ‘grey literature’. Indirectly this again points up the ‘between-ness’ 
of the thesis. The criteria of a systematic review where attempts are made to 
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appraise the methodological rigour informing a particular conclusion or 
finding, do not ‘fit’ in the context of the appraisal of art works, and yet, to 
understand the social processes of evaluation and consecration, this suggests 
the need to understand the ‘position’ of the ‘speaker’.  Where possible an 
attempt is made to identify this positioning, but the ‘greyer’ the source, such 
as blogs, the more difficult this becomes.  
 
A further source of material has been the art exhibitions attended in the 
course of undertaking the research, which, even if not directly related to the 
subject matter, have helped to stimulate questions or add to an 
understanding of context.  Outwith this direct contact with art objects the 
study did not involve interviews (e.g. with artists, or art critics), surveys (e.g. 
of museum or exhibition attendance) or other ‘fieldwork’.  
 
4.3 Dilemmas and limitations  
4.3.1 Omissions and commissions 
A number of the images selected raised ethical issues.  In particular Roger 
Ballen’s image of Dresie and Casie, reproduced in chapter 6.  As discussed in 
that context, the production and reproduction of images of others raises 
specific questions of the power to control the construction and distribution of 
self-identity.  There is a risk that by reproducing images where this self-
presentation and authorising cannot be assumed, this reinforces or generates 
processes of ‘misrecognition’.  In a different vein, but also raising admittedly 
unresolved ethical issues, is the reproduction and analysis of the work of 
Francesca Woodman (see chapter 5), and the risk of exploiting (or 
perpetuating the exploitation of) her image beyond her death.   These ethical 
issues may be particularly pertinent in the context of analyses of portraiture 
(as opposed to, for example, landscape, or abstract art), with their ostensible 
connectedness to a ‘living or once living person’.  But it does raise the 
uncomfortable question when does ‘regarding the pain of others’ (Sontag, 
2004), slip from one of “witnessing” to one of objectification (Nussbaum, 
1995) and a “gaze of mastery” (Young, 2005)? 
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As well as an ethics of commission the thesis raises an ethics of omission.  
None of the portraits in the final selection is by or of black artists or subjects.  
This is recognised as a significant limitation of the thesis. As suggested in 
chapter 3 the power relations at play across each of the different dimensions 
of concern to the study in terms of the image, the subject in and of the image 
and the position of the art and artist in the field of cultural production, have, 
historically worked to exclude, negate or render as ‘other’ (the subject and 
the work) of black artists and the representation of black subjects.  Any 
subsequent extension of the thesis would seek to critically examine, in the 
context of portraiture, the ‘racialized regime of representation’ (Hall, 2003 
[1997]).  
 
4.3.2 The researcher’s gaze 
 
“It is possible to investigate inanimate objects…the exercise of power is not 
necessarily absent in relations between the researcher and their treatment of 
the objects, but the situation is more complex when the researcher enters into 
a social relationship with a research subject.” (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 
2002, p.156) 
 
The theme throughout this discussion has been the difficulty of achieving 
‘methodological rigour’, where the objects of inquiry are individual 
artworks, and where implicit, if not explicit aesthetic and subjective 
judgements are being made at every stage.  Thus, aesthetic judgements 
inform institutional definitions of what constitutes ‘art’ and who is defined 
as an ‘artist’ (as well as differential access to the means for art production), 
the availability and nature of the commentary on the works and the 
accessibility of works. In the context of portraiture power relations play out 
also in who is portrayed (and how).  In addition, subjectivity or the analyst’s 
own ‘positioning’ informs the fundamental questions asked, the selection of 
works and the means for analysing the images.   
 
Notwithstanding the ostensibly less complex relationship between the 
researcher and the inanimate object, posited by Ramazanoglu and Holland, 
(2002), there is an argument for saying that the researcher’s own position, 
values, their subjectivity, have an even more intense role in the research 
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process. At every turn my own position, and, in effect, exercise of authorial 
‘power’ intrudes;  into the choice of subject matter (why ‘art’ and not 
madness), the selection of images, my own far from ‘pure’ gaze, the 
interpretations of the subjects in the image.  Thus, while seeking to avoid the 
“god trick” (Haraway, 1988), the ‘view from nowhere’, the illusion of 
‘objectivity’, it is also important to acknowledge the imposition or intrusion 
of my own “situated knowledges”. That is, as a social researcher who 
struggles with the ‘in-between-ness’, of seeking methodological rigour in a 
context in which the normal ‘rules’ of social research do not apply – a 
struggle perhaps reflected in the straining for an appropriate metaphor to 
describe, but also render transparent (and hence open to critique) the process 
undertaken (a ‘synthesis’, ‘between-ness’, ‘a line taking a walk’). But also as a 
late middle-age, (lower) middle-class female, neither artist, nor art historian, 
for whom ‘art’ as presented in the context of an English secondary modern 
school education was primarily a practical activity and one that felt closed 
off to me (lacking the requisite ‘habitus’?)).   
 
Arguably the breaching of the normal ‘rules’ of social research is a limitation 
of the study.  But it is also a ‘finding’ in the sense of demonstrating the 
specificities of the field and the disciplinary challenges this poses.  It 
demonstrates in its very process the complexity of ‘synthesising’ “value-
distanciating” social analysis and “value affirming aesthetic appraisal” 
(Harrington, 2004).  No claims can be made to have overcome this in the case 
studies, but, what the approach described does seek to achieve is a degree of 
transparency, and in this way to open the thesis to intersubjective and 
disciplinary criticism and validation (or refutation): to open up the potential 





5. The constant re-appearance of the disappearing self 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Finding Woodman 
The first image by, and of, Francesca Woodman that I was aware of seeing 
was while visiting the Naked Portrait exhibition, held in Edinburgh in 2007.48  
Figure 1 is the image I recall, one of a series by Woodman called Self-deceit. I 
came across the image again in 2009 when it was used to advertise an 







                                                
48 Scottish National Portrait Gallery, Edinburgh, 6 June – 1 September 2007. 
49 Ingleby Gallery, Edinburgh, 4 April – 13 June 2009.  
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While I cannot recall the detail of the label accompanying the image shown 
at the Naked Portrait exhibition, the published catalogue captures the essence 
of the text: 
 
“In a forbiddingly bare interior, with pock-marked walls, Woodman’s naked 
form interacts with a roughly shaped piece of mirror.  She crawls on the floor, 
turning away from us…The pictures distil some urge to self-effacement to 
retreat from an oppressive world of social interactions into a private 
melancholy sphere, in which the self is stripped bare. Such readings are 
facilitated by our knowledge of Woodman’s youth…and the fact that she 
killed herself at the age of twenty-one (sic), suggesting (we presume) some 
complex history of depression and self-doubt.” (Hammer, 2007, p.96) 
 
It was this apparent ‘self-effacement’ and desire to hide, the physical 
vulnerability of her body, the later knowledge (from a subsequent reading of 
the catalogue) that she committed suicide at age 22, coupled with the 
nostalgic quality that flows from black and white photography, that seemed, 
on subsequent looking, to give the image its emotive power. In other words 
it was a combination of the content, form and biography that informed the 
image’s ‘aesthetic’ impact.  
 
In the context of the questions posed in chapter 2, and specifically how to 
empirically address images in ways that retain an appropriate balance 
between consideration of the art object’s own affordances and critical 
analysis of the social practices and institutions of art production, distribution 
and consumption, this image raised a number of compelling questions.  First, 
on the one hand, how to comprehend its power as an image, and the 
potential for this emotive, sensuous and/or intellectual ‘power’ to be shared 
or “intersubjectively defensible” (Harrington, 2004, p.201), albeit not 
'universally’.  And, on the other hand, to also retain a critical understanding 
of the social processes by which the image and the subject of the image are 
framed, constituted and evaluated.  
 
Second, and relatedly, why did attempts at an answer keep revolving around 
the potential for the image to provoke a recognition of subjectivity or 
selfhood, an answer that seemed to run wilfully against the theoretical 
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critique of a unitary, essentialist ‘subject’. That is, notwithstanding 
arguments for the concept of the ‘subject’ (and ‘artist’) as an effect of power 
(Foucault, 1991a [1969]), and whose ‘death’ was long overdue, what the 
image seemed to conjure up was a sense of ‘thereness’ (Jones, 2006), not just 
of a physical, bodily exterior but an ‘interior’ ‘self’ that was neither entirely 
unitary and self constituting nor wholly fragmented and discursively 
constituted.   
 
Two conceptual ‘frames’ were drawn upon to explore these issues in relation 
to two of Woodman’s photographs.  First, as (ostensible) self-portraits the 
images provided an opportunity to consider arguments for the ‘death’ of the 
subject (as ‘a’ self, and as an ‘author’/artist).  Second, as visual images, 
consideration was given to Barthes’ (2000 [1980]) concept of the ‘punctum’ as 
a way to think about what their sensuous properties might provoke within a 
viewing ‘subject’ or subject(s), without necessarily engaging in qualitative 
judgements.  While acknowledging the potential incommensurability of 
these two framing devices, the aim here is to examine these images with a 
view to understanding how even as the notion of single, unified, ‘subject’, is 
dismantled, there is a constant re-appearance, in a different guise, 
theoretically and representationally of a something, a ‘thereness’, in Jones’ 
(2006) term, that is, a continued sense of a self or selfhood, which is 
perceived as comprehensible, recognisable (and hence shared), 
notwithstanding its mutability.  Further, it is suggested that this desire or 
yearning to recognize (and an awareness, on the part of the artist of that 
desire) that precisely gives these images their ‘punctum’ (Barthes, 2000 
[1980]), and may be implicated in the evaluation of both the image and the 
imaged.  
 
The following sections will briefly sketch out the two conceptual frames, 
before focusing on the two images, to consider what these frames afford to a 
‘reading’ of the images, but also, importantly, the images’ own supplement 
to these frames.  This is followed by an account of the evaluative context.   
The institutional consecration of Woodman’s work in general is then 
explored, before drawing together some of the emerging themes.  Before 
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moving on, however, there is a value in momentarily reflecting on some of 
the contingencies of time that informed and structured the analysis. 
 
5.1.2 Protentions and Retentions 
 
“The past is always experienced through a retention of previous events – a 
construct of the present – just as the future is experienced as a protention of 
possible eventualities – also a present construct. Both constructs, of past and 
future, alter dynamically as the present evolves through the shifting relations 
between prehending subject and prehended object.” (Born, 2010, pp.183–
184) 
Born (2010) draws attention to the “multiple temporalities that subtend 
cultural objects” (p.195).  In the context of the thesis among these “multiple 
temporalities” should be included the time period it took between starting 
the main study and its completion.  Over this time period not only did the 
analytic approach take firmer shape, but the process of canonisation (or de-
sacralization) of the cultural objects discussed continued.  This was most 
evident in relation to the works considered in this first case study.  The initial 
analysis (undertaken 2009 – 2010), helped to inform the structure of the 
subsequent two case studies (another means by which art objects can 
generate affordances), but the sacralisation of the artist, Francesca Woodman, 
whose work is the focus of this chapter, also gathered pace changing 
direction and emphases over time.  Returning to this case study in 2015 
proved to be an opportunity, allowing an examination of this process almost 
in ‘real time’.  But it also (as an effect of this process), required further 
reflection on my initial analysis, and particularly the earlier emphasis on the 
‘death’ of the artist/subject.  This case study, perhaps even more than the 
following two, is therefore marked by, and illustrative of, what Born (2010) 
describes as the cultural object’s “protentions” and “retentions”, and the 
changing relations between myself as the “prehending subject” and the 
“prehended [art] object”. 
 
5.2  Conceptual framing – ‘death’ and the punctum 
 
“The author as fixed, uniform and unconstituted creative source has…died.  The 
concept of authorial dominance in the text has also been thrown open to question.  
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But the author, now understood as constituted in language, ideology, and social 
relations, retains a central relevance… in relation to the meaning of the text (the 
author being the first person to fix meaning, which, of course, will be subject to 
redefinition and fixing by all future readers)…”(Wolff, 1981, p.136) 
 
“[For Mallarmé] and for us too, it is language which speaks, not the author…to 
reach that point where only language acts, ‘performs’, and not me.” (Barthes, 
1977 [1968], p.143) 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, at the core of portraiture is what Brilliant (2002 
[1991]) calls an “intended relationship” between the image and a “human 
original”.  Although the nature of this relationship historically slips and 
slides between being the reflection of a physical, exterior likeness, or 
capturing some sort of inner essence, there remains a desire for “for the 
image to render up the body, and thereby the self, in its fullness and truth” 
(Jones, 2006, p.xiv). In the 20th and 21st Century, however, the concept of a 
unitary human ‘original’ or ‘essence’, has been the subject of extensive 
critique, and one which brings into question a view of the portrait as in some 
way expressing, as van Alphen (1997) notes “the ‘original’, unique 
subjectivity of the portrayer, but also that of the portrayed” (p.239).  
 
The apparent paradox of the perpetuation of a genre of visual art predicated 
on a conceptualisation of both a ‘doer’ (a unique artist-creator) and a ‘deed’ 
(the act and outcome of portrayal), when the notion of an autonomous, 
unitary, substantive subject has been exposed as ideological, and an effect of 
discourse, suggested one frame through which to approach the Woodman 
images.  In large part this was because in different ways these issues would 
have resonance across the subsequent case studies, so would provide an 
initial opportunity to explore some of their implications.  In addition, the fact 
that so much of the ‘talk’ about Woodman’s work drew (initially at least) on 
the artist’s biography suggested an opportunity to consider the persistence of 
a sense of self - as subject, object or, in fact ‘viewer’, albeit reconfigured and 
mutable. 
 
No attempt is made here to address the philosophical, sociological and 
psychoanalytic streams of thought relating to the concept and experience of 
subjectivity and the ‘self’ (for a brief summary in the context of literary and 
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cultural criticism see, for example, Hall, 2004;  Heartfield, 2002).  But perhaps 
the key intellectual shift of relevance in relation to portraiture of the 20th and 
21st century, has been from a concept of a (bourgeois, masculinist) unitary, 
self-making subject, a mind separated from its body, and with an all-
seeing/perceiving ‘God’s eye’ view, to a conceptualisation of a fragmented, 
situated, partial, decentred, discursive, performative and embodied self, one 
that is both constituted and constituting.   It articulates a break with the 
Western European humanist conceptualisation of subjectivity expressed in 
Albertian perspectivalism (Jones, 2006), the Cartesian distinction between the 
thinking ‘I’ and the material object (Woodall, 1997a) and the Kantian 
“rational agent, whose primary duty is to bring selfish desires and behaviors 
[sic] into line with reason-based ideals of social duty” (Hall, 2004, p.27), to a 
questioning of a unitary, self-conscious ‘presence’, constituted outwith social 
processes of language and relations of power.   
 
This re-thinking of subjectivity encompasses Nietzsche’s critique of the 
‘metaphysics of substance’, the assumption of a volitional ‘something’ 
behind or before a ‘deed’ (Brickell, 2005;  Lloyd, 1999). It also draws on 
psychoanalysis and the Freudian concept of the unconscious mind with its 
repressed sexual instincts “leaving”, according to Woodall (1997a) “the 
cognisant mind no longer ‘master in its own house’” (p.12).  Lacan’s (1977 
[1949]) account of the ‘mirror stage’ through which a child acquires a sense 
both of its wholeness and its fragmentation or incompleteness;  his 
understanding of the child’s acquisition of language as the mechanism 
through which “the child takes its place as subject in the ideological or 
symbolic relations of the family” (Wolff, 1981, p.133);  and his concept of the 
‘screen’ (1964) to describe the process by which we are self-constituted and 
constituted in relation to the gaze of others, conceptually “give language, 
representation and the social a prominent place in the constitution of the 
subject” (Wolff, 1981, p.132).50  This theme of a socially and historically 
constituted subject also emerges through Marxism, and Marx’s contention 
that “it is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence, but 
                                                
50 See also footnote 30 above for further background on Lacan. 
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their social existence which determines their consciousness” (Marx, 1993 
[1859], p.2).  Building on this, Althusser (1971) argues that the subject is an 
effect of ideology:  “ideology hails, or interpellates concrete individuals as 
subjects” (cited in Wolff, 1981, p.130, see also MacDonnell, 1991 [1986]). 
Thus, there is no ‘subjective essence’ outwith this constitution in ideology, 
although, as Wolff notes, all subjects are unique (Wolff, 1981, p.131).  The 
post-modern theorists, including Derrida and Foucault further trouble the 
notion of a substantive a priori essence outwith discourse.  Derrida (1997 
[1967]) seeks to deconstruct the ‘metaphysics of presence’ through a critique 
of phonocentrism – the primacy of speech with its assumption of a “fully 
conscious subject who utters pure and full meaning” (Youngblood Jackson, 
2010, p.701).  For Derrida language is so unstable that meaning is endlessly 
deferred.  Différance is the term Derrida uses to capture this process of 
deferral. Youngblood Jackson argues that the “escape of full presence” that 
this implies “leaves behind the fiction of origins, foundations and a pure 
consciousness” (2010, p.702).   
 
For Foucault the subject is produced in two different “senses or places” (Hall, 
2003 [1997], p.56):  discourses (of madness, the penal system, sexuality, for 
example) produce subjects;  discourse also produces subject positions. Thus, in 
Foucault’s analysis of Velasquez’ Las Meninas (2006a [1966]), the subject 
position constituted by the discourse of representation is that of the 
Sovereign (Hall, 2003 [1997]).  Foucault’s analysis of individual paintings by 
Manet similarly explores not what the image says, 
 
“…But what it produces…the behaviour that it generates, and what it leaves 
barely seen among the social machinery, in which it distributes bodies, spaces 
and utterances.” (Bourriaud, 2011, p.13) 
 
Thus, in his analysis of Manet’s Bar at the Folies-Bergère (1881-82) Foucault 
explores how the painting places, or rather dis-places, the viewer:   
 
“While all classical painting, by its system of lines, of perspective, of 
vanishing point, etc., had assigned to the viewer and to the painter a certain 
precise place, fixed, constant, from where the spectacle was seen...Here, on the 
contrary...it is not possible to know where the painter has placed 
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himself…and where we must place ourselves in order to see a spectacle such 
as this…with this last technique, Manet plays with the picture’s property of 
being not in the least a normative space whereby the representation fixes us 
or fixes the viewer to a point, a unique point from which to look.” (Foucault, 
2011 [c1971], p.7851) 
 
As Bourriaud (2011) notes, Foucault’s analysis of these paintings excluded 
reference to Edouard Manet, as an individual.  This resonates with Foucault’s 
earlier analysis of the author function as an effect of discourse (Foucault 
1991a [1969]).  Addressed primarily to the production and interpretation of 
the written text, Foucault’s criticism of the authorial privileges manifest in 
the concepts of ‘the work’ and the notion of ‘writing’, is accompanied by an 
analysis of the implications of the author’s name. The name of the author, 
Foucault (1991a [1969]) argues “manifests the appearance of a certain 
discursive set and indicates the status of this discourse within a society and a 
culture” (p.107).  Discourses containing the author function are distinguished 
by four characteristics. Of these perhaps the most resonant in the context of 
an analysis of self-portraiture is the “plurality of self” which all discourses 
endowed with the author function possess52, thus in the context of the 
narrative text there is a distinction between “the author”, the “real writer” 
and the “fictitious speaker”.  For Foucault, writing effaces the signs of the 
“real writer”: 
 
“Using all the contrivances that he sets up between himself and what he 
writes, the writing subject cancels out the signs of his particular 
individuality.” (1991a [1969], p.102) 
 
The ‘author’ (or ‘artist’) is thus a function of a specific discourse.  By 
critiquing or questioning the (discursive) function of the author, Foucault 
argues that he is not “abandoning” the subject, but opening a space within 
which to analyse the production and constitution of both ‘the author’ and the 
‘subject’: 
                                                
51 This is based on a recording of a lecture given by Foucault in Tunisia in 1971. 
52 The remaining three are:  “(1) the author function is linked to the juridical and institutional 
system that encompasses and articulates all discourses; (2) it does not affect all discourses in the same 
way at all times and in all civilizations;  (3) it is not defined by the spontaneous attribution of a 
discourse to its producer, but rather by a series of specific and complex operations.” (Foucault, 1991a 
[1969], p.113). 
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“It is a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as 
originator, and of analysing the subject as a variable and complex function of 
discourse.” (Foucault, 1991a [1969], p.118) 
 
At around the same time Barthes (1977 [1968]) was similarly arguing for the 
‘death of the author’.  For Barthes, however, this is about the ‘descralization 
of the image of the author’ – of rejecting the idea of a single, fixed, ‘God-
given’ meaning, and opening the text to multiple readings, to multi-valency.  
As a result, the unity of the text, according to Barthes, lies “not in its origin 
but its destination” – the reader or viewer, who also does not have a history, 
but is “simply that someone who holds together in a single field all the traces 
by which the written text is constituted” (1977 [1968]), p.148).   For Barthes, 
“the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the author” (p.148).    
 
It is this theoretical death of the author-artist that will comprise one of the 
frames through which to consider Woodman’s work, and in particular the 
‘talk’ about her work.  But in looking at the image’s themselves, a further, 
and perhaps contrary concept will be considered - that of the ‘punctum’.   
 
It is from Barthes too that this second ‘frame’ is drawn.  Although perhaps 
running against the grain of the ‘death of the subject-artist’ as an 
autonomous individual, it nonetheless, arguably runs with the grain of 
multi-valency – of multiple interpretations or readings.  
 
Although not an analytical framework as such, Barthes’ distinction, set out in 
Camera Lucida (Barthes (2000 [1980]) between the interpretation of, 
investment in (or effects generated by) a photograph or photographs in the 
viewer (the Spectator) in terms of the ‘studium’ and ‘punctum’, provides a 
starting point.  The ‘studium’ is the interpretation and response to an image 
that draws on culturally and historically specific understandings of the social 
and political codes manifest in the form and content of the image.   The 
punctum, however, is not about the substance or content of the image per se, 
but the sense of ‘wounding’ or ‘pricking’ that an image may generate in an 
individual viewer, a supplement, perhaps from a detail, that creates a 
“disturbance” in the course of viewing an image, and which, unlike the 
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studium, is not coded:  “what I name cannot really prick me. The incapacity 
to name is a good symptom of disturbance” (Barthes, 2000 [1980], p.51).  As 
summarised by Rose (2003), the punctum is unintentional and 
ungeneralizable.  It is also highly personal.  The aim here is to use Barthes’ 
conceptualisation very loosely to analyse what ‘disturbances’ the images 
may provoke in a situated viewer.  
 
5.3 Selection of the images 
As discussed in chapter 4 to talk of ‘selection’ or ‘sampling’ criteria is 
perhaps to suggest a spurious methodological rigour.  How can one ‘sample’ 
art objects or products?  It would be hard to select on the basis of some 
imputed ‘typicality’ in relation to the artist’s work or to self-portraiture in 
general. Partiality and subjectivity are therefore written into the very process 
as well as the object of study.  By way of defence it is argued that the purpose 
is not to make statements of ‘generalizability’ (where even the ‘general’ is 
problematic e.g. ‘generalizable’ across an artist’s body of work, across 
contemporary self-portraiture, across portraiture?), but to use two images to 
examine and explore some initial ideas – and in this sense selection could be 
argued to be ‘purposive’.   
 
As noted above, the selection of Woodman’s work as the basis for one of the 
case studies emerged from a combination of the institutionalised process of 
gallery going and the subjective response to the works on display.  The main 
‘criteria’ for selecting images from the photographer’s body of work were 
that the image had to include Woodman (and not be solely of others who she 
used as models or of inanimate objects/still lives).  Images that, in the 
western art canon might be categorised as ‘nudes’ (even when they may be 
considered, in Hammer’s terminology ‘Naked Portraits’ (2007)) were 
excluded, but only to set boundaries on the number of dimensions which 
could be addressed - debates around the representation of the naked body, 
particularly the white, young, female body, important in themselves, would 
have added further complexity to an already complex undertaking (chapter 
6, below, however, does attempt to address the question of the naked self-
portrait, albeit that of the differently charged male body). Finally, and even 
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less justifiably, the images were those that, when looking through 
Woodman’s work consistently arrested my attention.  It was this ‘arrest’ that 
required (a sociological) explanation. 
 
Another methodological objection that could be made is that the images are 
not truly ‘self-portraits’.  Townsend in fact argues that, “if the conventional 
understanding of the self-portrait is that it states ‘this is who I am’ then we 
can see these pictures as an announcement that ‘I am another’”(2006, p.57).  It 
is true that in many of the published images which feature her own body, 
rather than that of a model, Woodman is often looking away from the 
camera, or has her face hidden or the image presents her face as distorted or 
blurred.  As was alluded to in chapter 3, within the genre, the absence of a 
clear portrayal of the ‘face’, of a recognisable ‘sign’ of a potentially knowable, 
concrete individual does not seem to undermine their categorical status as 
self-portraiture.  But it does raise the question whether the object of the 
image is a body/any body or whether Woodman is both the object and/or 
the subject of the image?  In the commentary on her friend’s work, Berne 
comments: 
 
“Francesca was ashamed that she took so many pictures of herself and was 
irritated by the simplistic self-portrait label attached to her work…but she 
alone knew what she was after…and she was the one who was always 
available.” (Betsy Berne, in Townsend, 2006, p.247)   
 
The ambiguity of an image produced by the ‘artist’ using her or his own 
concrete form as subject or object perhaps has particular resonance in the 
context of photography, which still retains a lingering sense of ‘truth’ value - 
of indexicality.53  As Barthes argues: 
 
“In photography I can never deny that the thing has been there…no painted 
portrait, supposing that it seemed ‘true’ to me, could compel me to believe its 
                                                
53 See footnote 18 above for Pierce’s distinction between the index, icon and symbol.  
Photographic portraiture’s indexicality arises at least in part from the mechanical process:  
“the action of light on certain circumstances…the formation of the image through an optical 
device” (Barthes, 2000 [1980] p.10) and which (in theory at least) requires the “coincident 
presence” of camera, subject and photographer (Soussloff, 2006). 
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referent had really existed.” (Barthes, 2000 [1980] p.76-77, emphasis in 
original) 
 
Thus, despite the apparently contingent availability of her own body, and 
Woodman’s own frustrations at seeing her work labelled as self-portraiture, 
as Sundell (1994), suggests: 
 
 “It is hard not to read these works…as an on going series of self-portraits, a 
map of the artist’s own evolution – both as a potential object of others’ desire 
and as a creator of images.” (Sundell, 1994, p.435)   
 
Other commentators too, suggest that it was not just pragmatism or 
convenience that drove Woodman to “obsessively” photograph herself, but 
was a means of “examin[ing], or perhaps affirm[ing] her identity” (Badger, 
2012, p.10).  For Badger (2010), however, the ‘identity’ represented is her 
specifically artistic identity, or what Bronfen (2014) describes as “the image 
she has composed of and for herself” (p.16). Townsend (2006), while critical 
of those who would subsume all Woodman’s work within the category of 
self-portraiture, does not exclude the connectedness between the image and a 
“human original” (Brilliant, (2002 [1991]), but sees the images as positioned 
both as within the genre and (contra Barthes) a critique of it: “In Woodman’s 
self-portraits we have a thoroughgoing critique of her medium’s incapacity 
to identify a subject truthfully” (Townsend, 2006, p.56).  Arguably, what this 
indirectly alludes to is a distinction, at the heart of portraiture (see chapter 3) 
between identity as physical ‘likeness’ and identity as the ‘essence’ of the 
person represented.  Within Woodman’s work, the former is present ([she] 
“has been there” – to paraphrase Barthes (2000 [1980]), but it is the latter that, 
because of its apparent performative quality (in the sense of a knowing 








5.4 The two images 






Francesca Woodman  
Untitled 
Providence Rhode Island, 1975-1978 




“[Elsewhere] the subject of the work is established in disestablishment, in 
separating itself from the obvious (‘What we see’) and instead proposing itself 
as equivalent to some other object, to space itself, or to the ethereal.  
Woodman makes herself equivalent to a museum collection of stuffed animals, 
awkwardly crammed and jumbled, spilling out of a vitrine...” (Townsend, 
2006, p.7) 
 
“Woodman’s art is a…troubling and troubled one.  Ridden with menace, its 
lapidary beauty and elegance function as a kind of lure. Nowhere is this 
clearer than in the numerous series that enact tableaux of entrapment, 
engulfment or absorption of the woman in those spaces…here the reified 
condition of the feminine as aesthetized object is made utterly explicit, as are 
the stakes.  Variations on this theme include...[one] in which the corpse like 
body of the model spills out of a Natural History display cabinet filled with 
stuffed specimens, birds, a raccoon.” (Solomon-Godeau, 1991 [1986]), 
p.252) 
 
Figure 5.2, Untitled 1975-1978, Providence Rhode Island54 comprises one of a 
number of images Woodman created using museum cases or vitrines, often 
depicting nudes (either herself and/or other models) squeezed into or 
against the glass casing.   This particular image was made in the Rhode 
Island School of Design nature laboratory, which held cases of stuffed 
animals and scientific specimens (Keller, 2011). 
 
In this image Woodman, as model, is positioned both within, but falling out 
of, or emerging from, a museum cabinet that she shares with stuffed birds 
and mammals.   The display cabinet has four glass doors, three of which are 
closed.  The fourth door has been ‘pushed’ or forced open by the 
model/Woodman who is squeezed uncomfortably into the confined space 
on the bottom right shelf, lying on her side with most of her curled body still 
contained within/constrained by the cabinet, one foot overlapping another, 
but with her head lying on the door frame. The model/Woodman wears a 
patterned dress of dark shapes (possibly leaves) on a pale background, but 
her legs are bare.  Only one shoulder is visible. Her eyes are closed as if 
asleep or dead (yet it is the truly dead, the stuffed animals, who’s eyes are 
open). 
                                                
54 Many of Woodman’s individual images are ‘Untitled’, though a number, such as figure 
5.1, are part of entitled series such as Self-deceit’.  See Fisher (1984) for a discussion of the 
implications (for interpretation) of titles. 
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Compositionally, the sides and shelves of the square museum cabinet 
generate strong horizontal and vertical lines. Its contents, however, produce 
a ‘zig-zag’ effect of right facing mammals and left facing birds and a human 
figure whose body is lying right to left, but whose neck and head face left to 
right as the model/Woodman breaches the boundaries, Gulliver-like, of the 
small animal display and tumbles out, hair flowing over the edge of the 
cabinet and onto the wooden floor, gaining, in Bronfen’s words, “a peculiar 
tangible quality” (2014, p.22). The top left hand side display case (from the 
position of the viewer) comprises stuffed birds (facing right) and feathers of 
other bird types.  The lower left hand side cabinet shelf displays a raccoon 
seemingly in mid bark/bite and whose positioning suggests that the object of 
its rage is the human animal on the lower right hand display shelf.  On the 
shelf immediately above the model/Woodman is a stuffed fox – whose open 
jaws mirror and are diagonally related to those of the raccoon’s. The fox’s 
‘gaze’ focuses on a point just beyond the model’s feet. Above the fox more 
stuffed birds, facing leftwards, but whose heads are not visible because of the 
way the photograph has been cropped. 
  
The light appears to come from the left reflecting on and elongating the 
model’s neck making it appear swan-like, and creating tantalising reflections 
in the glass doors of the cabinet; tantalising because the reflections suggest 
but do not reveal the parameters or substance of the room beyond.  This 
includes hints or traces of the mechanics of taking the photograph (is there 
someone else in the room, someone who’s shadow may be in the reflection 
on the glass door enclosing the fox?) 
 
The contrasting light and dark of the model’s skin and the dark frame of the 
cabinet and the background of the raccoon’s cabinet perhaps generate the 
sense of ‘menace’, alluded to by Solomon-Godeau above; the shaft of light on 
one part of the model’s pale neck both makes it stand out and draws 




The eye line (of the viewer) is not at full adult height but the position of 
someone bending down to take a closer look at what is on display on the 
lower shelves of the cabinet.  This level positions the viewer as a viewer of 
the exhibit as well as of the photograph. 
 
At a surface level the content suggests both the warmth of nostalgia and the 
chill of capture or entrapment.  History, or the past is evoked by the age of 
the museum cabinet with its battered, dark wood frame, and its ‘traditional’ 
museum display of stuffed, dusty animals ‘captured’ in poses as if in the 
wild (even in the late 1970s this would probably have seemed an archaic 
display mode).  The concept itself perhaps refers further back to the idea of 
the cabinet of curiosities or Kunstkammer, rooms or cabinets containing 
collections of stuffed birds or animals, paintings, or ‘curious objects’ perhaps 
brought back from overseas explorations.55 As in the cabinets of curiosities, 
the stuffed animals in Woodman’s cabinet represent ‘Natural History’.  
 
Beyond these formal ‘aesthetic codes’ of light, form and surface content, is 
the scope for interpretation, as illustrated by the two quotes that open this 
sub-section.  Woodman herself is largely silent on what she sought to achieve 
or intended by these or other images.  For Townsend (2006) who seeks to 
wrest analyses of Woodman’s work away from ‘extra-aesthetic’ 
considerations of biography and feminism, to address the specifically 
‘aesthetic’ contribution of her oeuvre, this particular image is illustrative of 
Woodman’s project to use self-representation to critique photography as a 
medium.  According to Townsend, “With Woodman’s art the medium that is 
most concerned with showing us what is indisputably there becomes 
preoccupied with hesitation, with uncertainty and with a displacement of 
forms” (Townsend, 2006, p.7). Thus, in this image she makes herself 
“equivalent to a museum collection”.   Keller, too, who aims for a more 
‘formalist’ interpretation of this work, locates it within Woodman’s concern 
with “the relationship of the body to space” ((2011, p.177), while Krauss 
                                                
55 http://www.tate.org.uk/learn/online-resources/mark-dion-tate-thames-
dig/wunderkammen (accessed 5 March 2015).   
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(1999 [1986])) sees it as one response to a problem set for students to define a 
particular space 
 
The feminist perspective, from which Townsend seeks to distance 
Woodman’s work, is exemplified by Solomon-Godeau for whom the sense of 
entrapment, of menace and of being ‘in captivity’ generated by figure 5.2 
could be read as a feminist critique of women’s estate under patriarchy. It 
could be interpreted as coupling the idea of the frozen in time, or  
‘mortifying’ effect of photography (Barthes, 2000 [1980];  Metz, 1991) with the 
idea of the ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ of women (Mulvey, in Solomon-Godeau  
(1991 [1986], p.245) or of ‘self-objectivication’ (Sundell, 1994).  For Bronfen 
(2014), for whom Woodman’s aesthetic self-fashioning of the body both 
“suspends but also perpetuates death” (p.11), this image illustrates “the 
symbolic equation between lifeless objects and the artist staging herself” 
(Bronfen, 2014, p.22).  It could be said to articulate or reinforce the ‘Other-
ness’ of women:  half in the animal world and half in the world of humans, a 
curiosity to the (masculinist?) gaze, a form of Natural History estranged or 
strange but also in need of containment. Yet, the model/Woodman has 
breached the cabinet’s frame: has she been ‘captured’ or liberated; is she 
being squeezed into or emerging from the cabinet? Or is all of this too po-
faced, too serious – is Woodman (just) making a visual joke? 
 
This realisation of the wit behind the image (whatever scope it offers for also 
being (interpreted as) potentially transgressive and/or as potentially 
disturbing) has the effect of drawing attention to the constructed nature of 
the image, of the pose and, by extension to the existence of a concrete 
producer who is also the ‘model’.  
 
What, for me, created the sense of a ‘thereness’, a sense of a self or selves 
behind the image and which also generates the ‘punctum’ (loosely defined) 
or arrest, is the model/Woodman’s hair, overflowing the display cabinet 
(something that also attracts the attention of Bronfen (2014) and Krauss (1999 
[1986]).   No doubt partly a visual effect by being at the centre of the 
photograph and extending beyond the horizontal plane created by the base 
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of the cabinet, it’s arrangement draws attention to both Woodman as the 
producer of the image and as a (similarly) constructed ‘subject’ (a woman 
with long, dark hair) ‘captured’ for and by the camera.  In other words, its 
positioning calls attention to itself, and, by extension, to the/a producer who 
is also Woodman.  
 
This is not to posit a unitary subject/artist identified as ‘Woodman’:  there 
are different ‘Woodman’s’ at play, the photographer, the ‘model’, the 
concrete individual located in time and space with an individual and social 
history, and as a body with its own (constituted) ‘Natural History’ prior to 
and post the construction of the image.  Rather, it is to argue that the hair 
draws attention to the fact that Woodman’s body is present and that a 
‘self’/Woodman is both constructing (concretely) and performing the pose. 
This ‘fiction of the pose’, (Berger, 1994) and the knowing-ness of its 
construction, together with what it opens on to in terms of interpretation, 





















5.4.2 An equivalence of forms 
 
Figure 5.3 
Francesca Woodman  
Untitled  
New York, 1979-80 




 “In these pictures Woodman establishes an equivalence of forms:  the pattern 
of the plastic fishbone she holds…is almost identical to the herring-bone 
structure of wire laid into the wall beside which she stands…[also an] 
equivalence between the fishbone, the wire mesh and fern pattern of 
Woodman’s dress…Woodman is not fantasising about being other in a 
performance of identity, she is positing her body as part of her milieu…That 
body is an integral element of the space (and time) in which it projects itself 
as a separate and autonomous identity.” (Townsend, 2006, p.57) 
 
“The examination of limits in Woodman’s work finds its structure largely 
through the principle of analogy…Woodman stands in front of a dilapidated 
wall, facing away from the camera. She wears a vintage dress decorated with 
a leaf pattern, its back cut away to expose her flesh. Against her back she 
holds a fish skeleton that serves as a visual analogue to her spine, the design 
of the dress, and a horizontal band of wall where the plaster and paint have 
chipped away to reveal the surface’s infrastructure.” (Sundell, 1994, p.436) 
 
Whether called “analogy” (Sundell, 1994) or “equivalence of forms” 
(Townsend, 2006), the ‘studium’ of the image (figure 5.3), for me, comes from 
the ‘puns’ being played out between the model/Woodman’s spine, the 
fishbone she holds, the herring bone pattern of the wire mesh in the 
plasterwork, and skeletal qualities of the ferns on her dress  – all of which not 
only share visually similar structural qualities but, also (maybe because of 
these structural qualities) in different ways hold things together/hold things 
upright.  Again suggesting, as in figure 5.2, a visual sense of humour. 
 
Compositionally too figure 5.3 repays close scrutiny: the verticals of the 
model/Woodman, the pleat of her hair, the fishbone she holds against the 
exposed skin of her back, her hand holding the fish skeleton, the splits in the 
back of her dress and overdress and the light-revealed right leg, counter-
pointing the horizontals created by the wire mesh under the plaster work – 
the chevron shapes also mirroring the chevron of the spines of the fishbone.  
The way the model/Woodman positions her arms also creates two rough 
chevron shapes:  the arm bent to hold the fishbone against her spine creating 
one; the arm held against the wall on which she rests her head creating a 
second. This pose also generates two diagonals:  through the hands, and 
through the elbows. 
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Approximately two thirds of the photograph comprises the crumbling light 
coloured plasterwork, the model/Woodman is positioned to the left-hand 
side. The position of the viewer is lower than that of the model/Woodman, 
as if kneeling (at some distance away) and looking slightly upwards towards 
the square of wall.  A small part of Woodman’s dress on the left has been 
cropped from the photograph, as have her legs just above the knee – as if the 
(visual) priority was to get as much of the wall in the image as possible.  The 
light appears to come from behind and to the left of the model/Woodman, 
lighting her back and the fishbone and much of the wall to reveal the 
crumbling, dented and defaced plasterwork.  The model/Woodman’s left leg 
is in shadow, and she herself creates shadows on the wall to her right – 
shadows which echo her shape.  Her ‘vintage’ dresses create their own 
oppositions of light and dark:  the light over-dress with its pattern of ferns 
and the dark under-dress (or possibly skirt) with its own patterning, possibly 
of leaves.  The costume and the crumbling wall also, as in figure 5.2 generate 
a quality of nostalgia. 
 
Figure 5.3 is one of a pair of images (see figure 5.4 below).  Of the two images 
it was this one in which Woodman has her face to the wall that I kept being 
drawn back to. Partly a matter of personal ‘taste’: the second image, with its 
blurry fashioning of the dress felt a bit too ‘romantic’ and the referencing of 
the fishbone and the herring-bone of the wire mesh under the plasterwork a 
bit too ‘obvious’.  But there was also undoubtedly something about the way 
the model/Woodman is presented in figure 5.3 (again reflecting a personal 
response) that went beyond composition/formal considerations (though 
these are what manufacture the impact) to suggest pathos.  The image of a 
figure with its head against a wall, ‘pushed’ away to one side of the image, 
almost out of the picture, however ‘beautifully’ composed (with the 
emphasis on the active nature of ‘composition’), provokes a sense of 
abjectness, and with it, an empathetic response in the viewer.  Insofar as 
Woodman posits her body as integral to the milieu, but as a separate and 
autonomous identity (to paraphrase Townsend (2006)), the identity projected 
is as fragile as the wall against which it seeks support. 
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Ironically, however, what gave the picture its ‘punctum’, was not the sadness 
it provoked (and again this is the response of a viewer aware of Woodman’s 
subsequent biography), but the delicacy with which the model/Woodman 
holds the fish skeleton.  Its delicacy and positioning drawing attention to 
both the feint that would seek to deny the fictions of the image, and to the 
self that performs and produces this feint. 
 
5.5 Between imaged and image 
5.5.1 Francesca Woodman (1958 – 1981):  the blank on the page 
Before going on to explore the evaluative commentary on Woodman’s work 
it is worth giving a brief account of her biography, which plays such a 
significant part in the reception and interpretation of the images, that is in 
constituting both Woodman and a ‘Woodman’.   
 
The artist was born in April 1958 in Denver, Colorado, and died in New York 
in January 1981.  Both her parents were artists, as was her brother.  Her 
biography, presented in Townsend’s monograph, principally lists the schools 
Woodman attended (including Rhode Island School of Design) and the 
places she stayed at, including one year in Rome (Townsend, 2006).  It is 
perhaps the most poignant ‘image’ of the artist:  half the page is blank  
 
From her first self-portrait taken at age 13 years, Woodman produced in the 
region of 800 photographic images, predominantly in black and white.  As 
late as the 2000s it was believed that only a selection of her images had been 
made public, with implications for how the body of work as a whole could 
be read. Townsend, writing in 2006, for example suggests that only around 
120 images had been published or exhibited.  Bryan-Wilson, writing in 2011, 
however, argues that most of Woodman’s output has been issued.   
 
5.5.2 Framing Woodman:  evaluative constitution 
 
“Woodman has been recognised widely as an artist only posthumously, a fact 
that places her by the generically feminine act of ceding control over 
commercial interaction with audience…This places her in a problematically 
feminine position…so that even as Woodman’s powerful work itself militates 
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against this particular passive position one notes the dissonance between 
Woodman’s masterful art and the powerless position from which she must 
approach us: through survivors.” (Raymond, 2010, p.10) 
 
As Keller (2011) notes, there is a lack of contemporary responses to 
Woodman’s work by people who did not know how her life would end.  In 
addition, outwith contemporaneous letters and notes, Woodman’s scope to 
position and frame readings of her own work were limited, unlike the artists 
discussed in chapters 6 and 7 below.  This places her and her work, as 
Raymond (2010) suggests, in a particularly “passive…and…powerless 
position”.  Into this ‘vacuum’ readings of her work have been largely shaped 
by (and in response or reaction to), the first art historical commentaries on 
her work, published in a catalogue in 1986 (five years after Woodman’s 
death), to accompany the first curated show of Woodman’s work held at the 
Wellesley College Museum, Boston, (now the Davis Museum at Wellesley 
College) and Hunter College Art Gallery (New York) (Gabhart, 1986).    
According to Bryan-Wilson (2011), the catalogue essays written by the co-
curator Ann Gabhart and two high profile art historians of the period, 
Abigail Solomon-Godeau (1991 [1986)) and Rosalind Krauss (1999 [1986]), 
have in different ways structured subsequent commentaries on Woodman’s 
work (and Woodman).  Reflecting the images’ multi-valency within and 
across time these broadly comprise (often in combination) 
feminist/psychoanalytic readings (building on Solomon-Godeau); formalist 
readings (from Krauss); and biographical readings.  
 
Although acknowledging that Woodman did not explicitly describe herself 
as a feminist artist, in her 1986 essay “Just Like a Woman” Solomon-Godeau 
(1991 [1986]), nonetheless, as suggested above, argues for a feminist reading 
of her work and what it reveals of the operation of sexual difference and “the 
problems of feminine subjectivity and creativity” (p.244).  Subsequently 
Solomon-Godeau’s reading has been critiqued as itself a product of its time – 
predating, for example, a move away from essentialist categories toward 
ideas of performativity and multiplicity (Bryan-Wilson, 2011; Butler, 2006 
[1990]), however, it remains a constant, albeit internally divergent thread 
(see, for example, Bleeke, 2010;  Bronfen, 2014;  Liu, 2004;  Posner, 1998;  
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Riches, 2004). Liu (2004) for example, proposes “a feminist/psychoanalytic 
reading of Woodman’s formation of feminine space and subjectivity in order 
to elucidate the sexual politics of her self-representation” (p.26) – seeing 
images such as figure 5.3 above as “exhibiting [Woodman’s] longing for a 
fantasmatic fusion with the womblike environment”(p.29).  Others, however, 
reject the implied passivity or vulnerability of some feminist readings (see 
for example, Pedicini, 2012; Raymond, 2010;  Townsend, 2006).  
 
Woodman’s active role in ‘performing’ and constructing the images in which 
she appears is also the thread that runs through the emphasis on the formal 
properties of her work. Beginning with Krauss’s (1991 [1986]) analysis of the 
formal, ‘objective’ qualities of Woodman’s work – the way she resolved 
“problem sets”, subsequent (and more recent commentators) have seen 
Woodman’s work as about explorations of forms of time and space using 
and within the photographic medium (Badger, 2012; Raymond, 2010;  
Townsend, 2006).  So, for example, figure 5.2 can be read as an exploration of 
space (Keller, 2011), or as an interrogation of the Kantian sublime (Raymond, 
2010) rather than (or solely as) expressing feminist confinement. 
 
These readings emphasise the photographic medium:  the technology 
Woodman used; concerns with issues of ‘space’ within the image and within 
the confined space constructed by the photographic ‘frame’;  the ‘blur’ as a 
means for capturing (the passing of) time (rather than as an effacing of the 
self); and the degree of planning and staging of the images and selection of 
the prints.    According to Keller (2011), Woodman was not ‘obsessed’ with 
the camera or print technology.  The medium format camera she used, which 
was already out of date at the time she was working, produced a square 
negative and a small 6 x 6 cm print.  This creates its own visual effects:   
 
“Through playing the stability of the architectural square against the 
mutability of the body…Woodman exploited the powerful psychological 
charge that the inherent tension in the format provides.” (Keller, 2011, 
p.179)   
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The spatial qualities of the square format print – the physical frame of the 
artefact, and of the spaces she photographed are also given emphasis in this 
consideration of form, even if it also again alludes to the “tension” between 
the physical body and the physical space in which it is located (as in figure 
5.2), or within the physical frame of the photographic image: 
 
“Whether or not the location in the photograph was an interior or an exterior, 
the most important thing about it was the space marked by the edges of the 
picture-frame…This was the real space in which she set her figures, bounded 
by a square, the limits of the photographic negative…The frame’s edge 
matters so much more to a photographer than a painter because it represents 
the bounds of the world you have captured.” (Badger, 2012, p.11) 
 
The other formal issue is that of the ‘blur’, of the representation of the figures 
in the image as if in motion, or disappearing from the picture frame.  For 
commentators who would emphasise the more active constructed nature of 
these images, the creation of a sense of movement using a technology that, by 
its nature generates stasis, is read not as a denial of self, or dissolution of ego 
boundaries (Posner, 1998), but as an experiment or critique of the medium’s 
immobilization of time (see, for example, Badger, 2012; Townsend, 2006). For 
Raymond, the blur expresses an active “formal gesture”: 
 
“Often read as suicidal emblems, her characteristic use of blur and self-
violating cropping in fact are methods that Woodman deploys to query 
geometry’s relationship to vision and must be read for that formal 
gesture…Woodman’s manipulation of shutter speed to create images of 
herself as a blurred figure, or her use of a square format or cropping of images 
of herself without a head…is not the disappearance of Woodman’s self, but a 
shifting of the mechanism of the frame itself, and a shifting of the 
mechanism of audience as the implied limit of photography.”  (Raymond, 
2010 p.13, p.15, emphasis in original) 
 
Townsend (2006) points to the way photographs are structured not just by 
what they contain, but what they exclude. This is what Metz (1991) describes 
as the “off frame space” – the “character” that is excluded but present.  What 
the emphasis on the formal, constructed character of Woodman’s work 
points to, outwith the frame is the ‘artist-creator’ - the hand that presses the 
camera shutter.  A theme emergent across commentaries is the degree to 
which the images were pre-planned, often quite meticulously. The works are 
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seen as self-staged, performances, orchestrated creations of ‘Woodman’ the 
performer by Woodman the photographer (Badger, 2012; Bronfen, 2014; 
Keller, 2011;  Pedicini, 2012;  Raymond, 2010).  
 
“The ephemerality of appearance may be the central theme of her 
photographic work and yet the placement of her body, along with the objects 
surrounding it, is as minutely calculated as the framing of the scene, the 
lighting and the movement captured.” (Bronfen, 2014, p.23) 
 
This duality between the imaged and the creator of the image, between artist 
and model, is clearly a defining characteristic of self-portraiture, but with it 
comes the overlap, or flip flop between an evaluation of the image qua 
image, and ‘evaluation’ of the imaged, between the image viewed as 
performance and the image as constitutive/performative.  While more 
formal analyses may not be solely divorced from concerns with the 
“psychological”, or with identity and subjectivity, these approaches locate 
these effects within Woodman’s ‘exploitation’ of her medium, and her role as 
an ‘artist’ rather than as solely representations of her psychic state.  This 
latter, however, is given greater weight among those commentators who 
would view Woodman’s work through the lens of her premature death. 
Although the catalogue accompanying her first major (posthumous) 
exhibition played down her death, by only making a reference to it at the end 
of the publication (Bryan-Wilson, 2011; Gabhart, 1986), it has been a common 
theme, even by way of rejecting this reading.  Phelan (2002), for example 
argues that many of Woodman’s images are to prepare the audience for her 
eventual death, repetitively staging her own disappearance: 
 
“Woodman found in her art a type of theatre for the oscillating tension 
between the desire to live and the desire to die.  Perhaps on Jan 19 1981 she 
found a composition that suited her, and she developed it into an act of 
suicide...in many of her photographs she traces her own disappearance in 
order to show her viewers that just as they can survive looking at her images 
when she has left the surface of the print, so they too can survive not looking 
at her when she leaves life’s visible surface.”  (Phelan, 2002, p.999) 
 
A similar focus on her “suicide vision” is to be found in Bleeke (2010), Kroker 
and Cook (1988 [1986]), for example, as well as inflecting interpretations of 
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her ostensible desire to disappear from the picture frame (see for example, 
Liu, 2004;  Posner, 1998).  Other readings seek to re-instate Woodman’s hold 
on life, and thus, by implication allude to her death.  Bronfen (2014), for 
example argues that Woodman’s work can be seen not “only” as 
“anticipating and rehearsing death” but also “to celebrate a precarious 
recovery of aesthetic presence” (Bronfen, 2014, p.15).   
 
Townsend argues that interpretations of each photograph as anticipating or 
as a presentiment of her death “is a particularly facile, romanticizing and 
unpleasant argument” (2006, p.8).  Raymond (2010) similarly rejects what 
Bryan-Wilson (2011) describes as the trend in art history to read work 
depicting an artist’s body as biographical.  Yet, even over 30 years after her 
death, reviews of recent exhibitions of her work both draw attention to her 
death while ostensibly wanting to separate it from the art. Gumport (2011), 
Johnson (2012), Smyth (2014) and Steinhauer (2012) all open their newspaper 
and journal articles by referencing the early death of the artist – Gumport 
(2011) even describes how the means of her death left Woodman 
“unrecognizable”.  Steinhauer (2012), in fact argues that attempting to 
separate Woodman’s art from her life is “impossible”.  What arguably has 
also become impossible is separating what Smyth (2014) calls the attendant 
“baggage” about both Woodman’s life and the “heavy symbolism” read into 
her work, from the on-going, self-perpetuating process of institutional 
consecration.  
 
5.6 Institutional Consecration:  ‘Portrait of a reputation’56 
 
“‘Francesca Woodman’ the name has become a title under the rubric of which 
is organized exclusively posthumous work.” (Raymond, 2010, p.11) 
 
The artist held only two solo exhibitions in her lifetime and contributed to 
four group exhibitions.  Subsequently the number of solo and group 
exhibitions has increased almost exponentially.  As noted earlier, the first 
posthumous exhibition was organised in 1986 by Ann Gabhart, the director 
                                                
56 This is the title of an artist’s book by Woodman containing five images. 
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of the Wellesley College Museum.57  The apparently contingent nature of the 
discovery or recuperation of Woodman’s work is alluded to by Johnson 
(2012) who describes how Gabhart saw some prints of her work in the family 
home about a year after the artist’s death. This conjunction may reflect the 
fact that both Woodman’s parents were themselves established artists, and 
while ‘chance’, also suggests the operation of the field of cultural production 
and the connections between agents within the field (Bourdieu, 2004;  
Grenfell and Hardy, 2003).58  In the 1986 exhibition catalogue, Gabhart 
describes how both the formal qualities of Woodman’s work, together with 
her capacity to act as a role model for the female students of the college 
(Wellesley is a women’s college) attracted her to the work:  
 
“When I eventually decided to introduce this work in an exhibition organized 
for Wellesley I was mindful of the special relevance it has for our students;  
done by an artist their age, it deals with some of the most disturbing issues 
faced by young women in their formative years.” (Gabhart, 1986, p.6, 
quoted in Keller, 2011, p.170) 
 
In other words, the process of positioning Woodman within the field of 
cultural production starts taking shape with the conjunction of a key ‘actor’ 
in the field, evaluating the formal properties of the work, but also 
engendering the construction of the myth of the (female) artist ‘Woodman’. 
 
Subsequently there has been a ceaseless flow of exhibitions, including 
consecration at what might be the considered the high altar of American art 
institutes including, latterly, The San Francisco Museum of Modern Art 
(November  2011 – February 2012)  and the Guggenheim Museum, New 
                                                
57 Wellesley College, located 12 miles outside Boston, describes itself as “A private, non-profit 
liberal arts college for women”. It was established in 1875 
(http://www.wellesley.edu/about/wellesleyfacts.  (accessed 13 March 2015).   
58 The contingent nature of consecration or canonization is perhaps something that is worth 
further exploration.  Parallels could be drawn with the ‘discovery’ of the photography of 
Eugéne Atget following a ‘chance’ meeting between the surrealist photographer Man Ray 
and his assistant Berenice Abbott when they were in Paris in the late 1920s (Baldwin et al, 
2000). Atget’s work features in Benjamin’s analyses of the impact of reproductive technology 
on the work of art (Benjamin, 1999 [1936], 2009 [1931])).  A more recent example might be the 
discovery of the ‘street photographer’ Vivien Maier whose work was found in a job lot of 
auctioned storage boxes. (http://www.vivianmaier.com/ (accessed 13 March 2015). 
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York (March – June 2012) (see Keller et al, 2011).  Recent exhibitions have 
been held in the UK and in Vienna (see Schor and Bronfen, 2014). 
 
In addition to her life and work being used as the basis for a video (Subrin, 
2000), it has also been the focus of a number of recent monographs or books 
(see, for example, Keller et al (2011), Pedicini (2012), Raymond (2010), Schor 
and Bronfen, 2014).  All of which suggests that here has been no diminution 
of interest in Woodman’s work, 30 years after her death.  Without wishing to 
go wholly down the institutional path to explain this continued interest in 
her work there are undoubted, ‘extra-aesthetic’ factors at play – the 
continuing presence of her parents (and boyfriend – Benjamin W. Moore) as 
holders/controllers of Woodman’s estate, for example, appear to be key in 
sustaining the consecration process.   All the books and monographs 
consulted formally acknowledge the support received from ‘Betty and 
George Woodman’ who, “have managed her estate, devotedly preserving, 
protecting and promoting their daughter’s work...” (Raymond, 2010, p.11). 
The family as a whole has also been subject of a documentary film, The 
Woodmans, released in 2011 (Willis, 2010).  Centred on Woodman’s work, the 
film includes interviews with her parents talking about their own work – 
potentially adding to and extending the myth of (the) Woodman(s). An 
American television news producer C. Scott Willis produced the film.  
According to Gumport (2011) Scott Willis did not know Woodman’s work 
but had a ‘chance’ meeting with her parents at a brunch held by his cousin. 
Although contingency plays its part, it again arguably illustrates the indirect 
operation of the field in bringing together agents with similar cultural 
capital.  
 
As Johnson (2012) notes, there are also commercial interests at stake in the 
form of Woodman’s management, the prestigious Marian Goodman Gallery, 
based in New York.59  
 
                                                
59 http://www.mariangoodman.com/artists/francesca-woodman/ (accessed 13 March 
2015). 
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To help maintain the “circle of belief” (Bourdieu, 2004) that surrounds 
Woodman’s work, it is located both within existing lineages, but also seen as 
so distinctive, as to be the progenitor of its own lineage.  Referencing back, 
links are made between Woodman’s work and Surrealism, particularly 
through her use of ‘props’ to create assemblages or tableaux vivants, in which 
each object is given equal weight (Bronfen, 2014;  Pedicini, 2012;  Riches, 
2004).  Emphasis is also placed on her connection, when on a study year in 
Italy, with a bookshop with a specific interest in Surrealist material (Liu, 2004 
Pedicini, 2012; Riches, 2004). Woodman’s work is, however, seen as 
“diluting” or “deforming” Surrealism by mediating it through the artistic 
forms of the 1970s and undercutting its misogyny/masculinist gaze 
(Pedicini, 2012; Posner, 1998; Solomon-Godeau, 1991 [1986]). Her work is also 
seen as a continuation of both a form of Pictorialism (Badger, 2012), a style of 
photographic work from the late 19th and 20th Century drawing on a fine art 
aesthetic60 and traditional “straight photography” pioneered by American 
photographers such as Paul Strand, Edward Steichen and Walker Evans 
(Pedicini, 2012).  
 
Locating Woodman within a contemporary (1970s) American context a 
number of commentators see links between her work and that of the 
photography of Duane Michals, particularly its seriality and the use of text 
((Johnson, 2012; Pedicini, 2012) and with the earth-body sculptures of the 
Cuban-American performance artist Ana Mendieta (Baker et al, 2003;  
Johnson, 2012;  Posner, 1998).  Resonances are also found with or in the work 
of Cindy Sherman who was also experimenting with self-portraiture in the 
mid-1970s (Bryan-Wilson, 2011;  Johnson, 2012;  Steinhauer, 2012; Townsend, 
2006).     
 
But, like the images, Woodman’s work is seen as occupying an ambiguous 
position (Bryan-Wilson, 2011;  Pedicini, 2012;  Solomon-Godeau, 1991 [1986]);  
Townsend, 2006). The work is described as being both within and outwith 
modernism and post-modernist art movements (Badger, 2012; Townsend, 
                                                
60 http://www.moma.org/collection/details.php?theme_id=10161, (accessed 15 March 
2015). 
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2006);  and as having elements of performance art, in the use of the body, but 
distinct in using the performance in the service of the photography not vice 
versa (Pedicini, 2012).  To absorb Woodman’s “original signature style which 
defied classification by group or movement” (Pedicini, 2012 p.41) has led 
commentators to suggest that she effectively created her own lineage, one 
that is followed by others:  “She has been enormously influential for 
subsequent generations of young artists and art students, particularly 
women” (Keller, 2011 p.170), to the extent that her style has generated its 
own clichés, both among art students (see, for example, a critique of the 
apparent appropriation and dilution of Woodman’s genre among students in 
Baker et al (2003)) and in fashion photography (Bryan-Wilson, 2011;   
Gumport, 2011). 
 
The question remains whether this process of institutional consecration is 
itself sufficient to account for the images’ ostensible enduring appeal – is 
there still some residue, or supplement, beyond their production as a cultural 
object that, as individual images, retain their own ‘thereness’ (just as the 
image of the artist provokes a sense of ‘presence’) – their ‘punctum’, and 




“In Michael Foucault’s analysis of literary criticism, he argues that rather 
than lamenting the eclipse of the author, we should study the places in which 
his presence asserts itself and consider the creative act like an ‘opening in 
space where the subject endlessly disappears’.  The means of 
disappearance in Francesca Woodman’s photography always refer back to the 
study of her own identity as a woman and as an artist in transformation, not 
in disintegration.” (Pedicini, 2012, p.96) 
 
 “Woodman’s photographs’ distinctive combination of self-portrait, blur, a 
de-centering…intervene in notions of the centrality of the subject, that 
watchword of humanism, and significantly interrogate the problem of the 
gaze displaced from the body through the mechanism of photography.” 
(Raymond, 2010, p.5) 
 
“Wandering through the final room of the Guggenheim museum, I stopped in 
front of a mesmerizing self-portrait.  In it Woodman is naked…She was 
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undeniably present.” (Jillian Steinhauer (2012) The Paris Review, 23 
May) 
 
This case study was an attempt to explore how to develop and warrant an 
analysis of individual art objects that did not (solely) focus on ideological 
and institutional frameworks, but which also did not slip into making 
indefensible evaluative judgements. Further, and reflecting the specific focus 
on portraiture, the selected images provided an initial opportunity to 
consider how the critique of the ideological, discursive function of the 
‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’ played out in and between the art object and its 
institutional consecration. 
 
Focusing on and describing the two selected photographic ‘self-portraits’ by 
Francesca Woodman provided space to consider what their form and content 
might provoke or prompt in viewers, and how they might achieve their 
effects as images – recognising that this analysis would be limited by my 
own and others’ social, historical and disciplinary position. In fact, there may 
be an argument for saying that in attempting to find a way to describe the 
images the analysis was perhaps unwittingly drawn into using the 
vocabulary of the field. As such it both illustrates the difficulty of locating an 
‘outside’ from which to talk about the images, but also risks reproducing 
(rather than critiquing) the operation of the field. Consideration was, 
however, given to the ‘punctum’ (Barthes, 2000 [1980]), as a way of 
understanding the arrest or disturbance that these images might generate: for 
me (as situated viewer) it was Woodman’s hair in fig. 5.2 and the sense of a 
‘thereness’ (of a concrete individual behind the image) that this evoked, in 
figure 5.3 my attention was drawn to the delicacy with which she holds the 
fishbone.  While the punctum felt will not be ‘universal’ it is arguably a 
useful concept for articulating why or how a particular image may or more 
not work as an image, in a way that is potentially ”intersubjectively 
defensible” (Harrington, 2004).  
 
Paying close attention to the individual images, and considering their 
provocations and evocations qua images, also provided a productive starting 
 149 
point for understanding the body of art historical evaluative commentary 
and critique which has developed around Woodman’s work. In particular it 
underlined how these images’ ambiguity afford multiple interpretations, and 
the fact that the photographs were published posthumously means that there 
really is no artist to attempt to fix their meanings. The two images which 
have been considered here, and others within Woodman’s oeuvre, have been 
‘read’ variously as: the means by which Woodman sought to ‘disappear 
herself’, or as a form of self-displacement, as “staged absence” (Riches, 2004); 
an articulation of feminine subjectivity and sexual difference (Solomon-
Godeau, (1991) [1986]); an attempt to expose the fundamental 
‘untruthfulness’ of photography’s assumed indexicality (Townsend, 2006); or 
a way of resolving a technical ‘Problem Set’ (Krauss, 1999 [1986]). At one 
level, the evaluative commentary is a process of engaging in an 
intersubjective defence of the images.  But, by formalising and 
institutionalising this multi-valency, couching it in the language of art 
historical discourse, these evaluative commentaries also begin the work of 
positioning Woodman’s oeuvre critically within the field of restricted 
production (Bourdieu, 2004). In other words, the works acquire ‘authority’ or 
status as art works in the field by being critically evaluated by ‘experts’, even 
as they contest their different interpretations.   
 
What this particular case study also demonstrates quite clearly is how the 
process of consecration and positioning unfolds and gathers pace through 
key actors, networks and institutions within the field.   Thus, a ‘chance’ 
meeting between a college gallery curator (Ann Gabhart) and Woodman’s 
artist parents, led to the first posthumous public exhibition, supported by a 
catalogue containing evaluative/interpretive essays by high status art 
historians (Rosalind Krauss and Abigail Solomon-Godeau).  Subsequent 
commentators have either supported, or rejected these initial interpretations 
with their own alternative (historically and socially located) readings, further 
strengthening and consolidating Woodman’s position within the field. This 
cultural snowball effect gathers further momentum from exhibitions of 
Woodman’s work, including those held by ‘prestigious’ American art 
institutions. These exhibitions generate catalogues with further evaluative 
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commentary, thereby adding to the reputational weight of Woodman’s 
oeuvre.   The influence of the body of work on subsequent generations of 
photography students, and on fashion photography, diffuses the ‘style’, 
normalising or making it recognisable, even if a pastiche of the original.   In 
addition is the continuing role of Woodman’s parents and the gallery 
representing Woodman’s work in maintaining the works’ presence and 
visibility in the cultural field.  In effect the ‘circle of belief’ (Bourdieu, 2004) 
around Woodman’s work, once set in motion, has gathered its own 
momentum. 
 
Cutting through it all is the “plurality of self” (Foucault, 1991a [1969)]:  the 
overlap or oscillation between ‘Woodman’ the artist, Woodman, the concrete 
individual and producer of the images (1958 – 1981) and Francesca 
Woodman as the subject of the self-portraits.  A theme which emerged in this 
case study, but which will be seen in some form across all three, is the cross 
over, or ‘flip flop’, between evaluations of the image and evaluations of the 
imaged:  between representation and a concrete, biographical individual.  As 
discussed in chapter 3, this reflects one of portrait’s ‘paradoxes”:  its 
ambiguous space between ‘art’ and ‘document’.  The added dimension, in 
the context of self-portraiture is the overlap between the concrete individual, 
the ‘artist’ and the subject of the art object.  Although not anticipated when 
the images were selected for inclusion, this case study revealed the operation 
of this oscillation in an extreme form through the way that the early death of 
Francesca Woodman mediated evaluative commentary on the work and the 
subject of the work.   
 
In fact, in unanticipated ways, death came to haunt this case study.  First, as 
alluded to in chapter 3, portraiture has, in its historical roots and in its 
function, been closely aligned with death.  For Pointon (2013), for example, 
portraiture both creates and ruptures the illusion of permanence, of “death 
and corruption of the body [being] what happens to others elsewhere” (p.20).  
Further, rather than offering certainty of identity beyond death, it offers only 
mutability (Pointon, 2013).  As the work of Woodman testifies, in the absence 
of Woodman the concrete individual, Woodman, or rather, different 
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Woodmans, come to be constituted by and through socially and historically 
located viewers. 
 
Second, photographic portraiture in particular is seen as in some ways death 
dealing even when its subjects are alive (Barthes, 2000 [1980]).  As Metz 
(1991) notes, photography is linked to death in a number of ways: 
symbolically, through the immobility and silence which they both share; 
through the practice of keeping photographs as reminders of those who have 
died; and, ‘phenomenologically’, even when the photograph is of someone 
still living, “the moment when he/she was has forever vanished…the person 
who has been photographed is in effect dead” (p.158).  
  
But, as the discussion of the evaluative commentary on Woodman’s work 
has revealed, the literal early death of the artist feeds into interpretations of 
both the ‘intentions’ of the artist and of the images (or, contrarily, through 
rejections of these readings).  In other words, the biography of the concrete 
individual (the ‘real photographer’) becomes the prism for evaluating the 
work of Woodman the ‘artist’, and of Woodman the subject of the art.  Thus 
Woodman’s self-representations have been viewed by some as enacting (in 
the fullest sense of the word) her subsequent disappearance, or, against this, 
as (positive) acts of transformation, or “the creative product of Woodman the 
photographer” (Bronfen, 2014, p.25) 
 
Ironically, what this perhaps suggests is that notwithstanding the theoretical 
critique of the ‘subject’ as constituted in discourse – what Raymond (2010) 
above refers to as the “watchword of humanism” (p. 5), the desire to identify 
a self, an “undeniabl[e] presence” (Steinhauer, 2012) retains its hold.  Thus, 
even where there is an acceptance of the images as performances and 
performative, constructing or constituting identity, or identities, there 
remains, at the same time a desire to hang on to Francesca Woodman as the 
active creator; to identify in the work the ‘authentic’ hand of the ‘real’ 





What the analysis of the two images by the photographer Francesca 
Woodman begins to suggest is the operation of two overlapping sets of 
relationships.  First, the sets of relationships between what the images afford, 
the evaluation of the images and institutional networks of consecration.  
Second, throughout these sets of relationships the overlapping or oscillating 
relationship between the artist – ‘Francesca Woodman’, Francesca Woodman 
the concrete individual (1958 – 1981), and the self-portraits of a Francesca 
Woodman.  In effect, Woodman the historical individual, overlaps with ‘a’ 
Woodman (as in, ‘a’ Picasso or ‘a’ Rembrandt), overlaps with the subject 
portrayed.  Despite the intellectual rejection of the subject and subjectivity as 
a function of ideology, constituted in discourse, running through both sets of 
relationships is a continued yearning or desire for a ‘presence’, for 
recuperating a self behind the image and behind the artist-creator, a 
‘thereness’ (Jones, 2006) within and outwith the picture plane.   What this 
yearning seems to provoke is the constant re-appearance of the disappearing 
self (or selves) 
 
It was by examining two images, employing the two framing devices of the 
‘death’ of the subject/artist, and the ‘punctum’ (Barthes 2000 [1980]), that 
these two sets of relationships began to gain a foothold.  That is, by 
considering these images as images, giving them space to generate their own 
affordances, albeit to a situated viewer, they opened on to questions of what 
and how they achieved their effects and how these effects may feed into (and 
be fed by) the processes of institutional consecration.  
 
One of the ‘affordances’ that emerged unbidden (and unexplored) in this 
case study was the ‘abject’ nature of the two case study images:  specifically a 
sense of things being out of place or of transgressing boundaries.  To further 
explore the generative potential of the art object for sociological 
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6. (Con)frontality: The abject portrait 
6.1 Introduction  
Through the conceptual frames of the (theoretical) ‘death’ of the 
artist/subject and the punctum, the analysis of two photographs by 
Francesca Woodman, discussed in the previous chapter, were productive for 
beginning to suggest the complex relationships, both centrifugal and 
centripetal, between the sensuous properties of the portrait as a material 
object, its ‘consecration’ or otherwise as ‘art’ (and the producers as ‘artists’) 
and its role in fashioning or fixing a subjectivity. This chapter seeks to 
explore this emerging dynamic further through the prism of the ‘abject 
portrait’.  By this (admitted neologism) is meant those portraits that, in terms 
of how, who and what they represent, are potentially ‘transgressive’ in form 
and or in content.  
 
Focusing on the sensuous properties of form, colour and composition 
provides an opportunity to explore the (socially and historically specific) 
affordances that these images of transgression evoke.  Addressing these 
images as ‘art’ objects, allows an exploration of the potentially paradoxical 
effects of the production of work that ostensibly questions or breaches some 
aesthetic boundary, but as a ‘ritual act of sacrilege’ (Bourdieu, 2004) may 
serve to reinforce the field and, paradoxically, enhance the position of the 
producers within the field (Heinich, in Danko, 2008).   
 
At the same time, considering the representations of those portrayed in these 
images opens on to an examination of the ways in and through which their 
subjectivities and identities come to be constituted or imputed through the 
processes of portrayal.  In particular, focusing on the ‘abject portrait’ 
provides an opportunity to consider whether images which cross the 
‘boundary’ and invoke the Other, that is portraits which seek to foreground 
the socially excluded, the transgressive, the non-normative, are potentially 
emancipatory, asserting the validity of difference, or, in a parallel move to 
the ‘art world’s’ response to transgression, work to effectively reinforce the 
boundaries of the ‘clean and proper’ (Kristeva, 1982).   
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Through this analysis it will be suggested that to fully understand the 
dynamics between the portrait as sensuous material object, as a culturally 
and institutionally defined or classified art object, and as the representation 
of a living or once living subject, it is necessary to consider the relation 
between the producer of the images and the person(s) imaged.  Further, and 
relatedly, this case study also allows for an exploration of the artist’s voice 
(largely silent in the case of Woodman), in the construction of the aesthetic 
evaluation of the object and the constitution and evaluation of the artist’s 
subjects. Following on from this it will be suggested that ‘recognition’ of the 
artist within the field of cultural production, and the incorporation of the 
object as ‘art’ is no guarantor of recognition of the imaged and may in fact 
perpetuate or constitute those portrayed in abjection.   
 
The next section briefly sketches out the concept of the abject and how this 
has been absorbed into avant-garde art practice. This is followed by a 
detailed examination of each of the two images.  What this examination 
reveals about the relationship between the sensuous object, the art object and 
the constitution of the subject is discussed in the final section. 
 
6.2 Seeing abjection  
6.2.1  Theorising abjection 
In this chapter the concept of the ‘abject’ will provide the frame through 
which to view two photographic portraits. As a vehicle for, and articulation 
of, a critique of the ‘civilizing process’ (Elias, 1994 [1939]), the theoretical 
‘turn to the abject’, to a consideration of the psychically and socially 
marginalized and normatively transgressive, develops from a number of 
different streams of Western European thought in the late 20th and 21st 
Century. To provide the context for the analysis this section provides a 
broad-brush overview of what is meant by the abject and how it has been 
applied within art criticism and art practice.  
 
The theoretical development of the concept of the ‘abject’ reflects a concern 
to account for, and critique, the constitution in bourgeois Western society of 
the social and psychical hierarchy between the normative ‘clean and proper’ 
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(Kristeva, 1982) and the ‘non-normative’, excluded ‘Other’. Intellectually it is 
part of what Murray and Murray (2006) describe as “the subaltern subject’s 
emergence in the late 20th Century era of identity politics as the ‘subject of 
history’” (p.26, emphasis in original).  Three themes connect the different 
streams of thought from which the ‘abject’ emerges:  the constitutive role of 
the ‘non-normative’; the instability of the boundary between the normative 
and non-normative or transgressive (and the potential ‘return of the 
repressed’);  and the dual attraction and repellence of the (socio-economically 
powerful) ‘high’ for the ‘low’ (Stallybrass and White, 1986).  
  
In social anthropology Douglas (2007 [1966]) explores the role of ‘Taboo’ in 
protecting the boundary between order and disorder or “matter out of 
place”:  a patterning that, Douglas argues, occurs, in different ways across 
and within both non-Western and “modern” societies. This way of 
conceptualising the boundary between the clean and the polluting has its 
parallels in accounts of the emergence of the bourgeois Homo Clausus (Elias, 
1994 [1939]). Drawing on the literature and art of the 17th Century, Barker 
(1984) describes the emergence, or rather the secreting away, of the 
‘tremulous private body’ as the signifier of the development of a bourgeois 
subjectivity.  Of a piece with the civilizing process described by Elias 
(drawing on Freud) as, the “movement of segregation…[the] hiding behind 
the scenes of what has become distasteful” (1994 [1939] p.99), the private 
body is one in which manifestations of corporeality such as faeces, urine, 
sweat, phlegm, blood, vomit, semen etc. must be hidden, denied, abjured, 
abjected, but always at risk of returning, of breaching the constructed 
boundaries of the ‘clean and proper’ (Kristeva, 1982 [1980]).   But while that 
which is rendered abject, the excluded ‘low’, the constitutive ‘Other’, the 
bodily ‘grotesque’, provokes disgust it also provokes desire.   For Stallybrass 
and White, for example,   
 
“The bourgeoise…is perpetually re-discovering the carnivalesque, as a radical 
source of transcendence.  Indeed that act of rediscovery itself, in which the 
middle classes excitedly discover their own pleasures and desires under the 
sign of the Other, in the realm of the Other, is constitutive of the very 
formation of middle class identity.” (Stallybrass and White, 1986, p.201) 
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Philosophical and psychoanalytical account of the construction of the fragile 
boundary between the normative and the transgressive can also be traced 
through the work of Bataille, specifically his concepts of the ‘informe’ and 
‘base materialism’ and in Kristeva’s seminal “Essay on Abjection” (1982).61    
 
According to Foster (1996), for Bataille the ‘informe’ is a condition in which 
“significant form dissolves because the fundamental distinction between 
figure and ground, self and other, is lost” (p.112).  This concern with the 
dissolution of form is also articulated in Bataille’s concept of base 
materialism, his critique of the existing social hierarchies through a call for 
an “active base matter that disrupts the opposition of high and low and 
disrupts all foundations” (Noys, 1998, p.499).  
 
Kristeva’s (1982) essay develops the concept of the abject to account for the 
process of subject formation. As a process, the (unformed) subject must 
(symbolically) abject the mother to become whole, to become part of the 
symbolic order (of language) and the law of the father, “the abject is what I 
must get rid of to become an ‘I’ at all” (Foster, 1996, p.114).  For Kristeva, 
‘proper’ sociality and subjectivity can only be achieved by the expulsion of 
the “improper, the unclean, and the disorderly elements of its corporeal 
existence” (Gross, 1990, p.86).  Although the abject is described as neither 
subject nor object, Kristeva (1982) nonetheless identifies three classes of 
abjects, against which taboos will be erected, and which, when encountered 
will provoke bodily disgust: these are food, waste and the signs of sexual 
difference.  The exclusion of the abject is, however, only provisional and 
partial. For Kristeva,  
 
“What must be expelled from the subject’s corporeal functioning can never be 
fully obliterated, but hovers at the border of the subject’s identity, threatening 
apparent unities and stabilities, with possible disruption and possible 
dissolution.” (Gross, 1990, p.87)    
 
                                                
61 For a more detailed examination of these concepts and the distinctions between them see 
for example, Foster, et al 1994;  Foster, 1996;  Gross, 1990;  Krauss, 1996;  Moi, 1986;  Wirth, 
1999. 
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Ross (1997) argues that, for Kristeva, “the bringing into play of the abject…is 
a critical practice that puts subjectivity into crisis;  it is a work by which 
categories of identity are abruptly questioned, disrupted and challenged” 
(p.149).  This critical potential is also alluded to by Murray and Murray 
(2006) who argue that, notwithstanding their differences (see, for example, 
Krauss, 1996), for both Bataille and Kristeva:  
 
“Abjection operates on the level of the symbolic.  Bodily excess, piss, shit, 
vomit, saliva and tears function to allegorize repression, shame and the 
construction of otherness.” (p.30) 
 
This mapping out of the topographical boundaries between the ‘clean and 
proper’ and the threatening abject is further developed in the work of Judith 
Butler (1993) in her discussion of the constitution of ‘sex’ and the materiality 
of the body through the regulatory regime of normative heterosexuality. 
Reflecting the theme of the constitutive Other, for Butler, the ‘abject’ 
designates: 
 
“Those ‘unliveable’ and ‘uninhabitable’ zones of social life which are 
nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of 
subject, but whose living under the sign of the ‘unlivable’ is required to 
circumscribe the domain of the subject.” (Butler, 1993, p.3)   
 
For Butler, the construction of a normative heterosexuality is thus achieved 
through the exclusion or repudiation of homosexuality:  homosexuality 
becomes heterosexuality’s abject. 
 
6.2.2 The abject in art criticism 
Kristeva (1982) argues that, historically, it has been a function of religion to 
purify the abject, but that with the disintegration of historical forms of 
religion the work of purification rests with the catharsis of art:  the aesthetic 
task is “a descent into the foundations of the symbolic construct” (Creed, 
1996 [1986], p.75). 
 
But, in addition to this ‘aesthetic task’, through its articulation of the 
liminality and permeability of subject and object, of inside and outside, 
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abjection as concept and condition has been attractive to the avant-garde 
“who want to disturb these orderings of subject and society” (Foster, 1996, 
p.114).  This can be seen particularly in the work in the 1990s of the authors 
associated with the October journal (Foster, et al 1994;  Foster, 1996; Krauss, 
1996).  It has also provided the theoretical bases for analyses of contemporary 
art works through the prism of a politics of difference.  A number of 
commentators, for example, have used the concept of abjection productively 
to theorise and critique the representation and constitution of female, queer 
and raced subjectivities in and through contemporary visual and 
performance art (see for example, Çakirlar, 2011; Campbell and Spackman, 
1998;  Creed, 1994;  Dibosa, 2009;  Erdrich, 2007;   Gutiérrez-Albilla, 2008;  
Houser, 1993;  Murray and Murray, 2006;  Ross, 1997). 
 
Murray and Murray (2006), however, in their analysis of the relationship 
between “identity formation and canon formation” also draw attention to the 
complex ways in which discourses of abjection can be a double-edged sword.  
While potentially an inclusionary move drawing attention to manifestations 
of oppression, it also has the potential to create a double abjection of 
minority art and artists through what Murray and Murray describe as a 
“hierarchical fragmentation of discourse”. By this they seem to suggest that a 
focus on aesthetic issues of form denies the potential for a ‘politics of 
identity’, while a focus on producing art objects as “vehicles for a particular 
political agenda” preclude consideration of their ‘aesthetic’ qualities, or what 
Murray and Murray (2006) describe as “the possibility of formulating an 
additional dimension of meaning and expression” (p.31). 
 
6.2.3 The abject as art practice 
Arguably, portraiture and the aesthetics of taste collude in marking the 
boundaries between the tasteful and distasteful, in terms of how the ‘self’ is 
represented in art, who and what constitutes a ‘clean and proper’ subject for 
art, and in terms of what constitutes ‘clean and proper’ art.  
 
As the above, however, suggests, in some areas of 20th and 21st century visual 
art there has been an ostensible inversion of this relationship with the 
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emergence of an art that seeks to reveal and even revel in the body’s 
corporeality, in the shit and blood and tears and urine without which there is 
no-body; and to place those at risk of social abjection and exclusion not in the 
‘dark side of the landscape’ (Barrell, 1985 [1980]), but centre stage.  
 
In the 20th Century62 this shift from an aesthetic of the object to an aesthetic of 
the abject as an ostensibly critical art practice, is ‘canonised’, in the American 
context at least, through two exhibitions held at the Whitney Museum of 
Modern Art in New York at the beginning of the 1990s:  Dirt and Domesticity: 
Constructions of the feminine, held in 1992, and, in the following year Abject art:  
Repulsion and desire in American art (Krauss, 1996).63  In the catalogue 
accompanying the 1993 exhibition, ‘abject art’ is described as not so much an 
art movement more as a body of work: 
 
“Which incorporates or suggests abject materials such as dirt, hair, 
excrement, dead animals, menstrual blood and rotting food in order to 
confront taboo issues of gender and sexuality.  This work also includes abject 
subject matters – that which is often deemed inappropriate by a conservative 
dominant culture.” (Ben-Levi et al, 1993, p.7) 
 
Described as drawing its “theoretical impulse”, from Kristeva’s notion of 
abjection and Bataille’s concept of ‘base materialism’, this ‘body of work’ was 
seen by contemporary commentators such as Ben-Levi et al (1993) as a 
political movement, both in terms of its confrontation (by effect, if not 
design), with the canon and the art institution, and also beyond the 
institution in its ostensible engagement with ‘extra aesthetic’ issues of gender 
and sexuality. 
 
“Employing the methodologies adapted from feminism, queer theory, post-
structuralism, Marxism and psycho-analysis, our goal is to talk dirty in the 
institution and degrade its atmosphere of purity and prudery by 
                                                
62 Although outwith the scope of the current study, there is an argument for saying that 
depictions of the abject/abjection have a far longer lineage within the European pictorial 
arts.  In Western Christian iconography, depictions of the crucifixion per se, and the blood 
and physical trauma of the crucified body could, for example, be regarded as images of 
abjection.   
63 The timing of these two exhibitions perhaps accounts for the burgeoning theoretical 
literature on the abject in art criticism in the late 1990s. 
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foregrounding issues of gender and sexuality in the art exhibited.” (Ben-Levi 
et al, 1993, p.7) 
 
Within the field of portraiture, Cindy Sherman’s photographic ‘self 
portraiture’ is frequently cited in analyses of ‘abject art’ (see for example, 
Foster, 1996;  Krauss, 1996;  Murray and Murray, 2006).   But, arguably, the 
performance art of the 1960’s and the body art of the 1970s/1980s, in which 
artists used their own bodies, often represented in pain or exposed to 
physical risk, could also be said to be a form of abject self-portraiture.  This 
includes, for example, the work of Carolee Schneeman, Vito Acconci, and 
Orlan (see for example, Jones, 2006;  Warr and Jones, 2000).  This theme 
continues into the 1990s in the work of, for example, Hannah Wilkes who 
took photographic self-portraits while receiving treatment for cancer (Jones, 
2006), or in the work of performance artist Franko B. with its “pervasive 
presence of blood” (Campbell and Spackman, 1998), and in the photographs 
of/by Catherine Opie of the effects of self-cutting images into her skin 
(Erdrich, 2007). 
 
The use of the artist’s own bodily effusions (or imputed bodily effusions) 
could be said to be the ‘indexical’ portrait par excellence, as in, for example, 
Piero Manzoni’s merda d’artista – an art work produced in 1961 comprised of 
90 sealed tins cans of the artist’s excrement.64  Mark Quinn’s Self a series of 
frozen sculptures made between 1991 – 2006 using the artist’s own blood, 
could also come within this ‘genre’, as perhaps could the detritus 
surrounding an unmade bed (Tracy Emin’s My Bed made in 1998). 
 
Late 20th century examples of portraits made by artists of the socially 
abject(ed) might include the photographic work of Diane Arbus whose 1972 
show in New York “lined up assorted monsters and borderline cases-most of 
them ugly, wearing grotesque or unflattering clothing; in dismal and barren 
surroundings” (Sontag, 1984 [1977], p.32).  The images by the American 
photographer, Nan Goldin, of both herself (including a self-portrait after 
having experienced physical abuse “Nan, one month after being battered, 1984), 
                                                
64 http://www.pieromanzoni.org/EN/works_shit.htm (accessed 13 June 2015). 
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and of drag queens, transsexuals and others within the New York sub-
cultures of the 1980s, together with her images of the impact of AIDS, could 
also potentially fit within the category of the abject portrait. Painterly 
examples might include Marcus Harvey’s portrait of the Moors Murderer 
Myra Hyndley shown at the Sensation exhibition in 1997.   In the 21st Century, 
the 2010 exhibition Hide/Seek: Difference and desire in American Portraiture held 
at the National Portrait Gallery Smithsonian Institute in New York, continues 
the theme, with its specific focus on “sexual difference in the making of 
American Portraiture”, including the influence on modern art of ‘social 
marginalization’.65 
 
6.2.4 Gilbert and George:  Dresie and Casie  
The turn to the abject, to the inversion of hierarchies through the 
representation of the psychically and, or, socially excluded or ‘transgressive’, 
therefore provides a powerful prism through which to examine the complex 
relationships between the properties of the portrait as material object, its 
‘consecration’ (or otherwise) as an ‘art’ object, and the implications for the 
constitution of the subjectivities and identities of those portrayed.  The 
following explores these questions through an analysis of two images, which, 
though not necessarily self-defined (by their producers) as ‘abject art’, in 
their use of abject materials and (potentially) socially abjected subjects, might 
be said to come within this ‘genre’.  The first is a ‘self portrait’ by the artists 
Gilbert and George the second is a portrait of the twins Dresie and Casie, by 
the photographer Roger Ballen.  
 
These two pictures have been selected for what they share:  both are 
‘consecrated’ art objects which include representations of abject ‘subjects’ (in 
both senses of the word), which enables an analysis of the implications of the 
‘abject portrait’ within the context of the field of cultural production.  But 
they have also been selected for their differences, in terms of the processes of 
                                                
65 http://npg.si.edu/exhibit/hideseek/ (accessed 15 June 2015).  The successful demand by 
the Catholic League to have one of the exhibits – a four minute video including an image of 
Christ on the cross being eaten by large black ants – withdrawn from show illustrates the 
continued ‘threat’ posed by the representation of the abject.   
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production and the control they afford over the presentation of self, enabling 
consideration of the implications of the mode and process of representation 
in the constitution of subjectivities. 
 
6.3 Gilbert and George 
6.3.1 Gilbert and George:  Bloody Shit House 
The first image (figure 6.1) comprises a collage of coloured photographs laid 
out on a grid of 12 equal sized squares (four columns by four rows).  Areas of 
the grid in the ‘background’ not covered by the image(s) are white.  At the 
centre of the grid – the length of the two central columns - is a photograph of 
two full-length, naked, white, grey-haired men standing close to each other, 
legs apart, arms at their sides.  Both men are wearing wristwatches, one is 
wearing spectacles, neither is ‘looking’ directly at the viewer. The taller of the 
two men (on the right) faces the camera/viewer frontally but is looking 
upward behind his spectacles.  The shorter man on the left is standing 
slightly diagonally to the picture plane, apparently staring into the middle 
distance to the right. 
 
The photograph of the two men is superimposed in front of an ‘archway’ or 
‘doorway’ comprised of photographs of three reddish brown cylindrical 
shapes: two uprights located at the right and left sides of the grid and one 
placed horizontally like a lintel across these, located at the top of the grid.  
The brown cylinders comprising the ‘architrave’ appear to be marked by 
black lines or striations, like cracks in stone, or the effect of marbling.  In the 
space created by the ‘doorway’, and behind the two men, a reddish-brown 
background is criss-crossed by white lines like roads marked on a map.  In 
the bottom right hand corner there is a typewritten legend in white on black 






Gilbert and George 
Bloody Shit House 
1996 
 
The image is a double self-portrait, produced in 1996 by the two artists 
known as Gilbert and George66 (they sign their work, and are referred to by 
their joint forenames), and is one of a series of images under the collective 
title The Fundamental Pictures.   It is a self-portrait (or potentially so) at a 
number of different levels:  the central photograph is of the two artists, the 
‘doorway’ is made up of faeces, and the ‘interior’ is blood, these latter two 
substances being arguably, among the most ‘indexical’. 
 
As an image in and of itself, it generates ‘provocations’ in relation to:  the 
grid-like structure and symmetry of the image;  the expression of male 
nudity and the representation of manipulated images of ‘abject’ corporeal 
matter. 
 
The grid structure, and the placing of the objects within the grid create a 
sense of formal symmetry and order/orderliness.  It also underlines the 
constructed/’designed’ nature of the image – like an architectural drawing or 
                                                
66 Gilbert Proesch, born in Italy in 1943;  George Passmore born in the UK in 1942. 
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blueprint.  As will be discussed further below, in addition to serving as a 
formal device, the grid has also been interpreted as embodying and 
articulating the subjects’ abject (non-normative) sexuality. 
 
Superimposed over the substantive content of the image, the grid also evokes 
the framing of a window.  The viewer is positioned almost as a voyeur 
looking on to the two male nudes who in turn are framed by (their own?) 
corporeal matter. In art historical terms, a distinction has been drawn in 
relation to the female body between the ‘naked’ and the ‘nude’ (Berger, 
1972).  Nakedness, for Berger, suggests the vulnerability of “being without 
disguise” and the promise of the “familiar” while ‘nudity’ implies an object 
“seen naked by others and not recognized for oneself” (Berger, 1972, p.54). 
As Berger and other commentators have noted, there are, however, different 
power relations at play in the production, representation and viewing of the 
male nude, including the implications of the male/female gaze (Kestner, 
1995;  Mulvey, 1981;  Solomon-Godeau, 1997).67 In the context of this self-
portrait it does, however, raise the question whether this represents self-
exposure on the part of the artists – revealing their vulnerability through 
their nakedness, or a mask suggestive of the nude – one which the artists 
deploy to actively avoid or deny being “recognized for oneself” (Berger, 
1972, p.54).  As Nancy suggests: 
 
 “Whatever the link between a naked body and the face, nudity involves 
stakes that are not, or not exclusively, those of the subject, not of the ‘person’ 
but of nudity itself…the portrait marks a break with nudity…since it exposes 
another sort of nudity altogether, that of the subject.” (Nancy, 2006, p.223) 
 
This sense of physical exposure, but under controlled conditions is given 
added weight by the physical relationship to the viewer and the denial of an 
exchange of looks.  While the nakedness suggests (physical) vulnerability the 
full-length pose places the artists at a physical distance from the viewer. The 
potential intimacy of a shared gaze is also denied by the fact, as noted earlier, 
                                                
67 It is recognized that the implications of the representation of the male nude is an important 
area for further examination, but the current context does not allow for a more detailed 
consideration. 
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that one of the subjects looks into the middle distance to the right, and one 
looks upward, in a pose frequently used in (Christian) religious iconography. 
 
The play between self-exposure and mask is also suggested by the prosaic 
nature of the watch and spectacles worn by the subjects.  Again, in the 
context of representations of the female body, Berger suggests that an 
element of the “banal” – or “loss of mystery” - is key to representations of 
‘nakedness’ (Berger, 1972, p.59).  Here, the retention of these mundane items 
promises this familiarity, but also perhaps draws attention to the artificiality 
of the image, as well as perhaps suggesting play or humour, including self-
parody.   As will be discussed below it may also be part of the subjects’ 
‘visual strategy’ of using “signifiers of middle-class stability” as a way of 
undermining convention (Dibosa, 2009;  Jones, 1995).  
 
The image contains not only the full-length (and naked) physical external 
presence of the artists, but also, in the background, representations of 
internal corporeality; the magnified images of blood and faeces which 
comprise the building blocks of the “bloody shit house”.  The use of these 
‘abject’ materials is underlined in the colour tones used in the image – the 
reddish-brown against a white background - and is signalled in the legend 
contained within the image and in the title of the series from which this 
image comes – The Fundamental Pictures.  As Fisher (1984) notes, titles are 
more than just descriptive (though they can be this too), but are guides to 
interpretation.  Certainly, the legend, contained within the body of the image 
itself, immediately points up the abject (assuming a basic understanding of 
demotic speech); evoking both the fact of blood and ‘shit’, but also the 
vernacular use of ‘shit house’ as slang for a mess, but also for a midden or 
waste dump, including for human excrement.  The title of the series from 
which this image is drawn and the text on the back cover of the exhibition 
catalogue, plays on the word fundament – fundamental as in foundation, but 
also as fundament - buttocks or anus, and on fundamentalism as traditional 
orthodox beliefs.  Thus, the text leaves the viewer in no doubt about the 
focus on the ‘abject’.  But although blood and faeces are compositionally 
present, they are not specifically linked to the artists’ physical selves 
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(although Gilbert and George do argue that it is all their own work) – they 
are literally background. Further, because they are so magnified and worked 
over technically the abject materials produce their own aesthetic effects, in 
terms of colour, shape, form and placement in the grid system. As the artists’ 
themselves comment: 
 
“Even if they had some real shit and lavatory paper stuck to the pictures they 
would mean nothing…We think that through the form we use, through the 
negative that [sic] becomes so hard and polished, the pictures become so 
powerful and so aggressive in some funny way...people said that we even 
made shit beautiful.” (in Obrist and Violette 1997, p.248) 
 
As noted earlier, the ‘abject’ refers not just to materials but also to the socially 
excluded.  In the case of the work of Gilbert and George the use of the grid 
and the representation of the scatological are seen as articulating and 
celebrating a non-normative sexuality (Bourguignon, 2000;  Çakirlar, 2011).  
It is suggested, however, that this is a reading that begins to move beyond 
the picture plane to the constitution of the subjectivity of the portrayed 
through the interpretation of the image.  The work of ‘talk’ in constituting 
the portrayed is the focus of the next section. 
 
6.3.2 Gilbert and George:  in their own and others’ words 
Figure 6.1 is characteristic of Gilbert and George’s work which often 
comprises large scale coloured photographic montages or a ‘bricolage’ of 
objects or materials blown up in size, reduced in scale, or distorted in some 
way, placed within or on top of a grid structure, often in primary colours.  
 
Written text features in much of their work – including photographic images 
of graffiti, particularly expletives, or ‘found’ text such as newspaper 
headlines, or as a legend or title inserted into the image.  
 
In addition to the ubiquity of their ‘portraits’ (clothed and unclothed), the 
images include photographs of the people (predominantly young men) and 
physical environment of the East End of London, where the artists live. 
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Many of their images include photographic or cartoon representations of 
culturally abject material such as semen, blood, urine and faecal matter.   
 
Further as intimated, the work of Gilbert and George has been interpreted as 
a challenge to, and critique of, normative male heterosexuality. 
 
Figure 6.1, is therefore useful for exploring the play of recognition and 
abjection at two levels:  as a portrait incorporating both abject materials and 
opening on to a performative and putatively abject subjectivity;  and as an art 
object subject to evaluative criteria and absorption into (or rejection from) the 
institution as canon and physical space.  Key to understanding the operation 
of these processes is the artists ‘performance’ of themselves as ‘Gilbert and 
George’, a lived, imaged and discursive ‘fiction of the pose’ (Berger, 1994) 
characterised by what could be called a transgressive conformity and a play 
on (non-normative) sexuality.  In this process of self-creation, the words of 
Gilbert and George are as much the art as the photo-images themselves - a 
textual portrait - which becomes the prism through which they and their 
work comes to be interpreted.  The following section briefly illustrates this 
process of subject formation drawing on examples from their published 
interviews and examples from the interpretive literature.  The ways in which 
this feeds into or is fed by art critical commentary on the images is discussed 
below. 
 
Constructing Gilbert and George68 
‘Gilbert and George’, as an artistic identity was formed in the late 1960s 
when the two men were both students at St Martin’s School of Art in 
London.  They describe the formation of this identity as a way of rejecting 
the “elitism” of the art associated with the school at that time, and in 
particular the sculpture department.  From their earliest incarnation as a self-
created ‘living sculpture’, they have actively fashioned an identity in which 
                                                
68 Much of this section draws on an edited collection of interviews with the artists The Words 
of Gilbert and George (Obrist and Violette, 1997).  Although not examined critically here, 
where it is used primarily as a resource, it is nonetheless acknowledged that this too is 
arguably a contribution to the discourse constitutive of ‘Gilbert and George’, and as such 
potentially a ‘topic’ in its own right. 
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“we are both the art and the artist” (in Obrist and Violette, 1997, p.177). The 
performance ‘Gilbert and George’, is a mode of presentation and 
representation:  it is in the way the artists present their physical selves both 
in media images and in their art works, and also in an on-going, self-
constituting narrative in their text based works, films and interviews.   
 
A signature of the performance, both in media images and in their art, is that 
(when presented dressed) each wears, like a pair of non identical twins, 
similarly styled formal men’s suiting.  These are what the artists refer to as 
their “responsibility-suits of art”.  Commentators have described this 
adoption of conventional male business suiting as articulating a pose of 
conventionality by which to ostensibly reject conformity and the “implicit 
ideology of youth fashions” (Bracewell, 2007;  Dibosa, 2009).69 As suggested 
earlier, in figure 6.1 the fact that the otherwise naked artists wear watches 
and spectacles perhaps continues this play on sartorial conventionality. 
 
The nature of their relationship with each other, and their sexuality is also 
something with which they play.  Although living together, ‘performing’ in 
public together, wearing identical suiting and producing art works that have 
leant themselves to homoerotic interpretations, they reject being seen as gay 
spokesmen and distance themselves from a homo-erotic reading of their 
work:   
 
“We don’t want to make a homosexual or heterosexual art. We never wanted 
to do that. We want to make a sexual art. We think that’s very important.” 
(in Obrist and Violette 1997, p.288)  
 
“There’s nothing homosexual about our pictures. All men have cocks…We 
are interested in sex. We don’t do eunuch art…We don’t want to decide what 
a person does with their hands or sexual organs.  We are freedom 
fighters…More importantly we are normal.” (in Obrist and Violette, 1997, 
p.170) 
 
                                                
69 Commentators such as Jones (1995) have examined in more detail than is possible here the 
ways in which male artists have used the way they dress to reinforce or subvert normative 
masculine identity. 
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Yet they and their work have consistently been interpreted through the 
prism of their imputed sexuality.  For Bourguignon (2000), for example, 
Gilbert and George’s use, since the early 1970s, of the grid system to 
structure the internal spaces of their images (evident too in Bloody Shit 
House), and the “conformist” strategies of their external appearances, is a 
parallel of, and a challenge to, the repression of the ‘closet’ which protects, 
but also silences and represses homosexual identity and homosexual desire.  
Thus, for Bourguignon, the grid is read not as an aesthetic device per se, but 
as a visual strategy for expressing and challenging political repression, a 
strategy underpinned by the artists’ physical presentation of self outwith the 
space of the picture plane. Bourguignon (2000), links this interpretation back 
to the specific identities of the two artists: 
 
“If the grid/clothes represented societal repression of sexuality, especially of 
homosexuality, it also allowed the artists to explore and expose this sexuality 
because it granted them a certain protection or distance from their viewers. 
This too became part of their identity.” (np) 
 
The specifically faecal focus, or what one commentator refers to as Gilbert 
and George’s “scatological aesthetics” (Çakirlar, 2011), emerges in their work 
as early as the late 1960s, and is a recurring motif. In 1994, for example, the 
artists produced the Naked Shit Pictures, a series of 19 pictures incorporating 
images of Gilbert and George dressed, semi-dressed/un-dressed and naked, 
together with images of faeces flying, in the form of poles, or in a cruciform 
shape, overlaid on background photographs of crowds, landscapes and 
cityscapes. This was followed, in 1996, by The Fundamental Pictures series 
from which the Bloody Shit House (figure 6.1) is taken.  
 
When accounting for their use of faecal matter, as well as blood and other 
bodily fluids, as the subject and medium of their art, Gilbert and George 
themselves seem to draw on four different discourses. In an almost Kristevan 
move (though they appear not to use the term ‘abject’), they allude to the 
constitutive necessity of the abject (and its expelling) for the physical body to 
continue to exist: 
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“We need to eat, we need to spit, we need to piss and we need to shit, so it’s 
more important than anything else. Without these kinds of objects we 
wouldn’t be able to survive to live...” (in Obrist and Violette 1997, p.301) 
 
By the same token they draw on a normalising discourse.  Shitting is a 
universal activity - something which all can recognise and connect with or be 
connected by.  Further, because of this universal and constituting experience, 
there is a moral imperative to display shit, “the morality that we are allowed 
to eat but not allowed to look at our shit is morally wrong” (in Obrist and 
Violette, 1997, p.248).  Because of this, despite risking degradation, or being 
“damaged” by the process of collecting and displaying these indexical 
materials, the artists feel driven to do so to, “show every viewer what we 
really are” (in Obrist and Violette, 1977, p.301). 
 
But, for Gilbert and George, the “power” of this ostensibly transgressive 
move, comes from the formal qualities of presentation – from the “beauty” of 
the objects imaged and the form in which they are presented.   
 
“Recently people said that we even made shit beautiful in some way, that we 
gave a way of looking at it.” (in Obrist and Violette, 1997, p.248) 
 
For commentators, however, the representation of abject materials is again 
interpreted backward through the (imputed) non-normative sexuality of the 
artists, and forward as an expression of a queer art aesthetic.  
 
A common theme is to link the emergence of the representation of bodily 
fluids in Gilbert and George’s work, and also the gradual disappearance of 
images of young men, back to the emergence of AIDS from around 1984 
(Henderson, 2007;  Livingstone, 2007;  Morgan, 1997).  Henderson (2007), for 
example, sees The Fundamental Pictures series as mirroring “the way in which 
bodily fluids ceased being personal and instead became part of a pool of 
potentially transmissible pathology” (np). 
 
For a commentator like Çakirlar (2011) the combination in these works of 
magnified images of faeces and other bodily substances superimposed under 
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“vulnerable” naked male bodies has a more positive political function in 
both exposing and “pastiching” masculine anxieties of abjection. This 
“radical double exposure”, as evident in The Fundamental Pictures, of (flaccid) 
male nakedness and abject materials “refers to a performance of de-
abjection…signifying an artistic performance of normalization through 
transgression” (Çakirlar, 2011, p.97), throwing the “shame-gaze” back to the 
spectator.  Gilbert and George’s “performance of self-embarrassing, self-
shaming masculinity” (p.92) for Çakirlar thus functions to desublimate 
masculinity and male shame:  converting shame into joy, or “ejaculatory 
bliss”. 
 
What this rapid overview begins to suggest is that the subjectivity of ‘Gilbert 
and George’ is emergent from, on the one hand, the knowing ‘pose’ adopted 
by the producers of the images, and, on the other hand, from the subjectivity 
imputed to the artists in and through the critical commentaries on their 
work.  As the analysis by Çakirlar (2011) illustrates, the application of 
evaluative criteria and absorption (or rejection) of the work as an art object 
within the canon, can hinge not only on the formal qualities or art historical 
resonances, but the (political) efficacy of the images in challenging normative 
notions of ‘beauty’, heterosexual identity and the bourgeois homo clausus 
(Elias 1994 [1939]). 
 
6.3.3 Institutional consecration of the Bloody Shit House 
The Fundamental Pictures series, from which Bloody Shit House is drawn, was 
first exhibited in New York at the Sonnabend and Lehmann-Maupin 
Galleries.70 In addition to photographs of Gilbert and George naked in 
different poses this series of 39 photo images includes hugely magnified 
images of faeces and blood (as in figure 6.1), semen, urine and spit.  
 
In addition to the physical space of the gallery, the series was distributed and 
circulated by and through a number of different media under the control of 
                                                
70 Notwithstanding the artists’ apparent refusal to insist on their works “privileged status as 
art” (Livingstone, 2007, p.13) – each series is created for the exhibition space in which it will 
be displayed.  
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the artists.  These include the publication of an exhibition catalogue (in 
Gilbert and George’s ‘standard’ format) reproducing all 39 images and a 
CD:Rom. The exhibition also coincided with the launch of a Gilbert and 
George website (no longer live). 
 
The preparation of the photo-images was also documented for The South 
Bank Show, an arts programme on commercial television, which included 
interviews with the two artists.  This film, ‘The Fundamental Gilbert and 
George’, was first shown in London at the Tate Gallery and at the National 
Film Theatre in February 1997 and subsequently aired on Channel 4.  
 
In interviews Gilbert and George consistently attempt to distance themselves 
from other artists, from collectors and the art market:  “we’re anti art for 
posh people…we don’t believe in an art world” (in Obrist and Violette, 1997, 
p.134).  Despite this, and their ostensible rejection of the left wing avant-
garde (Livingstone, 2007), by the time The Fundamental Pictures were 
exhibited the artists were, in some respects, entrenched within the avant-
garde canon (if this is not a contradiction in terms). Grenfell and Hardy 
(2003), for example, include Gilbert and George among the ‘established’ 
artists in their analysis of the ‘field’ of contemporary British Art in the 1990s. 
 
This ‘canonisation’ may go some way to account for the degree of ennui or 
jocular familiarity that might be noted in some of the contemporary media 
responses to the exhibition. 71  The self-descriptive Naked Shit Pictures, shown 
in London the year before provoked the Mail on Sunday’s headline ‘The 
shock of the poo’ 72, while The Fundamental Pictures, generated ‘Digitising doo 
doo for the internet’ (Independent, 8 June 1997) and ‘Arty Farty’ (Sunday 
Mirror, 23 February, 1997). 
 
                                                
71 This brief overview of contemporary media responses was based on a rapid search using 
the Lexis Library and Factiva databases, and as such will only reflect the responses of the 
newspapers covered by these databases.  Further, no attempt has been made to undertake a 
systematic content analysis of these articles. 
72 A play on The Shock of the New, the title of a documentary series and book on the 
development of modern art produced by the art critic Robert Hughes in 1980. 
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Although Bloody Shit House has been singled out here for particular attention, 
largely for pragmatic purposes (being downloadable, and hence reproduce-
able in yet a further form), it is one of a series of pictures whose collective 
impact may be different from that of the individual image. 73  This is reflected 
in art critical responses which tend to comment on the whole series rather 
than individual images. One commentary that does make specific reference 
to Bloody Shit House, describes the work as among the more ‘trivial’ 
compared with other images in the series (Morgan, 1997).   
 
Reading across the evaluative commentary it is possible to identify three 
different strategies critics appear to draw on to position (and ‘canonise’) this 
series of works. The first strategy seeks to locate the works within the 
existing art historical canon, Early Modern art in particular.  This surfaces in 
relation to the not dissimilar Naked Shit Pictures series which, according to the 
art critic David Sylvester, “are as full of pictures of males nudes posturing, 
gesturing, parading…not reminiscent of stained glass but of Italian frescoes” 
(Sylvester, 1996, p.318).  
 
The art historical legitimation of the abject: locating the images within an 
established lineage, both in terms of substance and form, is compounded by  
a second strategy, that of reading the works as articulating a humanist 
and/or quasi religious morality.  This coalesces in Rosenblum’s introductory 
essay to the exhibition catalogue for The Fundamental Pictures: 
 
“Brilliantly transforming the visible world into emblems of the spirit, Gilbert 
and George create from these macroscopic facts an unprecedented heraldry 
that, in a wild mutation of the Stations of the Cross, fuses body and soul, life 
and death. Once again they have crossed a new threshold, opening unfamiliar 
gates of eternity.”  (Rosenblum, 1997, np) 
 
Although critics do not ostensibly evaluate the series through the lens of 
portraiture, a third strategy that can be read into the evaluative commentary 
                                                
73 In retrospect this may suggest a methodological failure, but it also alludes to the potential 
‘sociability’ of images:  the impacts of multiples over and above individual images, as well 
as between the images and the format(s) in which the images are viewed and the different 
social position or positioning of the viewers.  The single image reproduced and distributed 
as ‘multiple’ is, however, discussed in chapter 7 below. 
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is the very traditional move of suggesting that the self-portraits represent not 
just the physical presence of Gilbert and George, but also their psychological 
‘essence’. What is of particular interest here is how the evaluative criteria 
merge the works with the imputed subjectivity of the artists.  As noted 
earlier, Gilbert and George are to a degree complicit in this merging, but it is 
also paradigmatic of the genre of portraiture, with its ‘flip flop’ between 
evaluations of the image and evaluations of the imaged. This was touched 
upon in chapter 5, where the artist, Francesca Woodman’s death became the 
prism through which some commentators evaluated both the works, and the 
representation of the self in the works.  As will be discussed below, this 
slipperiness takes on a particular significance in the portrait of Dresie and 
Casie by Ballen.  In the case of the self-authored portraits by Gilbert and 
George, however, this evaluative merging of image and imaged has a 
number of manifestations.  For example it can be seen in the allusion to “the 
reality of their corporeal selves” (Bracewell, 2007, p.35).   Evaluative 
consideration is given not just to the formal properties of the abject materials 
represented in their art74, but the imputed indexicality of these materials.  
Bracewell, for example, describes how Gilbert and George, have included 
“phenomena” from both the streets and from within their own bodies: 
 
 “…Locating scripts and symbols, maps and patterns, a density encoded 
within the massively magnified substances of their own blood, sweat, urine 
and tears.” (Bracewell, 1997, p.27) 
 
Self-revelation both through the exposure of their naked (external) selves and 
their (internal) bodily fluids is framed as expressing the artists’ 
‘vulnerability’.  Referring to one of The Fundamental Pictures (but not Bloody 
Shit House), Rosenblum (1997), for example, describes Gilbert and George as 
appearing “stark naked and traumatised as a new Adam and Eve”.  Not only 
do such references reinforce the legitimating function of allusions to Early 
Modern art described earlier, but continues the (Christian) religious theme 
                                                
74 The art critic David Sylvester, for example, reviewing the not dissimilar Naked Shit Pictures 
series, describes how “the faeces they present us with are perfectly formed units… Blown up 
they look like rocks…Employed as building materials for monuments human excrement 
becomes as sociable as cow dung” (Sylvester, 1996, p.317). 
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that threads its way through much of the (positive) critical commentary on 
Gilbert and George’s work.   
 
It is interesting that the consideration of the artists’ sexuality, which fed into 
much of the commentary from the 1980s onwards, is much more muted in 
relation to The Fundamental Pictures.  In place of the ostensible homo-
eroticism of their early 1980s work, the images are read as representations of 
the aging artists’ physical and psychological vulnerability.  In other words, it 
is the vulnerability of their nakedness, rather than the sexual provocation of 
the nude that is foregrounded.  
 
6.3.4 Absorbing ‘Gilbert and George’ 
Through an overview of the ‘Words of Gilbert and George’ (Obrist and 
Violette, 1997) and an interpretation of the critical commentary on the art 
objects they produce it becomes possible to see the operation of a number of 
different processes of absorption and reconstitution of boundaries. First, the 
analysis of the artists’ own accounts and the interpretive and evaluative 
commentaries on their works suggest that the subjectivity of ‘Gilbert and 
George’ is emergent from the mutually reinforcing action of, on the one 
hand, the knowing ‘pose’ adopted in and by the producers of the images - 
the visual and textual pictures that the artists draw through not just their 
photographic self-portraits, but the interviews and accounts of their work.  
On the other hand, ‘Gilbert and George’ emerges from the subjectivity 
imputed to the artists in and through critical commentaries on the work; 
including the ‘flip flop’ between the evaluation of the image and an 
evaluation of the subject(s) of the image.  In effect, although the performative 
and performance that is ‘Gilbert and George’ could be seen as challenging 
what Jones (1994) refers to as the unitary (bourgeois) authorial subjectivity, 
the combination of their own ‘voice’ and the readings of their work, 
reinstanciate this very authorial subjectivity – and in the process construct 
and re-construct the subjectivity (ies) of Gilbert and George.   
 
Second, what is also revealed is what Morgan (1997) describes as the 
‘aestheticization of the abject’. That is, the way in which even the most 
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normatively abject material, the matter most out of place on the white walls 
of the gallery, cannot only be absorbed into the ‘clean and proper’, but can 
actually acquire value.  It is an almost alchemical process of “creating value 
out of fairly brutish material” (interview with Gilbert and George by Adrian 
Searle and Dan Atkinson, The Guardian 24 January 1997) – a value that 
appears to be acquired through the mutually reinforcing action of the 
evaluative criteria applied and the associated commercial value of the 
works.75  Through the attention to form, to the art historical canon and a 
humanist discourse, the threat of the abject, like the chaos or ‘shock’ and 
power of the ‘sublime’ is effectively, ‘tamed’ or domesticated’ (to paraphrase 
Battersby, 2007).  Like the ‘picturesque’ it serves to:  
 
“…Reassure that - even where there is disorder - man is in control and that 
nature has been constructed for human delight.” (Battersby, 2007, p.12)  
 
In effect, what a focus on the images and the ‘talk’ about the images reveals 
is that in the complex ‘dance’ of pose, performance, imputation and 
evaluation, the ‘abject’ ceases to be transgressive or threatening but becomes 
normalised and neutralised.  Far from defiling the white cube of the gallery 
spaces, the representation of faeces and blood are effectively absorbed by the 
gallery walls. Rather than constituting matter out of place (Douglas, 2007 
[1966]), the boundaries of ‘out of place-ness’ prove permeable.  In fact, not 
only are these abject materials absorbed they undergo an increase in 
evaluative and financial value (Thompson, 1979).   Further, while Gilbert and 
George’s knowing presentation and representation can be interpreted as a 
critique of normative heterosexual masculinity, this too can turn back on 
itself.   As Jones (1994) argues in her analysis of the work of male body of 
performance artists of the 1960s and 1970s, while their work could be read as 
a challenge to the “heterosexual, masculine conception of artistic authority” 
it can work “both against and with the grain of phallic authority” (p. 553): 
                                                
75 Several contemporary newspaper articles refer to the monetary value of the images. Robert 
Askwith, for example, writing in the Mail on Sunday notes that,  “A good Gilbert and 
George can fetch GBP 200,000” (4 April 1999). Another article describes the brand 
recognisability of Gilbert and George’s work, which, according the journalist, “can sell for 
between $40,000 and $200,000 (£25,000 - £125,000), depending on the scale of the piece” (Ian 
Burrell, Independent on Sunday, 8 November 1999, p. 49).  
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“Subversive, or simply regressive and phallocentric each of these pieces both 
strategically unhinges the phallus/penis/artist equation, and in some ways 
reinforces it.” (p.578) 
 
To explore this aesthetic-political double-cross, a second image will be 
analysed: a black and white photograph by the American photographer 
Roger Ballen of the twins Dresie and Casie (figure 6.2).  A double portrait of 
two men (as in Bloody Shit House) but one in which the authoring and 
authorising of the subjectivities is more problematically dispersed between 
the image, imaged and image-maker (and viewer), and in which the 

























6.4 Roger Ballen:  Dresie and Casie, Twins, Western Transvaal, 1993 





Dresie and Casie, Twins, Western Transvaal,  
1993 
Silver Gelatin print 
 
This second image (figure 6.2) comprises a black and white photograph of 
two young white men - twins.  The twin on the right (facing the viewer) is 
wearing an open-necked, short-sleeved shirt, which appears stained down 
the front.  The shirt has two pleated pockets in which he may be keeping 
things (they appear to be bulging).   He is standing upright with his arms 
down his sides.  He looks slightly unshaven.  His clean-shaven brother also 
wears a white open-necked, short-sleeved shirt with one patch pocket.  The 
shirt looks stained under the right collar, but less so than that of his brother’s, 
and is half tucked into the waistband of his light-coloured trousers.  Leaning 
slightly to the (viewer’s) right, he has crossed his arms in front of him and on 
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his left wrist he wears a watch. They both have dark, short hair, with fringes 
cut high on their foreheads.  The left hand twin’s hair has been flattened 
down, that of his brother stands up.  Their short hair exposes what appear to 
be quite pronounced ears.  Saliva is dripping from the mouths of both men;  
from the centre of the lip of the twin on the left and from the left corner of 
that of his brother’s.  They stand close together, directly facing and at eye-
level to the viewer/camera. The creases on their foreheads suggest frowns, 
accusatory or quizzical expressions.  They stand against a shadow-less white 
wall or background.  Light appears to be coming in from the right, and 
exposing one-half of the twins’ faces and casting the other side in a slight 
shadow. A sense of compressed space is underlined by the close cropping of 
the picture: at the waist level of the two men, at the sides (the outer arms of 
both men are either not visible or cut off), and at the top (just clearing the 
right-hand twin’s head). 
 
This double portrait, Dresie and Casie, Twins, Western Transvaal, 1993 was 
among the images included by the photographer Roger Ballen (1995) in his 
monograph Platteland:  Images from Rural South Africa.   At one level this 
image is closer to conventional portraiture than figure 6.1.  Dresie and Casie 
are photographed close up, clothed and ostensibly the subject of the image.  
But aspects of the medium, the internal form and the content systematically 
undercut this (relatively) unproblematic reading. 
 
In terms of medium, the use of black and white film coupled with the way 
the photographer has used the light makes the image appear quite stark, 
sharpening the contrasts and emphasising the men’s physical features.76  But, 
interpretively, this continued use of an older photographic medium, rather 
than colour film, combined with its content locates it within a lineage of 
                                                
76 The significance of the technology and the medium is highlighted in a commentary on 
Ballen’s work that describes how, in the 1980s, Ballen changed from using a 35mm Nikon 
camera, to using a Rolleiflex.  The reason Ballen gives is that the rectangular image produced 
with the Nikon implied that with each shot one length was more important than the other, 
whereas the 2¼ inch square format of the Rolleiflex “encourages a neutral aesthetic, 
emphasizing the formal shapes with the image and their contrasting textures” (Young, 2012 
http://www.rogerballen.com/articles/the-photography-of-roger-ballen - webpage no 
longer live).   
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images in the unstable border between documentary and ‘art’.  
Commentators variously suggest that, historically, Ballen’s images evoke the 
work of August Sander (1876-1964), who in his project ‘People of the 20th 
Century’ aimed to capture the portraits of a cross-section of early 20th Century 
German Society (Benjamin, 2009 [1931];  Sontag, 1984 [1977]) (see, for 
example, figure 6.3). It also recalls photographs commissioned by the 
American Farm Security Administration (FSA) in the 1930s.   Although 
intended, according to Sontag to be avowedly “propagandist” and to 
demonstrate to middle class people “that the poor were really poor, and that 
the poor were dignified” 1984 [1977] p.62), some of these images have also 
crossed the documentary-art divide and taken on their own ‘iconic’ 
[aesthetic] status, independent of their initial context (see, for example, figure 














‘Migrant Mother’ (Destitute Pea Pickers in California, mother of seven 
children, Age thirty-two, Nipomo, California) 
1936 
 
Although only signalled by the full title of the portrait of Dresie and Casie, 
the South African dimension opens on to comparisons with the work of 
David Goldblatt (1930- ), who used black and white photography to 
document life under apartheid (Young, 2012).  
 
The medium used coupled with the internal dynamic of Ballen’s image - the 
confined space, the closeness of the two men to the viewer and the directness 
of their gaze to camera - also, however, evokes the late 19th century 
‘mugshots’ of asylum inmates and prisoners (Edwards, 1990;  Gilman, 1982;  
Gilman, 1995) and in this cognitive leap, to the 19th Century eugenics 
movement.    
 
Through what could be argued to be a shared conceptual route, Ballen’s 
image draws parallels with the work of Diane Arbus who, working in the 
1950s and 1960s, self-avowedly photographed people who ‘looked strange’ 
(Sontag, 1984 [1977]).77 
                                                
77 A text accompanying Ballen’s image submitted for a Citigroup prize in 2002, illustrates the 
response the image provoked in the media -  “It looked like one of Diane Arbus’s many identical 
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The medium used, and the internal formal arrangement, thus trigger 
references to the poor, the mad, the bad, the excluded, but potentially 
threatening Other. This abjection by formal association is underwritten by 
the content. 
 
At an immediate level the image of the two men with shared and very 
distinctive physical features, in such close proximity to each other (and to the 
viewer), evokes what Freud, (2003 [1919]) describes as the uncanniness of the 
double (or Doppelgänger).   For Freud, the uncanny is a sense of the familiar 
rendered strange (or ‘unhomely’ (unheimlich));  in psychoanalytic terms it is a 
return of the repressed.78  Although not intending here to read this image 
through a psychoanalytic prism, Freud’s analysis draws attention to the way 
in which the double is constituted and experienced as troubling or 
unsettling, its symmetrical orderliness provoking its own converse - a sense 
of disorder or out of place-ness.  Gilbert and George draw on the double’s 
potential to unsettle in the way that, in many of their images, they mirror 
each other’s pose, in their adoption of identical or matching modes of dress, 
or, as in Bloody Shit House, their shared nakedness, but it is playing with the 
form. Arguably, because Gilbert and George are so self-evidently not twins 
the visual/emotional charge of the doppelgänger, whether 
psychoanalytically generated or tapping into some form of social imaginary, 
is largely missing from their work.  In the case of the image of Dresie and 
Casie the doubling of their distinctive physical and facial features works to 
provoke a sense of a self “duplicated, divided and interchanged” (Freud, 
2003 [1919], p.142), and as such, becomes disruptive of the familiar.  
                                                                                                                                     
twins, taken in the 1960’s and 1970’s only without the obvious empathy”  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2002/feb/02/weekend (accessed 4 March 2012). 
It is possibly ironic – Arbus is not necessarily known for her empathy. It should also be 
noted that Arbus was working in the 1950’s and 1960’s, she died in 1971. 
78 Drawing on the stories of E.T.A. Hoffman, Freud analysis the uncanny effect produced by 
the double – “persons who have to be regarded as identical because they look alike” (Freud 
(2003 [1919], p.141).  Freud sees the sense of uncanniness experienced when faced with a 
doppelgänger as having its basis in the evolution of the ego during which the meaning of the 
‘double’ changes.  In the ego’s earlier ‘primitive stage’, the double is experienced as “an 
assurance of mortality”.  In the subsequent development of the ego the ‘double’ is 
experienced as something alien and to be ejected - it is the “uncanny harbinger of death” and 
an “object of terror”.    
 185 
Unlike the image of Gilbert and George, Dresie and Casie are clothed. This in 
itself is unremarkable, and again much closer to the ‘traditional’ posed 
portrait.  The fact too, that the clothing of the right hand twin is noticeably 
dirtier than that of his brother does not necessarily wholly subvert the genre 
if the fiction being posed (Berger, 1994) is that of a romanticised and 
sanitised representation of the ‘dignity of labour’ or ‘dignity of the poor’.  
Ballen, talking in a podcast about how this picture was taken, does in fact 
describe how the twin with the dirty shirt had been working out of doors 
while the one with the cleaner shirt had come from indoors.79  
 
Problematically, in the absence of this explanation (or other indicators of the 
nature of the man’s work) the only visible link is between the saliva from his 
lip and the marks on his shirt.   In a converse move to that described above in 
relation to Bloody Shit House, this potentially pitches the image from the 
neutralising effect of the ‘picturesque’, to the more threatening realm of the 
abject, or, in Battersby’s terms with the ‘sublime’ “an encounter which is so 
strange or strikingly ‘other’ that our conceptual framework is unable to 
encompass it” (2007, p.11).  Arguably, the sense of ‘shock’ on encountering 
the ‘other’ in this image arises because, unlike the faeces and blood included 
in Bloody Shit House, the overflowing saliva is very directly linked to the two 
men.  The representation of this bodily effusion is not (apparently) the 
outcome of a series of active technical processes (including photographic 
magnification) intended for insertion into the background or foreground of 
the image, with only an implied rather than demonstrable link to the artists, 
but is apparently issuing from Dresie’s and Casie’s own lips at the moment 
the photograph was being taken.  Further, the ‘civilizing process’ has 
deemed saliva as inappropriate for public display and its exposure indicative 
of a shaming lack of bodily continence in adults.  As such any inadvertent 
leakage should be a source of humiliation and embarrassment - for which an 
apology would be offered or sought (Elias, 1994 [1939];  Koestenbaum, 2011; 
Munt, 2008; Tavuchis, 1991).  But in this image the two men appear 
                                                
79 https://www.eastmanhouse.org/events/detail.php?title=roger-ballen (accessed 15 June 
2015). 
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unabashed in presenting themselves to view with saliva ostensibly dripping 
from their lips.  
 
Also pulling the photograph in a number of directions is the watch worn by 
the brother on the left.  As with the image of Gilbert and George, the watch is 
both a banal residue of a life lived beyond the space and time of the 
photograph, but also in its very ‘normality’ draws attention to the 
‘strangeness’ of the image.  In the case of Gilbert and George it was 
suggested that the spectacles and glasses they wore on their otherwise naked 
bodies served to point up both the artificiality of the image, and their own 
parodic, transgressive respectability.  In the case of Dresie and Casie, the 
watch may perform a similar double action:  on the one hand acting as a 
“signifier of middle class stability” (Jones, 1995, p.27); and, on the other, 
against the counter signifiers in the image of physical labour and non-
normative corporeality, to (unwittingly) parody that respectability. 
 
Adding to the image’s ambiguity is the direct ‘full frontal’ pose of the two 
men.  In Bloody Shit House Gilbert and George present themselves similarly 
full or near frontal, but full length and at a distance so that there is less sense 
of physical proximity to the viewer or the implied intimacy of looking or 
being seen.  Dresie and Casie, on the contrary are presented half-length, close 
up, and looking very directly at the photographer/viewer.   From an art-
historical perspective, the frontal position in figure painting can work to 
position the viewer;  generating an implied ‘conversation’ between the 
person being painted, and the observer (painter/photographer and/or 
viewer) (Berger, 2001a;  Marin, 1980;  Schapiro, 1973).   Schapiro, for example, 
describes how, “we are inclined to see whatever faces us as looking at us” 
(1973, p.39). 
 
This sense of Dresie and Casie existing “in a space virtually continuous with 
our own” (Schapiro, 1973, p.39) coupled with the directness of the gaze – the 
absence of shame’s downcast eye (Charles Darwin, in Munt, 2008) has the 
potential to work at three levels.  First, it perhaps reinforces the sense of the 
uncanny, discussed earlier, of being in the presence of something that is both 
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familiar and yet somehow ‘out of place’.  Second, to be in “a space 
continuous with our own”, suggests an exchange and an equality of gazes – 
to be looked at and look back.  As described by one commentator: 
 
“Ballen presents us with two sharp massively physical beings scrutinising 
the camera’s lens back with as much intensity as we, as viewers bring to the 
photograph. Such is its power that we do not feel comfortable sitting back and 
judging these subjects;  we are also forced to consider how they view us.” 
(Cook, c2008, p.18) 
 
Third, and following on from this, it can be read as a rejection or refusal of 
what Munt (2008) has called “the injurious abjection caused by the 
withdrawal of the gaze of social acceptance” (p.222).   Their unabashed look 
could be read as a challenge to the other signifiers within and on which the 
image draws for some of its ‘meaning’, to provoke a more politicised reading 
which sees their presentation and representation as a challenge to the 
“hegemonic ideals” (Munt, 2008) of the bourgeois homo clausus (Elias, 1994 
[1939]).  This duality (duplicity?) of the image affords a reading of the 
photograph both as a critique, challenging and pushing the boundaries of 
bourgeois aesthetics and standards of beauty (in art and in physical form) 
and of normative subjectivity, and as an image which perpetuates or 
reinforces these “hegemonic ideals”, constitutive of the abjection of the 
subjects of the image.  
 
6.4.2 Dresie and Casie:  Beyond the picture plane 
‘Dresie and Casie’ in context  
As suggested in relation to Bloody Shit House, individual images produced in 
monographs, or as part of larger exhibitions, have their own ‘sociability’. The 
interpretations or meanings attached to the whole may be different from the 
affordances offered up by individual images when seen out of their 
presentational context. However, although, like Bloody Shit House, the image 
of Dresie and Casie has been bracketed together in a compound 
interpretation of the body of work of work of which it is a part, unlike the 
image by Gilbert and George it has also had a life of its own split off from its 
original context.   
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The whole, of which the image of Dresie and Casie is one part, is a series of 
around 20 black and white photographs first reproduced in the monograph 
published as Platteland:  Images from Rural South Africa80,81 (Ballen 1995). The 
images are of predominantly white couples or individuals ‘posing’ sitting or 
standing in their homes or gardens looking directly at the camera.  The 
apparent sparseness of the physical environments in which the men and 
women are photographed is suggestive of the poverty of the inhabitants of 
these rural towns.  The title of the series and the publication date locates 
these images within a specific geographic and political ‘space’:  the period in 
which the political regime of apartheid was being formally dismantled in 
South Africa.82    
 
An analysis of the responses to this series of images, contemporaneous and 
over time reveals a constant allusion to the sense of the ‘other-ness’ of the 
people as imaged: 
 
“His [Ballen’s] camera has recorded the troubled minds of these people, who 
gaze defencelessly into the camera and who have no sense of their visual 
presence. They are outsiders, excluded people, whose physiognomies are 
etched with the marks of their profound alienation from what is considered 
normal human existence.” (Pohlmann, 2010, p.8) 
 
But, in accounting for this otherness, the duplicitous nature of the 
photographic image - its allusive reality and hidden construction - is played 
out in the commentaries. Reading across the responses, the images are seen 
as documents opening on to the macrocosmic politics of apartheid and its 
dismantling and/or as raising problematic questions about the microcosmic 
political and ethical relation between photographed, photographer and 
viewer (when photographer and photographed are not one and the same).   
 
                                                
80 Platteland – literally ‘flat land’ in Afrikaans, refers to the rural areas of South Africa 
(http://www.thefreedictionary.com/platteland (accessed 10 July 2015)). 
81 In the UK the images were also exhibited at the Royal Festival Hall Galleries on the South 
Bank in London in 1995. 
82 The policy of apartheid (separateness) was adopted when the white National Party came to 
power in South Africa in 1948.  Over the period 1989 – 1991 the laws were repealed.  In 1994 
the African National Council, led by Nelson Mandela won the first non-racial elections.  
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Whether focused at the macro or micro political, however, the perceived 
‘transgression’ relates to the content and context of the images, not to the 
form. 
 
When the monograph was published in South Africa, accompanied by two 
promotional exhibitions in Cape Town and Johannesburg, the photographer 
experienced the vilification and opprobrium of the South African media and 
arts community, arrest and death threats.  Ballen, who denies being a 
‘political photographer’, has described how unprepared he was for the level 
of “social anger” and “overwhelming disapproval” that the monograph 
generated (Coslovich, 2009).  His introductory text to Platteland, however, 
firmly locates these images within the specifics of the political regime, seeing 
these people as victims of an ideology of white supremacy that was intended 
to secure their interests:   
 
“Fundamentally, what drew me to this subject was the profound irony that, 
despite half a century of political privilege, here in the physical heart of South 
Africa, even in a system created to secure their survival, were archetypes of 
alienation and immobility, victims of both political forces and personal 
circumstances, defending themselves against economic deprivation and 
psychological anguish in a hostile and unyielding environment.” (Ballen, 
1995, c p.1) 
 
Both Ballen, and commentators on this work, interpret the “tidal wave of 
controversy” (Cook, c2008) that the images provoked as due to the fact that, 
by documenting photographs of poor whites in conditions of deprivation, 
they transgressed the ruling white group’s view of itself.  According to Cook 
(c2008), Ballen’s: 
 
“Surreal vision and unsentimental regard was to upset the balance of the 
culture for whom certainties of black and white, coloniser and colonised were 
set in stone as a force of massive cultural defensiveness.” (p. 20)  
 
Ballen was seen as an interloping American “overstepping the mark of what 
could and could not be represented” (Cook, c2008, p.20).    
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In a context in which photography could be a technology of subjugation and 
surveillance, for example, through the pass books (‘dompas’) containing 
identity photographs, which black South Africans were required to carry 
when travelling outside their homeland or designated areas, the images in 
Platteland could be evaluatively framed as transgressive insofar as they 
turned the colonial gaze on itself,  revealing not the superiority of the whites, 
but their abjection – their own ‘otherness’ to themselves.   
 
The evaluation of the images as politically transgressive seems to have 
shaped the response within the cultural field outwith South Africa.  When 
Platteland was published the book jacket included an endorsement by Susan 
Sontag who is quoted as describing the monograph as “The most important 
sequence of portraits I’ve seen in years”.83 When the photographs were 
exhibited in London in 1995 a review in the free newspaper Metro described 
the images as: 
  
“...A new slant, pure documentary…an incisive use of portraiture to reflect 
times of great change…And it is clear from the fraught and often ravaged 
faces that stare out from these powerful, virtually surreal portraits, that 
despite the political privilege apartheid has bestowed on the white population, 
many whites have slipped through the net.  This is their story...” (Metro, 31 
March 1995, p.2)  
 
As with Gilbert and George, cultural institutional canonisation (outwith 
South Africa) came in the form of a special edition of the South Bank Show in 
February 1995, in which Ballen was filmed on a trip around the Western 
Transvaal. A television reviewer describes the film as revealing some of the 
“most demoralised people I had ever seen”, and Ballen’s photographs as 
“evocative, tragic, unforgettable portraits from hell” (Naughton, 1995, p. 25). 
 
Responses to the series over time suggest the absorption and neutralising of 
the images as their meanings (and financial value) shift.  As Ballen himself 
notes in recent interviews, the initial political furore that accompanied the 
publication of the images has dissipated and the series is now viewed in a 
                                                
83 http://www.lensculture.com/ballen-video.html (webpage no longer live).  
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nostalgic light “If I had done the same book now, nobody would care.  So 
much in life is timing” (Ballen, quoted by Coslovich, 2009, np).   The 
specificity of the context in which the images in the series were produced 
and published, gives way, in Ballen’s mind at least, to the supra-context of 
the ‘human condition’:  
 
“So I think that the photographs which have become iconic in some ways are 
more related to the human condition than to the particular circumstances of 
the time.” (Ballen, quoted in an interview with Chas Bowie, 2007, np) 
 
‘Dresie and Casie’ on their own 
Evaluative commentary which views the images contained in the Platteland 
series as articulating a critique of the political regime of apartheid, runs in 
parallel to a strain of commentary which focuses on the ‘micropolitics’ of the 
relationship between the photographer and the photographed.  At this 
micropolitical level critique is divided between an interpretation of the 
photographs as empowering and unsentimental and as an exploitative and 
unsympathetic ‘freak show’.   
 
In relation to the image of Dresie and Casie it is this micropolitics of the 
power relations at the level of picture production, and the abjectness of these 
two men, rather than the macro politics of place that is given greater 
emphasis.  This may have arisen because this photograph in particular has 
taken on a life of its own, separate from the other images in the series, 
compounded by the absence of markers of place, space or time, within the 
image itself.84   
 
It has been described as one of Ballen’s “most controversial and iconic 
images” (Cook, c2008, p.18), a cause and effect perhaps, of its ubiquity.  In 
addition to the Platteland series, Ballen included the image of Dresie and 
Casie as part of his Outland series published in 2001.  The photograph is also 
                                                
84 The absence of markers of place and space is perhaps indirectly illustrated by the 
experience of undertaking an internet search for the image of Dresie and Casie.  As noted in 
chapter 4, this was initially impeded because I had assumed that, because of its formal 
properties (and subject matter), the photograph was the work of Arbus.   Only by searching 
for ‘twins’ in Google Images did Ballen emerge as the photographer. 
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often used in advertisements for retrospectives of Ballen’s work (e.g. Shadow 
Land, Manchester Art Gallery in 2012) and to illustrate as well as be the focus 
for published interviews with Ballen (see for example, Coslovich, 2009). 
Media and academic commentaries on his work as a whole also use this 
image both for illustration and critique (O’Hagan, 2012;  Schoeman, 2011).  
Prints of the image have been auctioned, and in 2002 it was nominated for 
the Citigroup prize.85 Ballen himself describes how it has also been used to 
sell products as diverse as hamburgers and property.86  
 
Dresie and Casie:  Not in their own words 
In interviews or podcasts accompanying retrospectives held in Manchester, 
New York and Western Australia in the 2000s, Ballen uses two strategies for 
positioning his body of work. First, a denial of its documentary quality, 
seeing it rather as “primarily existential and psychological” (interview with 
Coslovich, 2009, np).  Drawing on the same humanist discourse identified in 
the commentaries on the work of Gilbert and George, Ballen describes his 
own work as opening onto or raising questions about the “human 
condition”.  He considers his work ‘art’ insofar as it helps to “expand 
consciousness” and “self-understanding”, providing an opening on to the 
“deep interior of the self”, defining a “condition before language”.87  Second, 
Ballen acknowledges the ‘constructed’ nature of his images, in the sense of 
selecting what he chooses to photograph “so not just happening and I was 
around to take the picture”.88  But he rejects the notion that they are ‘staged’ 
feeling that this implies that they are contrived or inauthentic.  For Ballen, 
the fact that his images can have many meanings gives them authenticity. 
                                                
85 The absorption of Ballen’s images into the mainstream is illustrated by a report in the Daily 
Telegraph in February 2002, which suggests the mutually reinforcing effect of being selected 
for a photography prize and the monetary value of art objects:  “The annual Citigroup 
Private Bank photography prize… has a habit of spotting future art celebrities…This year, 
American photographer Roger Ballen is the name on everyone's lips. Since his discovery by 
London dealer Michael Hoppen three years ago, prices for Ballen's powerful portraits of 
poor South African whites have risen from pounds 600 each to pounds 15,000 for sought-
after images.” (Gleadell, Daily Telegraph, 4 February 2002, p.16). 
86 https://www.eastmanhouse.org/events/detail.php?title=roger-ballen (accessed 15 June 
2015) 
87 Podcast to accompany Manchester Art Gallery retrospective, 2012, 
http://www.manchestergalleries.org/whatson/exhibitions/index.php?itemID=87 
(webpage no longer live)  
88 Ibid 
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Accounting for the image of Dresie and Casie, Ballen has described how it 
came about when he was travelling in relation to his geological work: 
 
“As they were driving around the town Ballen glimpsed an interesting 
person in a garden. He stopped the car and walked over. The man could not 
speak but his mother was on the porch and Ballen asked if he could take a 
photo. She said yes. As he was shooting, he saw a shadow behind him, turned 
around, and was startled to find the other brother. He then asked if he could 
take a photo of both of them. The whole event lasted only five to eight minutes 
in total.” (Cook, c2008, p.30)  
 
As this quote suggests, there is an element of contingency in the process of 
capturing Dresie and Casie:  Ballen sees “an interesting person” by chance 
who is then joined by his brother.  Ballen does not account for what 
“interested” him, whether the picture published was one of a series of the 
brothers from which a selection was made, or why he included it in the 
monograph.  The production process is therefore unseen.  Ballen is, however, 
aware of the effect the image has had.  In a podcast produced at the time of a 
retrospective of his work in New York in 2010, Ballen describes this image as 
being his most famous (but not necessarily “favourite”) photograph, and one 
that would “haunt him to the grave”.   Aware that wherever he goes this is 
the one image of his to which people refer Ballen admits to struggling to 
understand what makes this image so unforgettable, conjecturing that it was 
“like looking at the other side of the brain, reflecting something very human, 
something that everyone has experienced though not necessarily in this 
generation...”.89  In an earlier interview, Ballen again seeks to account for the 
image’s apparent visual power in terms suggesting that it taps into some pre-
historic trace memory “What do you think human beings looked like a 
million years ago”.  At the same time the photographer seeks to distance 
himself from the implication that the two men represent some sort of 
‘throwback’ to an earlier period of human development, by emphasising the 
constructed nature of the image and the multivalency of its meanings: 
 
“The most important thing is I can’t tell you the meaning of the picture;  you 
have to find it yourself…You are not looking at them, you are looking at the 
                                                
89 https://www.eastmanhouse.org/events/detail.php?title=roger-ballen (accessed 15 June 
2015) 
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picture. What you are looking at is a picture that I have created and refined 
and created an aesthetic with. The story is actually irrelevant because it may 
be subjective, it may be distorted.” (Ballen interviewed by Coslovich, 
2009, np)   
 
Dresie and Casie: Subject or object? 
The analysis of the work of Gilbert and George suggests the parity of the 
artists’ voice in their self-construction and in mediating the evaluation of the 
art objects they produce.  In this sense they are authors and authorisers of 
their own ‘abjection’. Dresie and Casie, by comparison with the similarly 
familiarly named ‘Gilbert and George’, have no public voice;  as the subjects 
of the image they are silent (the description above of how the picture was 
taken also suggests that at least one of the twins was literally mute).  Further, 
little is made known about their identities;  which one is Dresie and which 
Casie (if that is their names), what their surname is90, their age, or other 
aspects of their biography.  This absence is filled by the authorial subjectivity 
of the photographer Ballen91, and by commentaries in which Dresie’s and 
Casie’s physicality, implicit assumptions about their mental and physical 
disabilities, or “genetic make up” (see for example, Coslovich, 2009; 
O’Hagan, 2012;  O’Toole, 2012), and the degree to which they were complicit 
in the production of this ‘fiction of the self’ overwhelms evaluative 
commentary. It is the ‘aesthetic significance of the face’ (Simmel, 1959 [1901]) 
rather than the image qua image which takes precedence: 
 
 “The twins have misshapen faces, necks as thick as bullocks, ears that 
protrude like chimps’, bluntly cut spikey hair and prominent lower lips.  
Ballen has photographed them with a long thread of drool hanging from their 
blubbery mouths, their shirts wet and stained with dribble. 
 
                                                
90 A Google search suggests their surname may be Williams, but this is not verifiable – 
neither the publication in which the image first appears, nor Ballen’s subsequent references 
to the image give their full names.   
91 Ballen himself was born in New York in 1950.  His mother was a photographer’s assistant 
with the Magnum photographic agency and subsequently ran a photographic gallery.  
Initially Ballen studied psychology.  Subsequently he took up geology, moving to South 
Africa in the early 1980s. He began photographing while young, buying his first camera at 
13 years, but he had no formal photographic training. He published his first book, Boyhood, 
in 1979.  His first collection of images of rural South Africa, Dorps: Small Towns of South 
Africa, was published in 1986.  Ballen has his own website. At the time of writing (June 2015) 
this was still live (http://www.rogerballen.com/). 
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The image provokes an uncomfortable rush of thoughts and emotions:  
curiosity about the twins’ genetic make up, intrigue about their story, 
concern that someone could so brutally point the camera and shoot – did the 
twins understand the ramifications of that moment?” (Coslovich, 2009, np) 
 
As noted above, the commentaries on the Platteland images allude to the 
perceived ‘otherness’ of the people represented.  In critiques and 
commentaries on the photograph of Dresie and Casie this seems to be 
coupled with a shared discomfort in looking, a discomfort not so evident in 
commentaries on the self-authored work of Gilbert and George.  In 
accounting for their discomfort, commentators fall somewhere on a 
continuum between those who would criticize the photographer for his 
putative exploitation of the two men (an exploitation in which the viewer is 
made complicit) and those (including Ballen) who would criticize the 
viewer/observer for their oppressive and abjecting gaze.   The ambiguous 
positioning of the viewer viz-a-viz Dresie and Casie is reflected in the 
commentators’ uncertainty whether the image objectifies:  rendering the 
twins mute and unknowing or uncomprehending objects of the viewer’s 
curiosity;  or is a ‘performance’ giving visibility to knowing, “inquisitive” 
individuals who are otherwise:  
 
“Absent from representations of the human according to conventional 
protocols…refused the human possibility of being the ordinary subjects of 
photography.” (Young, 2012, np). 
 
Cook (c2008), for example, reiterates Ballen’s expressed view that people 
have difficulty with his material because they cling to a notion of civilization 
and humanity that is fundamentally restricted and artificial, and which 
places culture above nature. Perhaps attempting to illustrate how Ballen’s 
work extends the boundaries of the normative, in his own commentary on 
the image Cook both draws attention to their (non-normative) corporeality 
while also arguing that, rather than objectifying and constructing them as 




“[the image] Shows the twins with their hair sitting spiky on their heads, big 
noses, big ears, protruding bottom lips, and a stream of drool hanging from 
their mouths that has stained their shirts. They seem relaxed in their skins, 
totally alert to what is going on. This work is a study in inquisitiveness, a 
study in what it means to present a camera to another human and what it 
means to face that camera.” (Cook, c2008, p.18) 
 
Others are more critical – and it is notable that these are commentaries on, 
rather than texts accompanying exhibitions.  O’Hagan (2012), for example, 
writing in the Guardian newspaper, critiques a seminar given by Ballen 
around the time a retrospective of the photographer’s work was being shown 
in Manchester.  In a largely critical article, ending with the comment that 
much of Ballen’s work “leaves me cold”, O’Hagan questions why Ballen does 
not address whether and why he was drawn, like Diane Arbus, “to the 
human grotesque”, nor acknowledge “our complicity as viewers – the very 
thing that gives these images another layer of disturbing power” (O’Hagan, 
2012). 
 
Dresie and Casie in the world 
Outwith the hermetic world of the academic journal and art criticism and 
into the (relatively) untrammelled work of the internet and blogging the 
photograph of Dresie and Casie, has taken on the life of a found image, with 
a similar afterlife (Schoeman, 2011).  The focus in this media on the two men 
rather than the image per se, however, poses critical questions not just about 
‘authorial subjectivity’ (whose?), ‘fictions of the pose’ (whose fiction and 
whose pose?) and transgression (pushing or reinforcing the boundaries) but 
about the about the ownership and control of the presentation of the self in 
the age of electronic reproduction: 
 
“Probably the most famous and widely stolen photo on the internet!...I've 
seen this pic before and each time they (the twins) still manage to scare the 
snot right out of me!”  
(http://www.modelmayhem.com/po.php?thread_id=754233 
accessed 11 February 2013) 
 
“The blogger PrecordialThump "it isn’t enough that the twin brothers Dresie 
and Casie possess wildly protruding ears and tree trunk like necks but Ballen 
photographs them with gossamer like drool dripping from their thick pouting 
 197 
lips.…a future geneticist, seems to have found the correct answer - Fragile X 
syndrome.”  
(http://casesblog.blogspot.co.uk/2008/12/roger-ballens-photograph-
and-search-for.html accessed 11 February 2013) 
 
 
In one register it could be suggested that the responses to Ballen’s work in 
general and to the photograph of Dresie and Casie in particular, reflects the 
attraction and repulsion of the other, the abject, the ‘carnivalesque’ 
(Stallybrass and White, 1986). But, what seems to mark the responses to this 
image as qualitatively different from the responses to the self-authored work 
of Gilbert and George, is the question of the power relation between the 
photographer and those photographed:  as summarised by Coslovich, “did 
the twins understand the ramifications of that moment?” (2009, np).  It could 
be argued that those who would seek to deny through visual exclusion the 
autonomy as well as the physicality of Dresie and Casie are, by the same 
token, seeking to preserve the integrity of the bourgeois homo clausus and 
deny its corporeality.  This, however, leaves the question of authorial 
subjectivity unresolved:  that is, whose subjectivity is being constituted and 
by whose authority?  
6.5. Discussion 
The overall aim of this chapter was to further explore the complex 
relationships, both centrifugal and centripetal, between the visual image, the 
subjectivities portrayed in and through the image, and the object’s trajectory 
through the field of cultural production. To examine this the focus was on 
two double portraits, which in terms of how, who and what they represent, 
are potentially ‘transgressive’.    
 
As sensuous material artefacts the images offer up affordances or 
provocations to the viewer, which, although historically and socially 
contingent, nonetheless are stimulated by the materiality of the object in and 
of itself – its own specificity – the form and colour and content generated by 
(largely unseen) technical processes.  
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Although both images analysed here draw on photography the manipulation 
of the medium is distinctive.    The image of, and by, Gilbert and George, is a 
form of ‘bricolage’, a number of discrete photographs of objects or materials 
blown up or reduced in scale, placed within or on top of a grid. The 
placement of the items, their colour and shape generate aesthetic effects of 
symmetry, line and contrast, while the distorted size and disproportionality 
of the objects represented expose the constructed nature of the image. 
 
The aesthetic choice of black and white photographic film by Ballen produces 
its own formal qualities of light and shade, but also plays on the historical 
resonances of the medium and simultaneously evokes a documentary mode. 
As noted earlier, these evocations can include the mythic (Barthes, 1985 
[1957]) dignity of poverty, or the classificatory ‘mug shots’ of the insane or 
criminal.  By effectively obscuring the aesthetic choices of medium and 
selection of images, Ballen exploits photography’s apparent fealty to reality 
to create its effects of ‘truth’.  The form thus generates an aesthetic response 
to the sensuous properties of the image, but also, perhaps, because of the 
resonances of the medium begins to provoke an evaluation of the imaged. 
 
In both images the human subjects adopt a frontal pose.  Earlier it was 
suggested that this pose carried with it an implied ‘address’ to, or the illusion 
of, a potential ‘conversation’ – an implied exchange/return of looks. Gilbert 
and George’s pose in Bloody Shit House, is frontal, but the gaze is at a distance 
and away from the viewer, thereby denying the exchange of looks.  In 
Ballen’s photograph of Dresie and Casie, the pose and look is direct and close 
up to the photographer/viewer.  Arguably, these formal arrangements could 
be interpreted as not just frontal, but ‘confrontational’ insofar as they return 
or reject the potentially shaming/abjecting gaze.  As suggested earlier, 
Dresie and Casie’s unabashed look could provoke a politicised reading 
which sees their presentation and representation as an empowering critique 
of bourgeois aesthetics and standards of beauty (in art and in physical form).  
But this is to oversimplify or even over look the series of power relations at 
play in the production and reception of the image.  In particular it disregards 
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the relationship between the subject and the photographer and the role of 
power in the ‘authoring’ and authorising of the pose.   
 
In portraiture frontality may intimate the consent (or complicity) of the 
subject, but Pointon (2013), writing in relation to 18th Century slave 
portraiture and Edwards’ (1990) in his discussion of 19th Century portrait 
photography, draws attention to the power relations embedded within the 
portrait process, that is the ways in which the portrait process “replicates 
patterns of authority that have wider resonance” (Pointon, 2013, p.59).   
Edwards, looking at the relationship between photographer and subject 
distinguishes between bourgeois portraits (in which the subject and 
photographer are co-author) generative of a ‘duologic’/participatory’ gaze 
and the monological/objectifying gaze generated by, for example, ‘mug 
shots’ of criminals, where the participation may not be voluntary or based on 
informed consent.  As noted earlier, in comparison with the self-authored, 
self-fashioned, naked pose of Gilbert and George, ethical (rather than 
aesthetic) concerns were raised regarding the degree to which Dresie and 
Casie consented to, or were fully aware of the implications of Ballen’s 
photograph.   
 
This differential concern is generated not just by Dresie and Casie’s 
physicality but by the exposure of otherwise hidden bodily processes – 
saliva.  As noted earlier, while the image of Gilbert and George is structured 
around faeces and blood photographically magnified this is not directly 
associable with the artist(s). The materials are abstracted from the corporeal 
and carry their own aesthetic qualities of colour and shape within the image. 
In the case of Dresie and Casie, this evidence of their own corporeality is 
integral to the pose.  Further, because of the medium used by the 
photographer and its apparent unconstructed-ness this image poses a 
different set of questions from the images using similarly abject materials by 
Gilbert and George. In the case of Dresie and Casie, the photograph could be 
said to capture the ‘reality’ of Dresie and Casie – overflowing saliva is part of 
them, it is how they are and to portray them otherwise would have been an 
‘untrue’ representation, and one that denies their identity.  It could also 
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reflect a selection process – a choice of image for display and distribution 
from a series some of which might include the men without the dripping 
saliva.  It could also be an artifice, a fiction, a ‘pose’, which Ballen has 
manipulated, just as Gilbert and George have manipulated their own image.  
As such it could be interpreted as aesthetically transgressive, undermining 
the idea and form of the portrait, and by extension challenging the social 
hierarchies of bourgeois bodily respectability, or it could be interpreted as a 
subjugating image, constituting Dresie and Casie in abjection.   
 
In both cases other dimensions of abjection: Gilbert and George’s non-
normative, ‘abject’ sexuality and Dresie’s and Casie’s identity as ‘poor 
whites’ opens on to a politics outwith, but imbricated in the interpretation of 
the image.  
 
What this demonstrates is how (even) the sensuous or formal properties of 
the portrait, specifically the pose of the subject, are both constituted by and 
constitute a series of power relations. In addition to the power relation at the 
point of production of the pose, is the way in which the pose subsequently 
positions the (temporally and spatially situated) subject of the image viz-a-
viz the (similarly temporally and situated) viewer.  As suggested earlier, the 
ambiguous positioning of the viewer viz-a-viz Dresie and Casie is reflected 
in the analysis of the commentary on the images.  This suggests that in 
responding to these images critics are uncertain whether to read the image as 
objectifying:  rendering the twins mute and unknowing or uncomprehending 
objects of the viewer’s curiosity;  or as a ‘performance’ giving visibility to 
knowing, “inquisitive” individuals.  Arguably, in the space of uncertainty 
even the self-fashioned pose may become the monologic gaze of 
objectification (Edwards, 1990). 
 
Second, the analysis draws attention to the processes by which these works 
are constituted and evaluated as ‘art’ and the producers recognised and 
evaluated as artists.  In particular, the response to these images suggest the 
working of what Heinich describes as the ‘permissive paradox’ (Heinich, in 
Danko, 2008), and Bourdieu (2004), “ritual acts of sacrilege” whereby works 
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that ostensibly question or breach some aesthetic boundary are effectively 
absorbed into and reinforce the field and enhance the position of the artists.  
Both images discussed here are consecrated as art objects and the producers 
positioned as artists, rather than as, for example photojournalists. As noted 
earlier, by the time The Fundamental Pictures, series was exhibited, Gilbert and 
George were already established artists within the avant-garde canon, and 
the critical commentary on their work situates it (paradoxically) within a 
lineage stretching back to the humanist impulse of Early Modern art.  The 
exhibition and publication that included the photograph of Dresie and Casie 
was relatively early in Ballen’s career, but this image in particular, seems to 
have contributed to his ‘recognition’ as an artist – indicated by the prices his 
prints command and the nomination of this photograph for the Citigate 
prize.  Critical commentary, however, reflects the ambiguous positioning of 
the image between documentary and ‘art’ – a function, as suggested above, 
of the medium, but also of the content, itself a function of the truth effects 
photography (erroneously) produces.  As a result less attention is given to 
the image’s formal properties and location within a canon, and much more to 
the macro- or micro-political and ethical questions it provokes.   
 
Third, the analysis again underlines portraiture’s specificity, and in 
particular the capacity for slippage between the (aesthetic) evaluation of the 
image as material object and cultural artefact, and evaluation of the subject of 
the portrait.  Further, it may also begin to suggest how the processes of 
evaluation of the object’s sensuous properties and of cultural canonisation 
can work independently and together in constituting the subjectivity of the 
imaged. Two critical relations seem be at play: the relation between producer 
of the image and the person(s) imaged – that is whether the image is a self-
portrait or whether it is a portrait by the artists of others; and the processes 
by which the subjectivities and identities of those imaged come to be 
constituted or imputed from the visual image. Ironically, in the context of a 
consideration of visual images, or perhaps as another dimension of 
portraiture’s specificity, what the analysis in chapter 5 and in this chapter 
begin to suggest is the contributory role of the ‘voice’ of the artist in 
constructing the aesthetic evaluation of the object as ‘art’ and in the 
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constitution and evaluation of the subjects/subjectivities of those portrayed.  
Chapter 5 described the processes of evaluation, canonisation and 
constitution of subjectivity in relation to self-portraits by an artist rendered 
voiceless by her premature death. This chapter illustrates how these 
processes play out in relation to a double self-portrait by artists who actively 
seek to construct their art and their self ‘image’, and in the context of a 
double portrait by an artist who ‘speaks’, but whose subjects are effectively 
mute. 
 
In their self-portrait, Gilbert and George are artfully and knowingly active in 
constituting their own authorial subjectivity and social identity.  The 
manipulation of the photographic medium and self-constituted ‘fiction of the 
pose’ (Berger, 1994) within the image is mirrored by their active self-
fashioning outwith the picture plane.  Paralleling their visual identity, both 
naked in the image and dressed in their ‘responsibility suits’ in public 
appearances, is their ‘voice’ in their pronouncements on their art, themselves 
and their politics. To the extent that the artists control the ‘fiction of the pose’ 
both within and outwith the picture plane they have the potential to exercise 
some (if not absolute) control over the conditions of their recognition as 
individual subjects of moral worth (Honneth, 2004;  Sayer, 2005). 
 
Ballen, too, is active in constituting his own authorial subjectivity, and in 
positioning his work. The subjects of his work, Dresie and Casie, are, 
however, silent.  In the space of silence their physicality overwhelms and 
comes to be constitutive of an imputed subjectivity – perpetuated by Ballen’s 
‘voice’ and that of the commentators on the image.  Arguably this image 
articulates the monologic gaze (Edwards, 1990)  - but not just the unequal 
power relation between the photographer and subject, but also inequalities 
in ownership and control of the constitution of subjectivity. Dresie’s and 
Casie’s silence may open up, in Çakirlar’s (2011) terms, the potential to 
return the shame gaze but equally (and perhaps simultaneously) exposes 
them to objectification (Nussbaum, 1995) and ‘misrecognition’ (Honneth, 
2004;  Sayer, 2005).   
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This is not to argue for some a priori ‘authenticity’ of ‘voice’.   As Youngblood 
Jackson (2010), for example, argues in the context of feminist qualitative 
research, the essentializing and romanticizing of ‘voice’, can work to 
replicate unequal power relations, perpetuating Otherness.  If, as in 
Youngblood Jackson’s reading (drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept 
of the rhizome) “silence can be resignified as resistance, as agency” 
(Youngblood Jackson, 2010, p. 707) Dresie’s and Casie’s own muteness may 
be a source of power.  But while ‘vocality’ is no guarantor over how one’s 
utterances will be interpreted (as interpretations of the work of Gilbert and 
George begin to suggest), as seen in the case of Ballen’s photograph, in the 
absence of a voice outwith the picture plane Dresie and Casie are, 
nonetheless, at risk of being constituted in abjection by the bourgeois gaze.  
 
6.6 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to examine what could be revealed of the 
relationships between the material object, the ‘art object’ and the constitution 
of subjectivity when looking at portraits pushed to the extremes in terms of 
how, who and what they represent.  What it contributed to was an 
understanding not just of the inter-relationships between these three 
dimensions, but also of the complex relations of power weaved through.  
 
Through the choice of the ‘abject’ as a conceptual frame – specifically its 
concerns with the constitution and fragility of social and psychic boundaries 
- there was an assumption that these images would provoke these 
considerations of power.  It was, however, only through the detailed analysis 
of the images individually and, particularly, in comparison, that the 
complexity of these relations became apparent. This comparison underlined 
how the authoring and authorising of the pose may feed not just into 
‘aesthetic’ evaluations of the image, qua image, but into aesthetic and ethical 
evaluation of the subjects of the images. Further it drew attention to the ways 
in which the ‘voice’ of the artist may work to position the viewing of the 
work as art (and their own position within the field of cultural production) 
and to the constitution of the subjectivities of the portraits objects. By the 
same token it revealed the potential duplicity of the image, that is, its 
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capacity to be both a vehicle for ‘recognition’ and for objectification and 
misrecognition, and as such raises the question “when is the power of the 
image turned against itself?” (Apel, 2005, p.100). 
 
This question may take on added urgency in the digital economy where the 
cues for reading work as ‘art’ rather than reportage or social networking are 
increasingly ambiguous.  The scope and limitations for self-fashioning in the 
age of digital reproduction will be considered in the next chapter. 
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7. An aura or a Blur? The work of portrayal in the age of 
digital reproduction  
7.1 Introduction 
 
“That which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the 
work of art.” (Benjamin, 1999a [1936], p.215)   
 
Up until this point no attention has been paid to the ways in which the 
portraits discussed here have been reproduced for insertion into the text.  
Yet, as Walter Benjamin has argued, the very processes of (mechanical) 
reproduction and the parallel or associated (if not causal) changes in 
structures of perception have implications for the work of art’s authenticity 
and the sense of its ‘aura’ (Benjamin (1999a [1936]).   In this chapter, 
Benjamin’s arguments provide the starting point for exploring the 
implications not just of the reproduction of the portrait as an (art) object, and 
one with sensuous properties, but also for the (re)production and 
(re)presentation of the subject/self as a portrait. 
 
Benjamin’s conceptualisations of ‘aura’ and ‘authenticity’ are significant in 
the current context in two ways.  First, because of the way in which 
Benjamin’s analysis focuses on ‘aura’ as an emergence from, and experience 
of, both the presentation and the representation of the human subject/the 
face.  As Costello (2005) remarks, “the photographic images of the face have 
a privileged relation to the experience of aura” (p.180).  In his essay, The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction Benjamin identifies early portrait 
photography with the “last refuge for the cult value of the picture” (1999a 
[1936]) p.219). In his earlier work, Brief History of Photography (2009 [1931]), 
Benjamin compares the portrait photography of the early 1840s, such as that 
produced by the painter David Octavius Hill, with that of the 1880s, and 
associates what he sees as the loss of aura of the later photographic images 
not just with improvements in photographic technology, but also with the 
diminution of the substantive aura of the bourgeois subjects. For Benjamin, 
the later portraits are marked by the feigned aura of the ‘age of decadence’. 
By contrast he writes approvingly of Eugene Atget’s early 20th Century 
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photographs of Parisian street scenes, largely devoid of human presence, for 
“disinfect[ing] the stuffy atmosphere” of later commercial portrait 
photographs, and ushering in “the liberation of object from aura” (Benjamin, 
2009 [1931] p.184).  Similarly Benjamin promotes August Sander’s portraits 
of ‘types’ (see figure 6.3 in chapter 6), precisely for not being portraits as 
normally understood, but for their ethnographic/scientific purpose 
(Costello, 2005).  Benjamin, however, appears to recuperate what Costello 
(2005) interprets as the ethical dimension of ‘aura’ in a later essay, Some 
Motifs in Baudelaire (1999b [1939]). Here Benjamin associates the decline in 
aura with mechanical technology’s “inhuman” gaze.  Unlike the early 
daguerreotype which “records our likeness without returning our gaze”, 
 
 “To perceive the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the 
ability to look at us in return.” (Benjamin, 1999b [1939]), p.184) 
 
Second, the questions Benjamin poses about the impact of techniques of 
reproduction on the ‘authenticity’ and ‘authority’ of the artwork takes on 
urgency in the context of the ‘hypermediated’ digital economy (Bolter and 
Grusin, 2000).  At the point(s) of production, digital media put under 
increasing pressure the conceptualisation of the singular ‘artist-as-creator’ 
(Bourdieu, 2004; Fyfe, 1988), and bring into question issues of the original 
and authentic (and finite or contained) work of art.  The multiple modes of 
reproduction and multiple points of distribution or dispersal (Joselit, 2011) 
and reception also pose significant questions about the acceleration of the 
loss of ‘aura’ (Benjamin, 1999a [1936]).  
 
The dispersal of the means and mode of production, reproduction, 
distribution and reception of the image have their parallels in the 
postmodern experience and analysis of the dissolution of the link between 
the signifier and signified, between the ‘real’ and the representational and 
the substitution of the ‘real’ by the simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1984), and the 
fracturing of the unitary bourgeois subject. Authors such as Buchloh (1994) 
and van Alphen (1997) argue that portraiture has been a medium of 
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expression for this shattering of ‘one-ness’ and its replacement by the 
performative, the absent and the multiple:   
 
“The portrait returns, but with a difference, now exemplifying a critique of 
the bourgeois self instead of its authority;  showing a loss of self instead of its 
consolidation; shaping the subject as simulacrum instead of as origin.” (van 
Alphen, 1997, p.242) 
 
In the 20th and 21st Century a number of art movements have emerged which 
express or articulate this shattering of singularity of both the subject and 
object.  Of particular relevance in this chapter is the concept and production 
of ‘artist’s multiples’.  This includes the use of ‘ready-made’ objects, of which 
the “founding gesture” (Bury, 2001) was Duchamp’s ‘fountain’ in 1917, but 
extends to Pop Art, the Fluxus movement and conceptual art of the 1960s 
and 1970s, through to the later neo-conceptualism.  Although defying 
definition and categorically elusive, for Bury, what these works share is that: 
“they are made by an artist (however defined), there is always more than 
one, the denial of the authentic ‘original’, and the insistence on the equality 
of each one in the ‘edition’” (2001, p.38).  Further, and underpinning the 
work, is an ostensible challenge or subversion of an art market predicated on 
connoisseurship, the hand of the artist and the unique object.   
 
Yet, in the face of the de-centring of the self and the dispersal of the means of 
production, reproduction and modes of reception, previous chapters have 
revealed the pull of the discrete, the singular and the ‘authentic’.92  The 
apparent persistence of the portrait’s singularity as object and subject would 
seem to raise the question whether the ‘aura’ and authenticity of the portrait 
as art object has (just) withered away, or whether it has been reconfigured in 
some way, and if so, with what effects, on the object, the art and the imaged? 
 
                                                
92 The attempt in each of the chapters to explore the portraits as material objects, arguably 
also not only reflects, but also as a method, reproduces the institutional consecration of the art 
object’s uniqueness by focusing on the singularity of the image, even as the articulation of its 
‘aesthetic’ effects is socially and historically situated.  
 
 208 
To explore (if not definitively answer) these questions, this chapter takes a 
slightly contrary approach - examining the implications for the auratic and 
authentic through the converse of the singular - the ‘multiple’ portrait;  
multiple as in ‘group portrait’, but also multiple in terms of the method and 
technology of production, the modes of reproduction and distribution, and 
the spaces of reception.   
 
The ‘case study’ for this analysis will be a set of portraits representing the 
four members of the pop group Blur, produced in 2000 by the artist Julian 






Blur:  The best of 
2000 
As individual portraits: 
C-type print on wooden board 
 
The set was commissioned for the cover of the band’s Best of album.  At one 
level the image (comprising the four individual portraits) constitutes an 
‘original’ ‘art’ work, but one intended to be reproduced and distributed via 
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multiple means for consumption or reception and interpretation by multiple 
viewers.  Based on digital photographs of the four individual band members 
and subsequently manipulated using computer software, both the means of 
its production and subsequent reproduction draw on digital technology and 
its capacity for “endless variation” (Hand, 2012).  The image itself featured 
on the CD cover (see figure 7.3 below) and on the sides of buses, advertising 
hoardings and posters.  But it was also displayed in an art gallery as part of 
an exhibition of the artist’s work and achieved institutional consecration by 
being purchased on behalf of the National Portrait Gallery in London, 
effecting a transition from multiple to unique object;  from consumer good to 
artwork circulating in the market of symbolic goods.  Running in parallel is 
the ubiquity of the four men portrayed:  the subjectivities expressed in and 
through the image; their control and ownership over their own 
(re)presentation, and their own claims for authenticity/’greatness’. 
 
As such this image raises a number of interesting questions in relation to the 
singularity and ubiquity of the portrait as material object, as ‘art object’ and 
as representation of the individual subject, in the age of digital production, 
reproduction, distribution and reception.  To set the theoretical context the 
following section briefly summarises Benjamin’s conceptualisation of ‘aura’ 
and authenticity.  This is followed by an overview of the ‘multiple’: as art 
movement; as means of production, reproduction and circulation; and as a 
mechanism of visibility. Sections 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 present an analysis of the 
image. As in the previous chapters these will broadly focus on the image as 
sensuous object, on the questions of subjectivity that it opens on to, and its 
position within the field of cultural production.  The final section will 
attempt to consider what this set of portraits affords for an understanding of 
‘aura’ and ‘authenticity’ in the age of the multiple, the dispersed and the 
hypermediated.   
 
7.2 Aura, authenticity and the gaze returned:  the work of art in the 
age of mechanical reproduction 
Benjamin recognises that works of art have always been reproducible, but 
the transition from “man-made” to specifically mechanical means of 
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reproduction represents a qualitative shift.  For Benjamin, the capacity for 
photography to reproduce works of art and the subsequent development of 
the ‘art of the film’ had significant repercussions not only for art, but also 
‘beyond the realms of art’ (1999a [1936]), p.215). 
 
For Benjamin, what the photographic reproduction of the work of art93 lacks, 
is “its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it 
happens to be” (1999a [1936]), p.214).   While manual reproduction preserves 
the object’s ‘authority’, technical mechanisms undermine it.  This, Benjamin 
argues, is because mechanical means of reproduction are more ‘independent’ 
of the original – capable of revealing aspects of the art object that may not be 
visible to the naked eye94 and because the reproduced image can be 
transmitted to and received within contexts not possible for the original 
object: “it enables the original to meet the beholder halfway” (1999a [1936]), 
p.214).  This capacity for dispersal “depreciates” the art object’s 
“authenticity”, that is “the essence of all that is transmissible from its 
beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the 
history which it has experienced” (1999a [1936]), p.215). By making possible 
the production and distribution of a “plurality of copies”, what mechanical 
reproduction brings about, for Benjamin, is a “shattering of tradition” and, as 
a corollary, the withering away of the ‘aura’ of the work of art. 
 
As noted above, Benjamin first explored the concept of ‘aura’ in his 1931 
essay Brief History of Photography (2009 [1931]).  Here he defines aura as  “A 
gossamer fabric woven in space and time:  a unique manifestation of 
remoteness, however close at hand” (p.184). This articulation of ‘aura’ as a 
sense of distance despite the (physical) proximity of the object of attention is 
repeated in the Work of Art essay where he defines it as “the unique 
phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be” (Benjamin (1999a 
                                                
93 In Benjamin’s account the paradigmatic work of art evoked appears to be physical object or 
entity - a painting, or sculpture with a physical presence in time and space. This 
immediately throws into relief the problem of adapting Benjamin’s account to works of art 
that do not have a concrete physical presence (the implications for music cannot be 
addressed here). 
94 Ironically, as Mitchell (1992) argues, the shift from analogue to digital means of 
reproduction may undermine this revelatory function. 
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[1936], p.216).  Here, and in the later Motifs essay (1999b [1939]), Benjamin 
further describes this sense of proximal distance as the object’s 
‘inapproachability’: a characteristic associated with the ‘cult’ or ‘ceremonial 
image’.   
 
This reference to the ‘cult’ function of the object alludes to Benjamin’s 
understanding of the historical relationship between the work of art and its 
location within the “fabric of tradition”:  a fabric which may shift, but which, 
until the emergence of photography and film, leaves the “unique value of the 
‘authentic’ work of art” (1999a [1936]), p.217), from which it derives its 
‘aura’, intact. Thus, from its roots in the ritual context of magic and then 
subsequently religion, the ‘ritualistic basis’ of the work of art extends into the 
secularized ‘cult of beauty’ from the Renaissance onwards.  Integral to these 
shifts is the way in which works of art are received and valued.  The ‘use 
value’ of the ceremonial objects of the cult rested on the fact that they existed 
as instruments of magic, not that they would necessarily be seen.  As the 
objects became separated and separable from religious ritual, their function 
shifted to one of ‘exhibition’, or “public presentability”.  Mechanical 
reproduction accelerates this shift toward exhibition value, and, by 
definitively separating art from its basis in cult presages the “liquidation of 
the traditional value of the cultural heritage” (Benjamin, 1999a [1936]), 
p.215), removes the basis for art’s autonomy (from social/political life) and 
results in the diminution of the aura of both the art object and subject of the 
art.  The aura emanating from early portrait photographs is thus replaced by 
Atget’s photographs of deserted Paris streets;  the aura of the stage actor and 
of the figure he or she portrays, is replaced by the fragmented, de-
corporealized performance of the film actor; the painter as magician 
maintaining his or her distance from reality, is substituted by the cameraman 
as surgeon, permeating deep in to reality.   
 
For Benjamin this runs in parallel with changes in structures of perception, a 
process he associates with the “increasing significance of the masses in 
contemporary life” and their: 
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“Desire…to bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly…[and] their bent 
toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its 
reproduction…Every day the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object at 
very close range by way of its likeness, its reproduction.” (1999a [1936]), 
p.217) 
 
The reception of images also changes:  in place of the individual, 
contemplation of, and absorption by, a ‘unique’ work of art (with all this 
implies for the ‘expert’s’ understanding of the ‘rules of art’), reception 
(particularly of film and architecture), is marked by collective and 
“distracted viewing”, and one, in relation to film, marked by constant change 
or ‘shocks’.  For Benjamin this distraction has the potential to mobilize the 
audience - providing solutions for difficult tasks:  
 
 “Distraction as provided by art presents a covert control of the extent to 
which new tasks have become soluble to apperception.  Since, moreover, 
individuals are tempted to avoid such tasks, art will tackle the most difficult 
and most important ones where it is able to mobilize the masses. Today it does 
so in film.” (1999a [1936]), p.233)  
 
As this underlines, Benjamin’s analysis aims to address the dual implications 
of mechanical reproduction: on the work of art and for the political function 
of art.  Commentators such as Ziarek (2005) and Franklin (2002) note that 
while Benjamin recognizes the risks these technologies bring of aestheticizing 
experience, he also sees their potential for collective mobilization. As 
summarised by Ziarek, for Benjamin, “dispelling the auratic existence of 
artworks, renders them political in novel and radical ways” (2005, p.211). 
 
As Costello (2005), however, points out, Benjamin seems to vacillate between 
welcoming the diminution of aura and what it suggests for the 
“emancip[ation] of the work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual” 
(Benjamin, 1999 [1936]) p.218), and mourning the loss of what Costello refers 
to as the “ethical dimension to auratic experience” (Costello, 2005, p.176). 
Costello suggests a distinction, in Benjamin, between a specific 
(photographic or technological) and a general, ethical, experiential 
dimension to aura.  Because photography records, but does not (at an 
intersubjective level) return the gaze, the loss of aura is to be welcomed as 
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part of the disenchantment of the world.  But at the more general experiential 
level, its loss is to be regretted if it implies an inability to respond to the 
“particularity of others” (Costello, 2005).  
 





To illustrate his argument Benjamin describes two processes:  the 
implications of the reproduction of what may be thought of as the 
paradigmatic ‘art’ work - the hand worked painting attributable to a named 
artist, directly experienced by an individual viewer;  and the implications of 
visual works, specifically photographs and films, created using reproductive 
technologies, experienced (potentially) by multiple viewers within and 
across time and space. Photography and film may include reproductions of 
art works but are also creative products in their own right;  that is they are 
reproducible (and often representational) but not (necessarily) reproductions 
of other pre-existing artworks. 
 
Since Benjamin wrote his essay, the introduction of digital technology has 
extended the potential for the reproduction and multiple dispersal of 
‘original’ artworks (all the images included in this thesis, for example, have 
been downloaded from the internet).  It is also a technology that can be used 
for both the production and the re-production of works, in the sense that the 
technology allows for further manipulation of the image by other 
producers/artists, potentially infinitely deferring the ‘finished’ object. 
 
Historically, as discussions of studio processes, and the use of other 
techniques of image production and reproduction such as sculpture, 
engraving, screen printing and photography, suggest (Becker, 1984;  Fyfe, 
1988;  Krauss, 1981), the unique painting produced by a single/singular 
individual may itself be something of a special case, albeit one that may 
serve a particular ideological position.  But the singular artwork/artist (and 
the ideological support) has also been put under increasing pressure by art 
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movements, which, at the level of content, as well as production techniques, 
have emphasised not singularity, but multiplicity, ubiquity and the 
commonplace.  
 
These shifts suggests that the relationship between singularity/multiplicity 
and ‘aura’ may be even more complex, particularly in the context of digital 
media, than could have been anticipated by Benjamin, and one, which, in 
relation to portraiture may have particular implications for the subject 
imaged, and the viewing subject. 
 
Before looking at the image itself (figure 7.1) in more detail, the following 
considers three dimensions of ‘multiplicity’ that in different ways are at play 
in relation to this image:  artists’ multiples (art practices); the digitally 
multiple (technologies of production and reproduction);  and being multiple 
- celebrity and visibility.  
 
7.3.2 ‘Image duplicators’ 95:  Artists’ multiples 
As has been discussed in earlier chapters, the concept of the individual 
‘artist-as-creator’ whose work expresses his or her unique vision, can be said 
to articulate a ‘charismatic’ ideology which, while making the author “the 
first and last source of the value of his work” conceals the role of the 
“cultural businessman”, in the consecration and valorisation of the work 
(Bourdieu, 2004, p.76).   As Fyfe suggests, this encompasses, as two sides of 
the same coin, the “idea of the artist as expressing the free-play of a coherent 
creative will, to which pictorial means are subordinate” (Fyfe, 1988, p.73), 
and the institutional practices, the work of the field of cultural production in 
constituting the artist (Bourdieu, 2004).  
 
But even within these parameters the actual practice of art suggests 
conceptualisations of originality and individual creativity will be historically 
specific and dynamic. The very concept of genres, for example, carries with it 
assumptions of categorisation and thematic standardisation.  In addition, as 
                                                
95 From Lobel (2002). 
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Loh (2004) argues in relation to Italian Baroque art of the 17th century, 
“premodernist artists enacted a certain type of originality that was located 
precisely in the imitation of great masters and in the competitive repetition of 
eternal tropes” (Loh, 2004, p.478). In other words, the recognition of 
pastiched materials, such as mythical Bacchanals, generated its own aesthetic 
pleasures. According to Kahng (2007) this particular form of ‘copying’, as a 
positive part of the Western academic tradition  “fell from grace” as part of 
modernism’s concerns around issues of authenticity and originality.  This, 
however, did not preclude individual artists from repeating their own 
“tropes”, perhaps as a way of working out an idea (Kahng, 2007) and, in the 
process, generating works which are then treated (institutionally) as 
individual art works.   Van Gogh’s painting of Sunflowers, for example, the 
paradigmatic ‘unique’ work of an artist constituted in their singularity 
(Heinich, 1997) exists as a multiple of seven versions:  four oil paintings and 
three copies that depart in detail from the ‘originals’ (Frances Spurling, 2014, 
Guardian, 17 January, np).  
 
It is, however, in the 20th Century that the use of the multiple as integral to 
the artwork itself became a self-conscious critical move - a mode of 
“repetition as resistance” (Kahng, 2007).  The use by artists such as 
Duchamp, the Pop artists and conceptual and ‘postmodern’ artists (see Bury, 
2001), of the ‘ready made’ or ‘found’ object as the artwork or to produce the 
artwork, and/or the use of repetition, multiplication, parody or pastiche in 
the artwork itself, has been interpreted as representing a critique of the 
market economy.  This may be a critique of consumer society in general as 
well as of the commodification of art as a specific manifestation of the 
market’s dominance (see, for example, Bury, 2001; Foster, 2012; Frith and 
Horne, 1987; Kahng, 2007; Moorhouse, 2007).  For Loh (2004), works 
premised on repetition share “a desire to subvert the institutionalization and 
commercialisation of artistic production by denying unique authorship and 
objecthood to the work of art” (p.477).  It is a means for artists to interrogate 
the “gap between use value and exchange value” (Bury, 2001, p.24).  In a 
context of commodification and ‘fetishisation’ of cultural products 
“governed by the principle of their realization as value, and not by their own 
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specific content and harmonious value” (Adorno, 1991, p.99), artists have 
used the form and content of “standardised” (Adorno, 1991), mass produced 
consumer goods to create its opposite: an (ostensibly) autonomous art. As 
expressed by one commentator,  “the [multiple] should have no ‘utility’ 
value other than its being an art object” (Bury, 2001, p. 28).  However, as 
highlighted in chapter 6, even ‘subversive’ art is subject to ‘repackaging’ and 
absorption into the field (Bourdieu, 2004).  Ganis (1999), for example, 
discussing Warhol’s Jackie series (based on newspaper photographs of Jackie 
Kennedy) observes that although this comprises over 325 prints and 
paintings the art market regards each of these works as a Warhol ‘original’, 
and the price of each is equal to that of individual paintings by other artists. 
 
The rules of the game are further shored up by the constant reference back to 
a named, identified, identifiable creator or collective (‘Warhol’, 
‘Lichtenstein’, ‘Peter Blake’ etc.).96  Without this, both the monetary value and 
status of the work as art is in jeopardy (Zolberg, 1997). This manifests itself 
even in relation to works using (pre-digital) reproductive techniques such as 
printing and analogue photography, where earlier numbered editions are 
given a higher market value.  This is not just because of their assumed higher 
quality, but because they are considered to be closer to the artist’s conception 
(Ganis, 1999;  Krauss, 1981;  Zolberg, 1997).  Again taking Warhol’s Jackie 
multiples as an example, although the screenprinting process does not 
necessarily produce poorer quality prints over time, the lower numbered 
prints still have higher monetary value (Ganis, 1999). 
 
In what could constitute a double or triple game some artists, ‘play’ or 
exploit the market. Warhol, for example, a self-confessed ‘Business Artist’ 
(Walker, 1987, p.28) is regarded by some commentators as using the market 
rather than opposing or exploiting it (Frith and Horne, 1987;  Ganis, 1999;  
                                                
96 As discussed in chapter 5, for Foucault (1991a [1969]) the name of the ‘the author’ (or 
artist), is an effect of discourse and to be distinguished from the ‘real writer’.  Perhaps 
obliquely, the example of artists collectives underlines this;  the works become identified 
with the name of the collective rather than that of the individuals who contribute to the 
collective, who may remain anonymous.  For examples of contemporary artists collectives 
see http://www.modernedition.com/art-articles/art-collectives/artist-collectives.html 
(accessed 24 April 2015). 
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Walker, 1987), signing “any object whatever” (Edmund White, in Danto, 
1999, p.71), and willing, in his commissioned portraits, “to grant the request 
for an even mythical identity to be bestowed upon those both willing and 
able to pay for it” (Buchloh, 1994, p.62).  In the 1990s, Damien Hirst, one of 
the ‘Young British Artists’, adopted a similar position. Described by Cook 
(2000) as representing “a new kind of entrepreneurial market oriented artist” 
(2000, p.173), Hirst, like Warhol before him, used ‘factory’ line production 
methods to produce his multiple ‘spot’ and ‘spin paintings’. For Cook (2000), 
however, what distinguishes the two artists is the degree to which they are 
regarded as playing the market “ironically” or “candidly” (Cook, p.173, on 
Warhol), or “cheapen their product for the sake of quicktime profit” (Cook, 
p.175, on the risks facing the young British artists, including Hirst). 
 
7.3.3 Digitally multiple 
Production technologies 
Technologies of production, particularly those using inherently reproductive 
processes such as cast sculpture, engraving, photography, film and digital 
media, place a distance (both physical and authorial) between the work and 
the (assumed) ‘hand’ of the artist, bringing into question criteria of 
judgement and value based on assessments of the material uniqueness and 
conceptual originality. While there are, as Hand (2012) and Lister (1995) 
argue, continuities and discontinuities between pre-digital and digital 
production technologies, digital technologies increase the stakes in terms of 
who and what constitutes the art and the artist as well as modes of 
perceiving art.  
 
Like analogue photography, digital media can be used as a means of both 
image production and reproduction.  The underpinning technology of digital 
media, however, marks it out as distinctive along a number of linked 
dimensions.97  First, and fundamentally, digital media are based on binary 
code:  that is, they are based on mathematical, not chemical processes 
                                                
97 It is not intended here to undertake a detailed examination of the implications of digital 
media and the digital economy. The following just draws attention to some of the issues of 
relevance to the case study image. 
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(Cubitt, 2006;  Hand, 2012).  Second, images produced digitally can be 
reproduced without deterioration, unlike, for example, prints made from 
analogue photography.  Digital images can therefore be reproduced 
infinitely with the first copy being the same quality as all subsequent copies.98 
Third, because digital images are based on numerical code they can be 
“altered, decomposed and recombined and presented in a seamless and 
perfect print” (Hall, 1999, p.274).  By extension, as these images circulate as 
‘information flows’ this manipulation and variation can be undertaken by 
multiple ‘artists’, ‘authors’ or ‘creators’.  In the absence of a ‘negative’ or 
print of an ‘original’ image, there is, however, no way of discerning this 
manipulation or the source of alteration. The absence of an ‘audit trail’ makes 
it harder to determine the ‘provenance’ of an image (Mitchell, 1992;  
Savedoff, 1997).  There is, in effect no finality (in principle) in relation to the 
image and no fixed creator:   “After digitization, it is arguably the case that 
modernist ideas of fixity, permanence and capture are giving way to notions 
of mobility, ephemerality and performance” (Hand, 2012, p.26).  For 
artworks in particular this shift from the fixed to the fugitive carries with it 
specific implications for both authorship and authorising: 
 
“We must abandon the concept of an art world populated by stable, enduring, 
finished works, and replace it with one that recognizes continual mutation 
and proliferation of variants…Notions of individual authorial responsibility  
for image content, authorial determination of meaning, and authorial prestige 
are correspondingly diminished.” (Mitchell, 1992, p.52) 
 
Finally, unlike analogue photography, digital media require no concrete 
referent, no ‘real’ or ‘original’, nothing from which to capture reflected light.  
Although, as Hand (2012) points out, analogue photography has always been 
malleable and partial, there is a socially constituted assumption that the 
photograph has an indexical relationship to the world, that it (literally) 
creates an analogy with the world (Cubitt, 2006).  Arguably, this assumption 
of indexicality gives the photographic image its own ‘authenticity’.  The shift 
                                                
98 The issue of what has been called ‘bit rot’ may, however, undermine the apparent 
availability of the images over time (see for example (Samuel Gibbs, Guardian, Friday 13 
February, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/13/what-is-bit-rot-
and-is-vint-cerf-right-to-be-worried (accessed, 24 April 2015)). 
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from a chemical to a digital process makes it harder to sustain this assumed 
link with the ‘real’.  In the context of the ‘art’ object, Mitchell (1992) argues 
that it places the digital ‘photograph’ on a spectrum between painting, 
understood as an articulation of an artist’s ‘intention’, and analogue 
photography’s ostensible record of an actual object. Given portraiture’s own 
interstitial position between documentary record and ‘artwork’ (see chapter 
3) digital technology may raise particular issues for the ‘authenticity’ of the 
portrait and the ‘aura’ of the portrayal.  
 
Circulating multiples:  reproduction, distribution, reception and re-production 
As noted earlier, Benjamin’s (1999a [1936]) argument addresses both the 
mechanical means for producing ‘art forms’ (e.g. films) and the reproduction 
of (pre-existing) art works.  Both dimensions have implications for the works 
in terms of by whom, where and when they are seen, and also for how they 
are perceived.  
 
Digital technologies may create the conditions for a quantitative and 
qualitative shift in terms of who can render and re-render an image. 
Potentially at least, “digital simulation makes everyone author [‘artist’] and 
reader” (Savedoff, 2005, p.33), anyone, that, is with access to a computer, the 
internet and the requisite skills.99   
 
Digital technologies also extend the opportunities for the on-going ‘re-
making’ of works (Hand, 2012), by multiple authors across networks.  In 
effect, what digital technologies may presage is an incremental shift from 
visual images as “immutable mobiles” (Latour, 1990) – that is images which 
can be recreated and changed in scale while retaining “optical consistency” - 
to one of ‘mutable’ mobiles.  By this is meant that not only can an image be 
extensively reproduced and circulated,100 it can (potentially) be subject to 
endless manipulation and variation in the course of its circulation.  In place 
                                                
99 As the concept of the ‘digital divide’ suggests digital technology can both reproduce and 
create new hierarchies (see for example, Jackson et al, 2008).   
 
100 Even if the form and context of its reception may fundamentally alter its meaning. 
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of the singular ‘artist-as-creator’, ‘origin’ may be dispersed and uniqueness 
becomes fleeting and transient.  
 
By their very nature, reproductive technologies imply potentially multiple 
‘viewers’ over time and in space. What digital technologies do is allow for 
extending this dispersion or distribution of ‘copies’. As Hand (2012) argues: 
 
“The informational character of the digital image changes how it can 
circulate, who has access to it and, given the number of contexts within 
which it can be embedded, what it can mean.” (p.72)   
 
Thus, in place of the direct one-to-one relationship between artwork and 
viewer in the context of a gallery or museum, digital technologies increase 
the capacity for (artists) and art works to circumvent these established 
channels of distribution (Scrivener and Clements, 2010). Instead they may 
circulate through different networks in different formats and received, 
downloaded, purchased, converted, shared and deleted, by multiple 
‘viewers’ (albeit individually) in multiple social, historical and physical 
contexts.  
 
As a corollary, what Frith and Horne (1988) describe as the “conditions of 
reception” of artworks will also be extended, expanded and shaped by the 
contexts in which they will be valued, interpreted and used.   This includes 
the different spatial, temporal and sensory contexts in which artworks can be 
experienced.  
 
This expansion of the contexts within which artworks are encountered - 
away from the socially and physically constituted space of the museum or art 
gallery, to different social, physical and virtual environments; environments 
saturated with visual images, may have implications for how attention is 
engaged (Lister, 1998).  Viewing may be more a series of “glances” rather 
than the considered reflection of the “gaze” (Bolter and Grusin, 2000; Hand, 
2012). It may, arguably, be closer to Benjamin’s “distracted” film-goer, 
exposed to a series of “shocks”, than the contemplative, absorbed 
connoisseur.  
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The digital circulation of images is also seen as means for extending (in space 
and over time) the sites of meaning generation. Hand (2012), for example, 
argues, that “the unprecedented mobility of the digital image through 
potentially infinite contexts, intensif[ies] polysemic interpretation” (p.69, 
emphasis in original). The evaluative criteria applied and the 
conceptualisations of ‘originality’ may also shift. The differences in scale, 
colour, texture and resolution of digitally produced art and the different 
contexts in which these works may be experienced may ‘de-emphasise’ 
concerns with formal qualities (Sweeny, 2005), to be replaced by a new 
‘visual language’ adding “fonts, photographic images, motion, time, sound 
and space (hypertext)…to the vocabulary of art” (Hall, 1999, p.273).  
 
For Benjamin (1999a [1936]) the reproduction of artworks diminishes the 
aura generated by the direct experience of the physical presence of the 
‘original’.  In the context of digital media, some commentators such as Hall 
(1999) argue that, “the ‘aura’ of a work may be destroyed or displaced by 
repetition, celebrity or cult value” (p.276).   Others make the case that 
ubiquity and diffusion through reproduction have the capacity to add to 
‘aura’, (socially) constituting both the artist (Fyfe, 1988), and the ‘power’ of 
the artwork (Bann, in Kahng, 2007), giving it greater currency.101  What is 
perhaps implicit in both sides of the argument is the desire to retain the sense 
of otherness, ineffability, autonomy and ‘distance’ of art, however it is 
produced or reproduced:  that is, to retain its ‘aura’.  
 
7.3.4 Being multiple: visibility and celebrity  
In relation to the representation of the self or subject, digital technology 
expands the potential field of visibility not only of the visual image but also 
of the subject(s) of the image. For Pointon (2013), dispersal via digital media 
extends questions of authentication as applied to both: 
 
                                                
101 My own non-participant observation of digital photographs being made of ‘original’ 
artworks revealed the degree of creativity required on the part of the photographer to obtain 
a good photographic reproduction (including recourse to ‘Photoshop’ software to enhance 
the image so that it is closer to the ‘original’). 
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“…Portraits by famous artists or celebrated subjects accessible through 
Wikipedia or through online galleries selling reproductions acquire, simply 
by being there, an authority that has everything to do with mass circulation 
of digital information and may have nothing to do with artistic provenance or 
biographical authenticity.” (p.15) 
It also extends the potential for visibility to be used as a tool or weapon that 
can be both empowering and disempowering (Brighenti, 2007).   This was 
touched upon in the previous chapter’s concern with the potential for 
‘misrecognition’ of the subject(ivities) portrayed.  In this chapter, the focus 
shifts to the use of the media of visibility to constitute and reinforce 
identifiability through diffusion.  This refers to the capacity to generate and 
control the production and distribution of the representations of a few (e.g. 
band members) to render them familiar to the many (‘fans’, putative 
consumers, “communities of admiration” (Heinich, nd)), to generate positive 
(in both senses of the word) identification of the few by the many.  In other 
words, this chapter touches upon the role of portraiture in the operation of 
the asymmetrical visibility (Brighenti, 2007) associated with celebrity. 
 
“Inaccessible as a person and simultaneously all available in his/her images:  
this is the very property of anyone possessing a capital of visibility.” 
(Heinich, nd, p.7) 
 
At what Brighenti (2007) calls the “intersection of the two domains of 
aesthetics…and politics”, ‘visibility’, in the context of celebrity has been 
defined as “the diffusion of the face and name in public space” (Heinich, nd, 
p.1).  As commentators such as Heinich (nd) and Thompson (2005) note, this 
diffusion of ‘face and name’ is not a contemporary phenomenon, nor specific 
to digital technologies or other communications media such as print media, 
television or film.  It is also not determined by these technologies:  rather, 
they change what it is possible to do (Hand, 2012). Whether and how these 
possibilities will become manifest will depend on the social practices within 
which and from which they emerge, and, as such, as Brighenti (2007) notes, 
are imbricated by relations of power.     
 
In the context of ‘celebrity’, what different technologies of diffusion have 
afforded is the freeing up of visibility from “the spatial and temporal 
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properties of the here and now” (Thompson, 2005, p.35).  Expanded 
possibilities through painting, sculpture, print, coinage and banknotes, and 
subsequently telecommunications and digital media break the direct link 
between physical presence and visibility. For the powerful it opens up the 
potential to diffuse a “fabricated” self-image (Brilliant, 2002 [1991;  
Thompson, 2005);  an image of the ‘greatness’ of the few (however 
‘greatness’ is defined or attributed (Heinich, nd)) distributed to the many.102  
No longer physically present, a sense of physical presence is, nonetheless 
generated through making a visible ‘likeness’ – of a face, to the extent, as 
Heinich suggests that “faces matter as much, if not more, than names” (nd, 
p.2).  Arguably, then, it is through the diffusion of a portrait that celebrity is 
both generated and sustained, contributing to the illusory sense of the 
celebrity’s accessibility (and hence to their “capital of visibility” (Heinich 
nd)).   
 
As a number of commentators note, the visibility of power and celebrity has, 
historically, been asymmetrical – from the few to the many, between seeing 
and being seen, between those able to control how and whether they are 
made ‘visible’ and those either exposed to the dominating (and gendered) 
gaze of the other, or rendered wholly invisible (Brighenti, 2007).   However, 
it is also double-edged;  the expanded technical possibilities for diffusion 
also reduce the control of the powerful over their visibility, exposing them, 
on the one hand to scrutiny and the risk of ‘scandal’ (Thompson, 2005).103 On 
the other hand, the emotional or erotic charge of the image of the celebrity 
can also turn back on the subject, “if (fans) feel strangely possessed by their 
idols, they take their revenge in the imaginary possession of them” (Frith and 
Horne, 1987, p.20).   
 
Within the ‘spectacular society’ of post second world war Western consumer 
capitalism, the presence of the celebrity in the form of ubiquitous visibility is 
                                                
102 The parallel being the surveillance of the many by the few (Foucault, 1991b [1975]). 
103 Digital technology also expands the potential for a self-image – a “networked self” (Bolter 
and Grusin, 2000) to be distributed by the many to the many – the phenomena of the ‘selfie’ 
being a recent dimension of this. As with celebrity images, this can also lead to a loss of 
control over the image as it circulates through different communication networks. 
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mirrored in what is conceptualised as the ‘absence’ or ‘vacating’ of 
subjectivity  (of the ‘real’) from the image.  Celebrities are “stars made out of 
blank bodies” (Frith and Horne, 1987, p.169), no longer a “unique” self, but 
“a subject in the image of the star” (van Alphen, 1997, p.243),  “public 
substitutes of subjectivity” (Buchloh, 1994, p.62). They are, in Baudrillard’s 
(1984)  conceptualisation, ‘simulacrum’. 
 
For portraiture, the response has been to ostensibly critique or expose what 
Buchloh describes as the “total commodification of the image of the subject” 
(1994, p.63) (even as it sustains it), such as in the portraits of ‘celebrities’ by 
Warhol.  But also, as in the work of Julian Opie, to which we now turn, to 
play the ubiquitous image as surface:  constituting the star(s) as cartoon(s). 
 
7.4 Blur portrayed  
7.4.1 Background 
The set of portraits (figure 7.1) used as cover art for the pop group Blur’s Best 
of album will be used to explore both what it affords as a ‘singular’ image as 
well as the impact of these dimensions of multiplicity and dispersal on the 
work of the portrait.  Commissioned around the end of the 20th and beginning 
of the 21st century from the artist Julian Opie, the image is a c-type colour 
print104 based on photographs of the four individual members of the band - 
Damon Albarn, Graham Coxon, Alex James and Dave Rowntree (figure 7.1).  
For ease of reference, figure 7.2 identifies the individual band members as 
they appear on the album cover. 
 
 
                                                
104 A c-print (or chromogenic-print) is a photographic process for producing prints from a 
colour negative or slide or from digital images.  Originally developed by Kodak in the 1950s 
it involves the reaction of two chemicals that work together to produce the print (Source:  
Visual Voice Collections;  http://www.visualvoicecollections.com/2012/07/05/q-a-what-
is-a-c-print/ (accessed 25 April 2015).  A digital c-type print is a chromogenic photographic 
print made from a digital file rather than a negative (Source:  Metro Print:  
http://www.metro-print.co.uk/what-is-a-digital-c-
type?forumboardid=10&forumtopicid=10 (accessed 25 April 2015). 
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Figure 7.2 Who’s who on Blur:  The best of CD cover 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Blur:  The best of CD cover 
 
When the album was released in 2000 the image was used not just on the 
CD/album cover (figure 7.3) but also on the accompanying promotional 
material. As a result, like Ballen’s image of Dresie and Casie (figure 6.2), (but 
for quite dissimilar reasons and through dissimilar routes), this has become 
Opie’s ‘signature’ piece (notwithstanding the absence of an actual 
‘signature’).  A trawl of newspaper articles published between 2000 – 2013 
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commenting on the artist’s work, for example, consistently locate and 
identify Opie as the artist who produced the cover of Blur’s The best of album. 
Opie had, however, been an established artist since 1982.  
 
The image is composed of four individual portraits105 - one for each member 
of the band.  Notwithstanding the ubiquity of the set as record cover image 
and promotional material, there are, apparently, only three complete 
(‘original’) sets, one of which is in the National Portrait Gallery, London.  The 
four separate portraits were shown as part of an exhibition of Opie’s work at 
Lisson Gallery in London in 2001.  They were also reproduced in a 
monograph of Opie’s portraits (Opie, 2003).  In common with the other 
portraits in the monograph, all of which are in a similar pictorial style, the 
four portraits have the titles indicating forename and social role:  ‘Damon, 
singer.  2000’;  ‘Dave, drummer.  2000’;  ‘Graham, guitarist.  2000’;  and ‘Alex, 
bassist, 2000’.  The individual portraits can also be viewed on the artist’s 
website, together with information on the medium used and the three 
different sizes in which the portraits were made available.106  Despite their 
ostensible reproducibility, however, the individual portraits are not 
downloadable from the website.  Similarly, the versions held by the National 
Portrait Gallery can be viewed online but are not downloadable because the 
rights do not belong to the Gallery.  The album cover image, while 
downloadable from Wikipedia, also comes with the caveat that the image is 
‘non free content’.  
 
As just this short précis suggests, the image and the four component portraits 
provide fertile ground for exploring the implications of multiple modes of 
production and reproduction, to which Benjamin’s analysis was so prescient 
in drawing attention, but which have unfolded in some ways at least that 
perhaps he could not have anticipated. Following the broad structure of the 
previous chapters, the following address the image, the imaged and the 
processes of institutionalisation.   
                                                
105 For the sake of consistency, the term ‘image’ will be used when referring to the set of four 
portraits;  and ‘portrait’ when referring to the individual component pictures. 
106 http://www.julianopie.com/#/artwork/painting/2000 (accessed 14 June 2015).  
 227 
7.4.2 Damon, Dave, Graham and Alex:  A group portrait 
The image (as cover art) comprises a square constituted by four rectangles.  
Within each rectangle is what appears to be a drawing of the head and 
shoulders of a different young white man.  Although adopting the form of 
the traditional portrait, each face comprises the sparest of details;  a black 
line gives the shape of the face, the eyebrows, mouths and noses are 
indicated by black lines and dashes, the eyes are black dots.   In one of the 
portraits spots of white give the illusion of a catchlight (light reflected on the 
eyes), in a second portrait white lines on the ‘surface’ of the young man’s 
glasses serve the same purpose – white squares perhaps suggesting the 
reflection of windows. There is no further ‘modelling’ of the faces, no 
blemishes, creases, shadowing, hair growth etc. on the ‘skin’, just a smooth 
surface in one colour. 
 
Within this very limited graphic vocabulary however, the four men are each 
given a distinctive physical identity. Their different characteristics are 
indicated by the slightly different ‘skin’ tones used for the face and neck of 
each man.107  The thick black line marking the shape of the face suggests 
differences between, for example ‘Alex’s’ slightly rounder face compared 
with ‘Dave’s’ longer, thinner face. The shapes and thickness of the eyebrows, 
and the length, shape and position of the lines and dots drawn above the 
‘mouth’ to suggest a nose, also work to create a sense of the distinct physical 
presence of each of the subjects. Two of the men are drawn with glasses, but 
one has rimless spectacles, the other wears ‘designer’ glasses with the 
imprint of a brand logo on the thick black frames.  Three of the four men 
wear T-shirts of different colours, but one, ‘Damon’, wears a blue shirt with a 
white neckerchief or tie.  He also wears a gold earring.  All four have 
short(ish) hair, the reflection and shading marked by the introduction of 
several colours. Red-headed ‘Dave’ and dark-haired ‘Graham’ are presented 
with comparatively neat haircuts, Alex’s dark fringe, however, strays across 
his face, while brown-haired ‘Damon’s’ hair looks ruffled, and his fringe too 
                                                
107 The colours in the portraits reproduced in the Portrait book (Opie, 2003) are subtler than is 
suggested by figure 7.1.  This suggests that reproduction technologies too can introduce 
elements of difference.  As Fyfe (1988) notes, technologies of distribution may both erase and 
create their own ‘aesthetic’ properties. 
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hangs spikily across one side of his forehead.  And then there is the shape of 
the mouth and the ‘look’ to the viewer.  ‘Dave’ and ‘Graham’ look face on to 
the viewer, Graham with the ‘upper lip’ portrayed slightly downturned, 
Dave’s slightly upturned, suggesting a smile.  ‘Alex’ is portrayed with his 
head slightly to one side, the lines for his mouth like ‘Dave’s’ suggesting a 
slight smile. It is, however, ‘Damon’, who appears the most ‘animated’, his 
head tilted to one side and the line of his ‘mouth’ most closely resembling a 
‘smile to camera’. 
 
As a total image it could be considered a group portrait (in itself a form of 
‘multiple’), but unlike most group portraits there is no sense of interaction 
between the four young men.  Within the square they are structurally 
‘connected’ on two sides with two other band members but, like stamps in 
an album, they are each in their own separate ‘spaces’. The different solid 
blocks of colour that comprise the ‘background’ to each portrait underline 
this separateness:  yellow (‘Graham’), blue (‘Alex’), pink (‘Dave’) and green 
(‘Damon’).  They also each individually ‘look’ out directly to the viewer – not 
toward each other.108  
 
The combination of primary colours and line drawing evokes the illustrated 
children’s story, cartoon or graphic novel.  Parallels have been drawn 
between Opie’s images and the work of the Belgian cartoonist Hergé 
(Georges Prosper Remi) who illustrated and wrote the Tin Tin cartoons, as 
well as with the style of drawing associated with Japanese manga and 
anime.109  In art historical terms the references are back to Pop Art of the 1950s 
and 1960’s such as Roy Lichtenstein and Andy Warhol.  Like the works of 
these artists, the colours and forms of Opie’s image draw on graphic design – 
                                                
108 Alois Riegl’s art historical analysis of the Group Portraiture of Holland introduces the idea 
of ‘attentiveness’ in the analysis of group portraiture:  the idea that the coherence of the 
painting is dependent on the presence of a beholder (Olin, 1989;  Riegl, 1999 [1902]). One of 
the differences between the Opie image and the group portraits described by Riegl, is the 
lack of internal ‘coherence’ between the ‘group’ members with each in their own separate 
‘frame’ looking outward. 
109 While some work has been done in relation to a sociology of the cartoon or comic (see for 
example, Barker, 1989;  Brienza, 2010;  Locke, 2009;  McCloud, 1993) it appears to be a 
comparatively underdeveloped field of sociological concern.    
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to the colours and forms of packaging and advertising – and the potential for 
catching the eye and provoking a response.  
 
But the image also draws on the vernacular of signage.  Opie has described 
how he began his work on the human form by looking at standardised 
representations, including the signs on lavatory doors indicating male and 
female (Horlock, 2004).  Opie similarly aimed to reduce his portraits down to 
a sign language:  “I want it to be as if each person I draw were a multi-
national company with a logo” (Opie, quoted in Horlock, 2004, p.82). In 
effect, then the four portraits are, in the specific historical context of the late 
20th Century, the signs or ‘logos’ for young white men: who in terms of the 
way they are depicted “are not too starry or cocky. They are the boys next 
door” (Jonathan Jones, 2001, Guardian, 28 February, p.18).  
 
As objects with sensuous properties, the portraits draw on the easy 
familiarity and immediacy of the (faux naïf) colour and form of (a culturally 
specific) childhood imagery and cartoon and the unthreatening vernacular of 
the road sign and advertising hoarding.  The direct ‘look’ out toward the 
viewer or beholder is both engaging and engages (it is hard to not ‘look 
back’).  But, by drawing on the visual vocabulary of the multi-national 
company logo, the image is not only a sign, but also one that also has a 
potentially globalised legibility (even in cultural contexts in which those 
portrayed are unlikely to be the ‘boys next door’).  Further, there is an 
argument for saying that use of this vocabulary works not just to generate a 
response to the ‘aesthetic’ qualities of a visual image, or to the subjects of the 
image, but interpellates a putative consumer of a ‘brand’.  
 
7.4.3 Reading110 the subject:  portrayed and portrayer 
This, however, is to assume that the process of ‘looking’ is one-way from 
image to a passive, receptive viewer.  Yet, looking at the image as a series of 
portraits, the simplicity of form arguably leaves greater scope for the 
“beholder’s share” (Gombrich, 1980), for interpretation and reading into the 
                                                
110 Opie regards the spectators of his work as ‘readers’ (Morere, 2005). 
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image.  Like a child’s doll, they open up the opportunity for imputing 
subjectivity, and like all ‘signs’ there is the potential for the connection with 
the referent to be arbitrary.  As has been argued in relation to Opie’s work:  
 
“By preventing subjectivity from manifesting itself in the finished work, 
Opie pushed the viewer to respond directly…the emphasis is on the active 
nature of looking.” (Horlock, 2004, p.81) 
 
There is, in effect, a duality at play in the portraits - a subjective absence and 
a quasi-physical presence.  This duality is built in to the very means of 
production.  For his portraits Opie takes a digital photograph of a ‘real 
person’ (in this case the four band members), then creates drawings from 
these photographs using a computer drawing programme “abstract[ing] and 
refining[ing] the image…captur[ing], by an economy of means, the most 
succinct likeness” (Horlock, 2004, p.107).  The drawings can then be 
reproduced in a number of different formats and sizes – from billboards to 
mugs – a reproduction of the same, which, as Mitchell (1992) suggests of 
digital mechanisms of reproduction, brooks no further revelation of detail.   
Like the work of Lichtenstein and Warhol the means of production combines 
the handmade and the mechanical (Foster, 2012), but the final product(s), 
appear to obliterate evidence of the artist-creator.  But, unlike Warhol’s 
multiples based on newspaper photographs of, for example Jackie Kennedy 
and Marilyn Monroe, the Opie portraits betray nothing of their roots in a 
photographic sitting - of the initial physical presence of the subjects 
portrayed.   
 
In the context of the work of the American Pop Artists, the vacating of 
subjectivity from the portrait has been interpreted as, on the one hand, part 
of a rejection of the bourgeois subjectivity perceived to be encoded in the 
work and persona of their avant-garde predecessors, abstract expressionism 
(Danto, 1999;  Foster, 2012).  On the other hand, at the level of content and 
form, Pop Art is read as both a celebration and critique of the impact on the 
self of the doubly constitutive and destructive “inflation of the image” 
(Foster, 2012), in post second world war western consumer economies 
(Foster, 2012;  Moorhouse, 2007). As Foster (2012) argues, just as “The Pop 
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[Art] subject is formed by images and circulated through them [so] he or she 
can also be disarticulated by images and dispersed through them” (Foster, 
2012, p.9). Moorhouse, for example, describing the layered production 
process behind the Warhol multiple silkscreen images of Monroe, sees this as 
creating an increasing distance between the ‘reality’ of the actor and her 
image: 
 
“Warhol began with a photograph, an invented image that masks the real 
person. The ‘mask’ was then progressively enhanced through the addition of 
garish colour, forcing a further disjunction with reality. The final portrait is a 
metaphor for fame:  a fabricated persona, in which the real person has become 
enmeshed with their ‘image’.” (Moorhouse, 2007, p.110) 
 
Yet, despite the similar use of multiple means of production, moving 
progressively further away from the concrete physical presence of the four 
men who posed for the publicity photo shoots, could the Opie portraits, 
commissioned for commercial distribution, be said to be similarly critiquing 
the ostensible dissolution of the subject in the glare of the image?  Insofar as 
the portraits exclude many of the clues by which ‘inner essence’ or 
individuality or ‘depth’ can be ‘read’ (e.g. more detailed facial modelling to 
indicate expression, bodily gesture etc.), there is an argument for saying that 
they expose and rebut the bourgeois “illusion of individual subjectivity” 
(West, 2004). Arguably, they return to a model of portraiture not as an 
articulation of an individual ‘self’, but as artefacts of ‘display’ (Maynard, 
2007) intended historically to express in visible form, power, authority, 
wealth, rather than inner depth.  Here, however, it is not power and 
authority, but familiarity, boy next-door-ness, that the portraits ‘display’.  In 
effect the four members of Blur are constituted not as individuals, but as 
social types, analogous to those photographed by Sander (see chapter 6)111, 
defined by their social roles: guitarist, bassist, singer, drummer.  In this way 
they are, as Horlock (2004), points out, representations of representations.  
 
Paradoxically, however, the limited clues as to ‘essence’ opens up, as 
commentators such as Horlock (2004) and Kurjaković (2003) suggest, greater 
                                                
111 Sander too included ‘The Performing Musician’ among his photographs. 
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scope for a beholder’s share.  In common with the other portraits discussed 
here, this image can function like a palimpsest, on which a positioned and 
positioning reader can impute subjectivities to the cartoon faces.  The reader 
is positioned in the sense that the capacity to both ‘recognise’ these as human 
faces and as representations of ‘real’ people, implies a very specific social-
historical and technical conjunction.  Like the portrait of Gilbert and George, 
discussed in chapter 6, this positioning is reinforced by the extra-aesthetic 
‘archive’ surrounding the image (discussed below).  But it also allows for an 
actively positioning reader in that, like Ballen’s image of Dresie and Casie 
(figure 6.2) the image’s apparent inscrutability and indeterminacy 
(particularly when separated by time, culture and technology from the 
‘archive’), opens up a void which a (socially and historically situated) reader 
can fill.  
 
As discussed in chapter 3 above, indirectly this tension between surface 
‘display’ or external features and imputed subjectivity illustrates what 
Sousslof (2007) describes as the “functional dialectic” in portraiture between, 
on the one hand, “the truth claims of an indexical exteriority or resemblance” 
and, on the other, the claim to represent an interiority or spirituality (p.5).  
The art historian (and past Director of the National Portrait Gallery) Nairne 
(2008), in his preface to an exhibition catalogue of Opie’s work, similarly 
draws attention to this ‘dialectic’, claiming that the artist’s work raises 
questions fundamental to the “500 year old tradition” of portraiture: “the 
questions span matters of recognition – is it this person? – through to those of 
expression – what is this person feeling?” (Nairne, 2008, np) 
 
In relation to the four portraits making up the Blur image it could, in fact, be 
argued that there are three levels of recognition at play: recognition in terms 
of ‘likeness’ or resemblance;  recognition in the sense used in chapter 6, of the 
person’s portrayed as subjects of moral worth - embracing the second term of 
Sousslof’s and Nairne’s ‘dialectic’ insofar as it opens on to inter-subjective 
understanding of ‘feelings’ and ‘interiority’;  but also, in the sense of  ‘brand 
recognition’, that is seeing the portraits not as representations of “living or 
once living people” (Brilliant, 2002 [1991]), but as a ‘logo’ for a brand (and 
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potentially a trigger to purchase the product for which the brand is an 
advertisement). 
 
In terms of the question of resemblance or likeness, despite the minimal 
detail and modelling each portrait represents a ‘different’ person:  as a 
number of commentators on Opie’s work suggest (Bonet, 2006; Horlock, 
2003; Kurjaković, 2003).  As the comparison above suggests the portraits do 
draw out the differences in the physical appearance of each of the band 
members e.g. the shape, cut and colour of the hair, the shape of face, the dots 
and lines shaping their eyes, mouths and noses.  But whether they are a 
‘likeness’ of the four individuals ‘Graham’, ‘Damon’, ‘Alex’ and ‘Dave’ is 
largely contingent on the extra-aesthetic ‘archive’ – without this they could 
just be fictional cartoon characters.  This prior knowledge means that the 
‘likeness’ can function as both a trigger to, and be read into, the four portraits 
by a very specific socially, historically, culturally and geographically located 
20th Century ‘reader’ bringing to the portraits a knowledge of who these four 
men represent (their names), what they look like in ‘reality’ (from 
photographs/television programmes/live performances) and why they are 
together.  The market saturation of the image generates recognition in the 
third sense of ‘brand recognition’. 
 
But what of ‘recognition’ in the sense of being acknowledged as an 
individual subject of moral worth (Honneth, 2004; Sayer, 2005)?  To even ask 
this question assumes that these cartoons are signs whose referents are ‘real’ 
people112, and as such can, on the one hand, draw on the archive of what is 
‘known’, or made known about each individual band member:  
 
“There’s Damon, lead singer, big blue eyeballs and remarkable 
confidence…There’s Alex, bass player, ‘the mad one’, always going on about 
amoebas in the stratosphere or whatever it is, with a permanent foolish grin.  
There’s Graham, guitar, big brown eyeballs, gets ‘panic attacks’ in the street 
for no reason whatsoever. And then there’s Dave. And he’s always in the 
pub.” (feature on Blur in Smash Hits magazine in 1991, quoted in 
Harris, 2003, p.56) 
                                                
112 Despite their ‘cartoon’ style, they are, arguably, no different in this respect from paintings 
where there is more detailed modelling – a more ‘warts and all’ depiction. 
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As suggested, the ‘archive’ contributes to the construction of individual 
identities.   From Maconie’s (1999) ‘official’ account of the band, for example, 
Graham Coxon emerges from the narrative as anxious and nervous.  Alex 
James is the ‘playboy’ of the band.  Dave Rowntree is older than the others 
(and tends to be less clearly defined). Damon Albarn is the main songwriter 
for the band and its leader and spokesperson.  Writing on the band, the two 
music journalists Maconie (1999) and Harris (2003), both draw attention to 
Albarn’s “bullish self-confidence”, arrogance and physical attractiveness.  
 
But, outwith the archive, the image, as a group portrait, relies on the capacity 
of the (socially positioned) viewer to read into the physical exterior.  
However, as Kurjaković (2003), suggests in relation to Opie’s portraits: 
 
“If we try to describe the expression…the one true sign of individuality – and 
attempt in the process to refer to particular psychological concepts that seem 
intrinsically coherent, then we will only discover that this very attempt is 
ambiguous.” (p.195) 
 
As suggested above, Andy Warhol’s portraits of celebrities have been 
interpreted as a comment on the nature of celebrity “and the function of the 
mass media as a means of creating a false sense of accessibility” (West, 2004, 
p.97).  Arguably, the ambiguity of the Blur portraits, coupled with the 
ubiquity of the image illustrates the generative processes at work to create 
this “false sense of accessibility”.  To invert Benjamin, the Blur portraits may 
create a sense of closeness to the image and imaged, however distant they 
may be. 
 
But what of the artist, how is his subjectivity referenced in the work?  
Writing about the pop art portraits of Warhol and Lichtenstein, van Alphen 
(1997) and Buchloh (1994) describe what they see as the disappearance of the 
subjectivity of both the portrayed and the portrayer.  In relation to Warhol, 
for example, van Alphen (1997) argues that: 
 
 “His painterly performance is systematically absent…his photographic, 
mechanically produced portraits leave no room for the illusion of the unique 
self of the portrayer.” (p.243)  
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Using digital technology Opie’s portraits similarly efface the presence of the 
artist insofar as there is no visible trace within the image of the (literal) 
‘creator’s’ hand.  Coupled with the absent body, commentators have 
suggested a parallel disengagement by Opie of his “human personality” or 
“emotions” in the creative process (Morere, 2005).  In the face of this 
apparent self-mortification, the artist’s subjectivity is, however recuperated, 
by, on the one hand, the ‘talk’ about the creative process (to which Opie 
himself contributes through interviews), a talk that focuses on the 
conceptual, rather than physical labour of the artist, and the ‘work’ Opie 
invests in “disguising” his presence:   
 
“The reality is that Opie’s labours are disguised in much the same way as his 
models are:  subjectivity contained within an impersonal, hard-edged 
syntax.” (Horlock, 2004, p.85)  
 
On the other hand, the artist’s presence is marked by the very ubiquity of his 
work.  Recognition is achieved through the specific ‘style’ of his work, and its 
repetition and reproduction across media in different contexts.  In other 
words, a ‘reader’ may not know Opie’s name but may nonetheless recognise 
an Opie:   “work known, artist unknown”, in the words of one journalist 
(Tom Lubbock, Independent 25 Sept 2001).  In the context of prints and 
engravings, Fyfe (1988) argues that reproduction “is a medium through with 
authorship is produced” (p.84).  Arguably, the use of reproductive 
technologies to produce and subsequently reproduce either the same image 
or different images in multiple formats for different contexts works to 
constitute Opie’s ostensible ‘uniqueness’.  Arguably, in this way the work 
effectively serves as a logo for Julian Opie.113 
 
 
7.5 The Blur narrative:  from Britpop to Best of 
As suggested above, the Blur myth or narrative, together with the specific 
social-historical moment of which the band was a part provides the ‘archive’ 
on which the meaning attributed to the image and the imaged draws.   
 
                                                
113 Opie has also produced a self-portrait in the style of his Blur portraits. 
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By the time the The best of album, for which the image was commissioned, 
was released, Blur had been in existence with the 2000 line up of members 
since 1988.  They produced six albums (excluding the ‘The best of’) over the 10 
years 1990 – 2000.  A seventh album was released in 2003.114   
 
Journalistic accounts of the group, including their Official History, (Maconie, 
1999) and Harris’s (2003) analysis of the wider phenomenon known as 
‘Britpop’ 115, set out and construct the Blur narrative: the band’s creation myth, 
its travails, and (to the time of the The best of album), resolution and 
maturation.  
 
In terms of the band’s emergence, two features had particular salience for 
their future direction.  First, their origins in the south and South-east of 
England and, second an art school connection, specifically Goldsmith’s 
College in London, where three of the band members met.  
 
As Frith and Horne (1987) argue, British art colleges have provided fertile 
environments for British pop musicians:  providing the romantic model of 
creative individuality that encourages freedom and experimentation that 
“can be translated into the terms of popular culture” (p.58).  
 
The south of England and art school connections are also relevant to the 
emergence what came to be defined as ‘Britpop’, a short-lived “cultural 
moment” (Harris, 2003) between 1994 –1998 of which Blur was a central part.  
 
As defined by Harris (2003), Britpop comprised two strands. First, it was a 
reference back to the British musical heritage of the 1960’s and bands such as 
                                                
114 A sociological or musicological analysis of the albums themselves is outwith the scope of 
the thesis.  
115 Both sources are not just accounts of, but also constitutive of the Blur myth, and of Britpop.  
As Frith, however, argues in respect of theories of pop music more generally, “[these] 
developed out of day-to-day practices of pop itself, out of people’s need to bring some sort of order and 
justification to the continuing processes of musical evaluation, choice and commitment…Perhaps we 
should call the results low theory – confused, inconsistent, full of hyperbole and silence, but still 
theory” (Frith, 1987, quoted in Frith and Horne, 1987, p.21). 
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the Beatles, the Kinks and the Who and a concern for “quintessentially 
British experiences” (Harris, 2003, p.xv). 116 
 
Second, Britpop was built on commercial success.  Although it had its early 
roots in the musical subcultures of indie and punk music, by the time the 
term became public currency in the mid 1990’s it was already, according to 
Harris (2003), moving away from its founding principles, seduced by 
popularity and “fetishisation of chart positions, platinum discs and huge 
crowds” (p.367).   
 
In Harris’s analysis, Britpop was both running in parallel with, and co-opted 
into, a corresponding political trajectory. It initially emerged from a political 
context of Conservative party government from 1979 until the election of the 
‘New’ Labour government in May 1997.  Although the (pop) music industry, 
including Blur, were courted by New Labour, the Britpop era, according to 
Harris (2003) was drawing to a close, just as the newly elected government 
set about a “Britpop-inspired project called ‘the rebranding of Britain’” 
(Harris, 2003, p.xx) – to become, in the media inspired epithet, ‘cool 
Britannia’. 
 
The term ‘Britpop’ itself was coined in 1993117, by which time Blur had 
released a number of singles and two albums.  It was, however, the release of 
the band’s third album Parklife in 1994 which was seen as both Britpop’s and 
Blur’s “defining moment” (Maconie, 1999).  The album received “universal 
acclaim” (Maconie, 1999), debuting at number 1 in the UK album charts, and 
staying in the charts for 90 weeks.118  With its cockney narration on the title 
track, and its cover sleeve of greyhound racing it was felt to express a 
                                                
116 Although referred to as Britpop, it was a largely English, and more specifically 
London/South-East England construct, built primarily around London based bands.  Oasis, 
a band from Manchester who also emerged in this period and who were set up in 
competition with Blur were, as Harris, suggests “gatecrashers” to the party. 
117 Both Maconie and Harris suggest that the term was first used in Select magazine in an 
article calling for a “new British perspective in pop culture” (Maconie, 1999, p.181).  
Although the social and political processes at play can not be explored here, it is perhaps not 
entirely coincidental that the term ‘Young British Artists’ was coined around the same time 
in relation to a group of artists, contemporary in age to the Britpop bands and similarly 
predominantly London/metropolitan based (see for example, Corris, 1992). 
118 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parklife (accessed 5 January 2014) 
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specifically English (sic) and proletarian identity, and one which would, 
according to Maconie, set Britpop’s dominant style.  The album was seen as 
ushering in a “birds, booze and football culture” (Maconie, 1999 p.181), an 
identity actively adopted by Albarn.  1994 also saw the emergence of the 
Manchester based band Oasis, a group who actively identified themselves 
with both (Northern) working class and ‘lad’ culture. 
 
Relations between Blur and Oasis, initially marked by “jokey sparring” 
(Maconie, 1999) turned increasingly sour.  This growing hostility was 
accounted for not in terms of musical differences but class and regional 
differences.  For the press it was a clash between art school, clean cut middle 
class, southern ‘boys’, and hard-drinking working class, northern ‘lads’.  The 
‘battle’ reached its high point when both bands released singles on the same 
day in August 1995.  
 
Blur’s fifth album The Great Escape was launched in September 1995, shortly 
followed by the release of the Oasis album What’s the Story (Morning Glory), a 
hugely successful album that also launched a media backlash against Blur.  
This again was couched in terms of Oasis as “rude and robust northern 
warriors keeping alive the torch of rock’s great spirit, while Blur were art-
school dilettantes” (Maconie, 1999, p.223). 
 
In February 1997 Blur launched their sixth album, Blur.  Reflecting what 
Harris (2003) describes as Coxon and Albarn’s desire to return the band to its 
art school roots, it represented “Britpop’s quintessential metropolitan lads 
perform[ing] the most wilful handbrake turn…” (Maconie, 1999, p.239).  This 
about turn was mirrored in Albarn’s re-invention of his own identity: 
 
“Though he had once been prone to lapsing into mewling faux-cockney and 
launching rapid verbal tirades, he now spoke in a deep, hushed timbre, and 
issued his words at half his previous rate.” (Harris, 2003, p.322) 
 
It was thus after the brief maelstrom that was the emergence and demise of 
‘Britpop’, three-years after the band’s own musical ‘handbrake turn’, and 
three-years after the election of a new government which had actively 
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courted the music industry, that Blur: The best of album, for which the four 
portraits were produced, was released. According to the Wikipedia entry on 
the band, the record debuted at number 3 in the UK album charts.119 
However, neither Maconie nor Harris make any reference to this record.  
Blur’s official website provides no information on the album, although 
Opie’s artwork was included in the Blur 21 exhibition of images and 
photographs of the band, held in London in 2012.  Only the Wikipedia entry 
for the band (routed directly from the Blur website) suggests something of 
the context behind its release.  An interview in a music magazine cites them 
as saying that this was "the first record we have seen as product". According 
to the Wikipedia entry, “the tracklisting and release dates were determined 
on the basis of market research and focus groups conducted by Blur's record 
label, EMI”. 120     
 
In some respects this framing of the album suggests its own ‘inauthenticity’ 
both in terms of the band’s musical rejection, by this time, of its ‘pop’ back 
catalogue, and a return to its ‘indie’ (and ostensibly more ‘authentic’) musical 
roots, but also because it is presented as market-driven rather than emergent 
from some sort of autonomous ‘creative’ process.  This raises the question 
why this image for this product at this time?   And what are the implications 
for its consecration as an autonomous work of art? 
 
7.6 Between art and commerce:  Blurred boundaries 
7.6.1 The Blur cover art :  “Art manufactured for a mass audience”?  
 
“I was buying computer games in Virgin Megastore when my gallery called 
to ask if I would let a design company use my portrait style to pitch for the 
next Blur album cover.  I said ‘sure’ and we got the job.  It was a great period 
for me, seeing the CDs in shops, coming out of Screen on the Green and 
seeing my portraits going by on a bus…they then got sold to the National 
Portrait Gallery which was a lovely ending.”  (Julian Opie interview, 2002, 
Independent on Sunday, 31 March, p.7) 
 
                                                
119 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blur_%28band%29 (accessed 3 January 2014). 
120 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blur_%28band%29 (accessed 3 January 2014). 
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Before the commission for the best of CD cover, Opie had previously 
designed a cover for the group St Etienne.  His portraits had also been 
published in the magazine Sleazenation – these caught the eye of a design 
group commissioned by EMI to suggest ideas for the cover design of the best 
of album.    As described above, he began by taking photographs of the band 
members, then: 
 
 “Abstracted and refined the image in his now trademark style, and captured, 
by an economy of means, the most succinct likeness.  The ‘generic icons’ 
could translate into multiple formats and scales...it became Opie’s most far-
reaching project.” (Horlock, 2004, p.107) 
 
It has not been possible to identify material describing the ‘brief’ given to 
Opie for the Blur cover, nor commentary on the interaction between the artist 
and band members in the course of producing the image.   
 
As has been intimated throughout, this particular image occupies an 
ambiguous, or hybrid position:  it is a group of individual portraits 
commissioned from an established ‘artist’ as a ‘unique’ work of art (the/an 
‘original’ set of which was purchased for the National Portrait Gallery in 
London);  but it is also the design for a record cover made using digital 
means of production and intended to have saturation distribution in 
different media for the purposes of advertising a product for ‘mass’ 
consumption.  Understanding how the image works as a group portrait 
cannot therefore be understood in isolation from its overtly commercial 
function as a record cover and marketing tool.   
 
While it is not possible here to undertake a sociology of record cover design, 
the work of Frith and Horne (1987), Walker (1987), Jones and Sorger (1999) 
and Inglis (2001), suggests that, from their initial function as protective 
packaging for the wax cylinders and flat disks of early pre-recorded music, 
record cover design emerged as a key site for the constitution of band/brand 
identity and, in its role as ‘silent salesman’, a means for ‘hailing’ a putative 
consumer.  Further, through designers ‘plundering’ ‘fine art’ images or, as in 
the case of the best of cover, commissioning ‘artists’ to design ‘original’ 
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works, record covers have the potential to effectively explode and expose the 
artificial distinction between ‘fine art’ and ‘graphic design’. First, images 
such as the best of cover blur the assumed (but socially constructed) line 
between images produced from an individual creative imagination, intended 
to solve a personal set of problems, and those intended for mass 
consumption drawing on the designer’s creativity to solve someone else’s 
problems (Lewis, 2003).  Effectively, the Blur album cover is both an 
expression of Opie’s individual artistic ‘difference’ or ‘unique’ vision, and 
the “singular visual image” which enables consumers to distinguish one 
product, or in this case, record/group, from another (Frith and Horne, 1987;  
Jones and Sorger, 1999), and to distinguish themselves from other consumers 
through the choices made.  Second, record cover design throws together (the 
equally socially constituted distinction between) ‘high’ art and ‘pop’ culture. 
Opie is just one in a line of artists commissioned to design record covers. 
Frith and Horne (1987), for example, note that in the 1960s it was ex-UK art 
school musicians who gave the first ‘High’ Pop art artists, such as Richard 
Hamilton, Peter Blake and Andy Warhol, the opportunity to design record 
covers.121 This made the artists ‘bestsellers’ while the images they made 
became part of pop culture. Arguably, the commissioned covers were a form 
of  “art manufactured for a mass audience” (Richard Hamilton quoted in 
Frith and Horne, 1987, p.103).  
 
The Blur album cover illustrates how the record cover can function as 
something that extends beyond protective packaging to become a visual 
medium in its own right for positioning a band/brand, the music and the 
consumer.  
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, for images in ‘series’ (another form of 
‘multiple’) consideration should be given to the cumulative effects as well as 
the operation of individual images within the series.  In this context, what a 
rapid review of the group’s record covers prior to The best of album 
                                                
121 Reflecting the inter and intra connections between what Frith and Horne (1987), following 
George Melly, call high pop (art) and low pop (mass produced), both Blake and Hamilton 
were commissioned through their agent Robert Fraser, who was a gallery owner and also 
socially connected to pop musicians such as Mike Jagger of the Rolling Stones. 
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underlines is the distinctiveness of this image across their ‘oeuvre’.  For the 
previous albums the design company Stylorouge 
(http://www.stylorouge.co.uk/) had used stock images.  Part of an oil 
painting by band member Graham Coxon was used for the cover of the 1999 
album ‘13’.122,123  Most conspicuously, however, as described above, is the 
conscious adoption (by Damon Albarn) of a ‘laddish’ identity for the release 
of the Parklife album, and the commissioned cover photograph of greyhound 
racing – a sport traditionally associated with the working class.  
 
The Blur best of cover was therefore significantly different in concept.  It was 
the first of the band’s albums to use a commissioned artist124 and visually to 
feature portraits of the four band members on the front cover itself.  This was 
at a time when their physical identities were already familiar (through 
photographs, concerts, pop videos and television appearances).  
 
Jones and Sorger (1999) suggest that portraiture or ‘face shots’ are the 
dominant form of album cover design across musical genres;  underlining 
the ‘atypicality’ of Blur’s earlier album covers.  The particular structural form 
of the best of cover with the individual band members separated as if on 
different ‘screens’ or in different spaces, also has its antecedents.  In 
particular the cover of the group Queen’s Hot Space album released in 1982 
which features each of the individual band members in their own square, 
with their faces traced out in different colour inks set against a different 
bright primary colour background (see figure 7.4).125  
 
 
                                                
122 There is scope, outwith the confines of the thesis, for a more detailed analysis of the Blur 
record covers, and particularly of the relationship between the covers and the band’s shifting 
(and constructed/reconstructed/deconstructed) musical and professional ‘identity’ (Inglis, 
2001).  More detailed analysis would also need to consider the titles and the relationship 
between text and image, including consideration of the covers for their singles, a number of 
which caused a degree of controversy.  
123 Information on the record covers has again drawn from ‘low’ sources, including Wikipedia 
and the fan’s website www.vblurpage.com (accessed 10 July 2015). 
124 The graffiti artist Banksy was commissioned to design the cover of the 2003 album Think 
Tank.   





[Artist not known] 
Cover art for the Queen album Hot Space 
1982 
 
Opie was therefore drawing on a ‘standard’ cover model of ‘portraits’ of 
individual band members located in separate spaces in a grid.126  This format, 
to use a term adopted by Inglis (2001) (drawing on Barthes), is the most 
‘readerly’ of the Blur album covers.  While the designs of their earlier covers 
were more ‘writerly’, insofar as their indeterminacy allowed the 
‘reader’/consumer greater scope for interpretation, this cover, and 
particularly its use of portraiture, leaves little scope for “the reader’s 
involvement in the negotiation of meaning(s)” (Inglis, 2001, p.94);  the cover, 
as material object, “achieves closure”, even as it leaves open, at the level of 
the imaged individual, scope for the beholder’s share in reading in 
subjectivity.  
 
As an image the Blur record cover emerges from a specific socio-historical, 
cultural and economic (and political) moment. As packaging for a ‘product’, 
the cartoon-like style, primary colours and limited modelling, can be read 
because of this knowledge, but the subsequent marketing of the ‘product’ 
and the ubiquity of the image in all its different formats, both reinforces and 
                                                
126 It may also be salient to note that, by his own admission, Opie finds it difficult to draw 
couples.  The grid format may therefore be an ‘individual solution’ for working around this. 
 244 
generates this ‘product recognition’, not just of the band, but the individuals 
represented; their ‘unique’ (physical) identities.   The image’s form and its 
raison d’être is therefore its capacity for multiple reproduction, multiple 
distribution and multiple reception/recognition.  
The album itself comprises a compilation of music from the Blur’s ‘Britpop’ 
days.  As noted above, by the time it was released the band had distanced 
itself from this style of music and regarded this album solely as ‘product’ 
(and therefore ‘inauthentic’).  To shift ‘product’ may require ‘packaging’ that 
emphasises surface over depth, artifice over ‘authenticity’.  This may account 
for the visually ‘readerly’ form over the ‘writerly’ (Inglis, 2001).  As Inglis 
argues, the removal of ambiguity is associated with the commercial 
imperative to sell product: 
 
“There is thus a commercial imperative to diminish the potential consumer's 
scope for uncertainty at the point of transaction by emphasizing as clearly as 
possible the nature of the commodity on sale. For the sale of albums, the 
easiest ways to accomplish this are to frankly present the name of the 
performers, their likeness (usually a photograph), and the title of the LP.” 
(2001, p.94) 
Another reading could suggest that the use of cartoon-like form may 
(inadvertently) function to signal the artifice:  to expose the simulacrum, to 
reveal the band as a “highly mediated version of reality produced for public 
consumption” (Richardson, 2005, p.5), or as a “logo for a multinational 
company”.    Damon Albarn’s later work, in association with the cartoonist 
Jamie Hewlett, to create the virtual band Gorillaz, even more self-consciously 
uses the artifice of animation to “creat[e]a kind of authorial signature while 
simultaneously bringing into sight the artifice that is his or her creation” 
(Richardson, 2005, p.7).  But while potentially a subversive or parodic move, 
the use of artifice to expose artifice, nonetheless works to meet the 
commercial imperative. As Frith and Horne (1987), comment, the problem of 
creativity (musical and/or visual) under market conditions is that “capitalist 
culture recuperates everything” (p.111). 
But, to turn away from its function as a record cover, to its source as an 
image commissioned from an ‘artist’, the parallel question it raises is 
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whether it is also or still a (semi-autonomous) work of art, multiply 
produced, or are claims to its being art negated by being produced precisely 
for multiple production and mass consumption?  Further, how might this 
positioning, and the reading of the four portraits (as image and imaged), be 
shaped by and shift beyond the specific social-historical moment?  To begin 
to explore this the next section shifts the focus from the ‘pop’ context to the 
‘art’ context. 
 
7.6.2 Julian Opie: between art and commerce  
As noted above, by the time Opie was commissioned to produce the four 
portraits he was already an established artist.  Graduating in 1982, he was 
one of the dense network of artists emerging from, or connected to, 
Goldsmith’s College, London, the breeding ground for a later generation of 
young British artists such as Damien Hirst (Grenfell and Hardy, 2003), and 
also, at a later date, where three of the Blur members met.  Opie was also 
‘established’ in the sense of having achieved a degree of art world 
recognition.  In 1997 he was offered, but turned down the opportunity to be 
nominated for the prestigious Turner Prize shortlist.127  
 
Initially beginning with more sculptural work (made from industrial 
materials), Opie subsequently moved on to images of the human form, 
producing very simplified images, starting from standardised 
representations such as the signs for male and female on toilet doors.  
(Positive) commentators see Opie’s work as being influenced by British and 
Dutch painted portraits of the 17th and 18th Century, the work of the 19th 
century Japanese artist Hiroshige, and, from the 20th Century, Duchamp, 
Minimalism, Pop art (specifically Warhol), the illustrator Hergé, and his 
Goldsmith’s teachers, the artists Michael Craig-Martin (for whom Opie 
worked as an assistant) and Patrick Caulfield. Each is variously seen as 
influencing Opie’s use of the everyday and familiar in terms of subject matter 
                                                
127 According to commentaries and media reports this was on the grounds that Opie felt the 
prize had become a “frivolous publicity stunt” (see, for example, 
http://www.thejackdaw.co.uk/?p=130 (accessed 10 July 2015);  Charles Darwent, ‘Visual 
art – Growing up as an infantalist artist’, Independent on Sunday, 11 February 2001, p.5).  It 
has not been possible to verify this. 
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and a visual language drawing on the clear lines, flat colour and schematic 
representation characteristic of graphic design (Bonet, 2006;  Horlock, 2004).  
 
According to Horlock, Opie sees his work as being primarily about ‘looking’, 
about creating a language to reveal how we ‘read’ the world.  But his 
“interest lies not in ‘reality’ but in how reality is represented to us” (Horlock, 
2004, p.7).   With a nod to Baudrillard, for Horlock: 
 
“Opie has always been making representations of representations;  paintings 
of paintings, models of models, signs…His art reflects the artifice that frames 
contemporary experience.” (2004, p.7)   
 
In addition to drawing on the visual codes and conventions of commercial 
art, Opie also shares with Pop artists such as Andy Warhol, the use of 
‘factory’-like methods of production, producing series of works, (or one 
work reproduced in multiple media or formats) involving multiple stages of 
production and multiple contributors.  In this respect Opie sees himself as a 
manipulator, constructor or “puppeteer” rather than an inventor or moulder 
(Terry Grimley, Birmingham Post, 21 October 2001;  Lewis, 2003;  Morere, 
2005).   Building on digital photographs, his images of bodies and portraits 
are developed on a computer, but do not become a work until the final stage 
of production, a process that may involve a range of other techniques and 
technicians:  
 
“Once I have chosen the photo I like best I trace it in Adobe Illustrator on my 
Apple Mac using the pen, not a mouse.  At a certain point I get rid of the 
photo and fiddle with the drawing for a week or so and then e-mail it to a 
printer who sends me back a string of colour tests.  Once I like the colours 
they print it and bike it to someone else who mounts it on a wooden frame.”  
(Julian Opie interview in the Independent on Sunday, 31 March 2002, 
p.7) 
 
Not only are the images technically ‘co-produced’, but by using digital 
media, the output is not a singular, ‘unique’ image, but rather, according to 
Horlock (2004), “a series of options stored on computer files that can be 
called up if and when required, tailored to relate to any space” (p.87).     
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The factory or industrial like processes has its parallel in Opie’s play with 
and on the link between art and commerce. This was made explicit in the 
production of a mail order type trade catalogue to accompany an exhibition 
at the Lisson Grove gallery in 2001 (at which the four Blur portraits were 
shown). By using the model of a trade paper, including drawings and prices 
for the prints exhibited, Opie felt he was able to use it both to display the 
range of his work and “systematise the prices” while, at the same time, 
reinforce his role as the artist and creator: 
 
“This is a trade catalogue because I am trading, and it’s a catalogue because I 
am an artist, and it’s got my work in it because I am the person making the 
exhibition…[and] a trade catalogue without prices in it is just not right. So I 
put the prices in, and it felt exciting and a bit risky. It’s reality, though. It’s 
in people’s heads when they go to commercial galleries that the work is for 
sale…There was also a definite desire on my part to systematise the 
prices…The catalogue obviously looks like its fictional but it is actually real, 
and that’s how a lot of my work functions. A play between revealing the 
falseness and falsifying the realness.” (Opie, quoted in Horlock, 2004, 
pp.90-91) 
 
Despite this apparent rebuttal and exposure of the romantic notion of the 
creative artist untainted by commercial concerns (Frith and Horne, 1987), 
Opie, in fact reinforces it, arguing that the work is created for itself, driven by 
an artistic purpose, and the fact that it can also function as design is 
peripheral to his concerns (Lewis, 2003).  
 
The artist’s claim to his own unique-ness (and that of those he portrays), has 
its own repeat among commentators supportive of his work, who frame both 
his working practices and his work as a play between: the universal and the 
particular;  between “objective observation and technology…perfected by the 
artist’s own hand and eye” (Horlock, 2004, p.85);  between the impersonality 
of digital media and a sense of Opie’s self (Morere, 2005);  between the 
distinguishing characteristics of each of the people portrayed and a style 
“which turns them practically into logos” (Bonet, 2006).   
 
But this play between unique creation, schematic representation and mass 
production techniques opens up the scope for the artist to lose control of his 
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own ‘products’.  While copying artworks, or producing works ‘in the style 
of’ is not specific to digital technology (as discussed earlier), it widens the 
potential for others to use the same technology to, as in this case, create their 
own ‘Opies’. At least one website, for example, has been found which 
includes instructions on how to create an Opie-style portrait.128 Opie has, 
however, been critical of others using Opie-type images.  In 2006, for 
example, he criticised a Channel 4 chat show for creating Opie-style images 
for each of the guests.129  In a letter to the Sunday Times in 2009 the Director of 
the Lisson Gallery (Opie’s gallery) was also moved to: 
 
 “…Correct any possible misunderstanding that Julian Opie was involved or 
approved the pastiche of his iconic Blur album cover that appeared on your 
Culture cover last week. He didn’t.  To see his original work click on…” 
Greg Hilty, 2009, Director of the Lisson Gallery (Letter to the Sunday 
Times, 29 November, np)   
 
In what could be interpreted as an attempt to extend (and maintain some 
control over) the opportunities for marketing his merchandise, Opie opened 
his own online shop through which images can be purchased.130 An article in 
the South China Morning Post, published on the occasion of an exhibition of 
Opie’s work in Hong Kong 2009, describes this move as helping to break 
down the boundaries between high art and commercial art.  Opie, however, 
argues, that this was motivated to enhance the longevity of his otherwise 
transient multiples: 
 
“A lot my multiple works, such as my bookmarks and posters disappear after 
gallery shows have finished, so it makes sense to have my own outlet.  
Opening the shop was mainly motivated by the frustration at the energy 
spent in creating these things being lost.” (Julian Opie, 2009, quoted in the 
South China Morning Post, 8 May, np) 
 
 
                                                
128 http://www.designandtech.com/fotoshop/tutorials/julianopie/julian_opie_tutorial.htm 
(accessed 5 March 2014).   
129 When invited by the same channel to participate in a programme on self-portraiture he 
accepted the offer, seeing it as a chance for ‘put[ting] things right.  For the programme he 
was filmed making a self-portrait (Interview in Julian Opie, Twenty Six Portraits, Alan 
Cristea Gallery (2006) (http://www.julianopie.com/#/text/catalogue/368; accessed 5 
march 2014) 
130 http://www.julianopieshop.com/index.php (accessed 14 June 2015).  
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7.6.3  The artist in the field:  ‘the painter of our modern life’ or ‘a slickly ironic 
Gainsborough’?  
 
“Opie does really seem to us the painter of our modern life, a life in which the 
real and the virtual, the artificial and the authentic, feelings and logos are all 
mixed. As the painter, that in days to come, we will most identify with our 
time.” (Bonet, 2006)131 
 
“This is not pop.  This is the culture of the contemporary British middle class, 
to whom Opie has appointed himself a slickly ironic Gainsborough.  The very 
thing about his portraits that makes them jokey, the assimilation of everyone 
to the same conventions – also establishes group identity…in Gainsborough’s 
case, those of the 18th Century gentry, in Opie’s – well, the people who buy the 
Best of Blur…Opie’s exhibition is contemporary art at its worst, over-
friendly with its knowing audience and flattering to nationalist cultural 
delusions.”  (Jonathan Jones, 2001, Guardian, 28 February, p.18)   
 
Critical appreciation of Opie’s work suggests he (and his output) occupies an 
ambiguous position between high and popular art, between institutional 
consecration and minor or transient status.  Introductions to his exhibitions 
or monographs of his works by art historians such as Horlock (2004), 
Kurjaković (2003) and Nairne (2008) tend to be largely positive, locating 
Opie, as noted above, within a lineage extending back historically to 
encompass 17th and 18th century portraiture, 20th century avant-garde art and 
cartoon as well as cross-culturally to Japanese graphic.    
 
Wider media commentaries on his work (often emerging at times when Opie 
has a new exhibition), however, shift, (even within the same article) between 
the overtly critical, cautiously positive and the ambivalent.  Examples from 
the print media at the time of Opie’s 2001 Lisson Grove exhibition include 
the review by Guardian arts journalist, Jonathan Jones, who as the quote 
above suggests, was vociferous in his criticism of Opie’s work.  Jones in 
particular criticises what he regards as the reductionist and “smugly 
celebratory” nature of Opie’s portraits, and their populist and middle class 
content (and, by extension, audience).  Other commentators suggest a more 
                                                
131 In using this expression Bonet is making a reference to Baudelaire’s essay on the 19th 
Century ‘painter of modern life’, Constantin Guy. Ironically, Baudelaire’s essay (1995 
[1863]), and in particular his account of modernity, has stood the test of time better than the 
artist and his work. 
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measured appreciation of his work, using terms like ‘simplicity’, ‘economy of 
means’, ‘punch[ing] above their weight emotionally’.  A common theme is to 
draw attention to effects of the series or the multiple, the whole over the part: 
 
“As bland and banal as the work is, in situ it impresses, the consistently 
dumbed-down aesthetic creating an atmosphere of unreality. Divided and 
separated, however, one wonders how powerful these pieces remain.” (Nick 
Hackworth, 2001,The Evening Standard, 23 February, p.60) 
 
As the quote from Hackworth suggests, the praise often comes accompanied 
by a ‘but’.  There is a reluctance to wholly consecrate Opie’s work but also a 
hesitancy about suggesting he is (in terms of the field) an imposter: 
 
“Wander around the Lisson Gallery for long enough – about three minutes, 
by rough reckoning – and you wonder whether the whole thing isn’t a 
particularly audacious piss-take…[But] Opie may be mocking, but it also 
seems troublingly possible that he may be doing something else;  namely 
embracing the realities of the visual world in which we live and trying to 
make something lyrical out of them.”  (Charles Darwent, 2001, 
Independent on Sunday, 11 February, p.5) 
 
Part of this ambivalence to Opie’s work also seems to stem from his 
ostensible commercialism:  both in terms of the nature of the images 
themselves, and the way they are presented in the exhibitions – the shop 
window displays and accompanying mail-order type catalogues.  In the face 
of the “hot potato of commerciality” (Hackworth, 2001), commentators seem 
uncertain whether to view this as a Warholesque gesture of subversion, or to 
take it at face value, with implications for both authenticity and the art 
market equivalent of value for money: 
 
“The overt commercialism of Opie’s aesthetic is matched by his 
prices...[Opie’s] work uses its own brazen commercialism to raise all sorts of 
edgy questions about the commercialism in art in general. The fact that you 
can order his pieces off the peg seems especially scandalous:  £35,000 quid 
and its not even couture!  Raising questions about the value of authenticity 
in an age of mechanical reproduction is not new – Warhol was asking them 
40 years ago – but Opie’s work takes the tendency to dangerous extremes.  
His works are blatantly phony:  paintings on canvas that are actually 
designed on a computer, downloaded to a commercial printers and paint-
jetted mechanically onto acrylic.” (Charles Darwent, 2001, Independent 
on Sunday, 11 February, p.5) 
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“…That’s the problem with a market that prizes the rare or unique – it can so 
easily be thwarted by an artist who doesn’t hold back.  Once Opie has fixed 
on his visual symbol, he will reproduce it in every conceivable format or 
size…Opie’s blithe attitude to what he sells is both humorous and winningly 
frank…After all, he could hardly pretend to be producing complex 
masterpieces, each carefully nuanced by hand.” (Laura Cumming, 2001, 
The Observer, 11 February, p.12)  
 
7.6.4 Blur in the Gallery  
As testimony to its success as ‘packaging’ for a commercial product, in 2001 
the best of cover image won a Music Week Creative and Design Awards Best 
Illustration award.  Fellow artist Gavin Turk, interviewed in 2009 for an 
article on record cover design also included the Opie image as one the 10 best 
album covers.  Noting it as a move, by Opie, into “product”, Turk makes the 
case for its qualities as a record cover on the basis of its likeability, which 
acted as an incentive to purchase the album, and its functionality as a cover 
design for a ‘greatest hits’ album: 
“I remember buying this album partly because I liked the cover.  Julian did 
capture a moment with his reductivist portraits, and here it’s an interesting 
move into product.  It fits with the idea of a band’s greatest hits, so it was the 
right choice of artist for this kind of album cover.” (Gavin Turk, 2009, 
interviewed for the Observer Music Magazine, 19 April, np) 
As an ‘artwork’, however, it has generated more mixed feelings.  For 
Jonathan Jones, writing in the Guardian, for example: 
 
“Almost anything in the National Portrait Gallery is irritating, but this [The 
Blur image] is particularly so because Opie’s done such a smoothed out, 
contemporary stylish painting, without any real originality or feeling or 
emotions.  It’s not anything that couldn’t be done on a computer.  I know it 
invites comparison with Warhol and Richter, but with both of those there are 
great painterly touches and emotions, but not with Opie. And Blur 
themselves are embarrassing subject matter. They’re the quintessence of Brit 
Pop and what was supposedly hot in our culture in the 90s.  Now they’re just 
deeply unfashionable.” (Jonathan Jones, 2005, Guardian, 19 August, np) 
 
Jones’ critique reflects the now familiar flip flop between the image and the 
imaged:  the work of art is inauthentic (lacking in ‘aura’?) because it is too 
slick/commercial and lacking in ‘emotions’, unlike that of other 
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contemporary portraitists; and the imaged insufficiently 
significant/passé/too low-brow to be worthy of ‘art’.   
 
This use of ‘authenticity’ (or rather its lack) as an evaluative criteria is 
mirrored in the response of some of the Trustees of the National Portrait 
Gallery (NPG) in London when, in 2001, the Gallery was offered a set of the 
Blur portraits.  As discussed in chapter 3 above, historically, the NPG has 
been less concerned with the ‘aesthetic’ qualities of the images included in its 
collection, than with the ‘worthiness’ of those imaged, and the extent to 
which the image is an ‘authentic’ likeness. Media reports at the time suggest 
that some of the NPG trustees proved unwilling purchasers of the four 
portraits on the grounds that the band (i.e. the imaged) were not sufficiently 
famous and might not pass the test of time.132  
 
A search of the NPG website does reveal a number of images of pop 
musicians in its catalogue which suggests that the gallery is not opposed, in 
principle, to including representatives of ‘pop’ culture within its collections.  
The rejection of this image may therefore suggest a qualitative judgement on 
the band and the music they produced and its presumed transitory 
(inauthentic?) nature. The then Director of the Gallery, Charles Saumarez 
Smith, even alludes to this, referring to “an unexpectedly sophisticated 
discussion on their musical merits and their place in the nineties pop 
hierarchy”.  For Saumarez Smith “it is controvertible that BritArt and Britpop 
have a place in history” (quoted by Nigel Reynolds, 2001, The Daily 
Telegraph, 6 September, p7).   The subsequent acquisition of the image 
appears to be due to Director’s negotiations with Opie’s commercial gallery133 
                                                
132 This does though perhaps beg the question in relation to portraits in general, and to 
displays in portrait galleries in particular, how many of those portrayed are recognizable 
outwith their specific space and time? Is there a point when the content or documentary 
function of the portrait – the value of the imaged - is superseded by the ‘aesthetic’/sensuous 
properties of the object – the value of the image? 
133 This process raises a number of questions, which cannot be fully explored here, about the 
power relations at play in the acquisition of artworks for public galleries.  In relation to 
National Portrait Galleries this would need to take into account not just the status accorded 
to the artist, but also to the subject, in other words who is of sufficient cultural ‘worth’ to be 
represented within a national collection. 
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and the National Art Collection Fund, which purchased the image on behalf 
of the NPG at half price (£12,000 for all four portraits).  
 
The Blur portraits were obtained and shown at the same time as self-portraits 
by the ‘young British artists’ Tracey Emin and Sarah Lucas. For Terence 
Pepper, the curator of photography at the Gallery the images were both “part 
of a drive to modernise the collection” as well as a draw for the public: 
 
 “Blur and Tracey Emin are two of the biggest names in modern culture, they 
are sure to attract more people to the gallery...they are in the entrance and 
will be the first pictures people see when they come to the gallery. We have 
given them pride of place.” (Terence Pepper, 2001, quoted in the Daily 
Mail, 6 September, p.27). 
 
Although obtained at a time when the gallery was actively seeking to expand 
its collection of contemporary art, throughout the NPG debate it is the 
evaluation of the imaged (their cultural significance and longevity versus 
their transient popularity) that takes precedence over the evaluation of the 
image.   Ironically, however, as the comment by Terence Pepper suggests, it 
is the band’s very popularity that is anticipated to achieve the gallery 
equivalent of ‘bums on seats’.  As a work of ‘art’ it is a journalist who 
perhaps damns it with faint praise when he comments that, “Artistically Blur 
are less eye catching than the self-portraits by the two BritArtists ‘Mad 
Tracey of Margate’ Emin and Sarah Lucas.” (Nigel Reynolds, 2001, The Daily 
Telegraph, 6 September, p.7). 
 
7.7 Conclusion: From an aura to a blur? 
  
“When the age of mechanical reproduction separated art from its basis in 
cult, the semblance of its autonomy disappeared forever.” (Benjamin, 1999a 
[1936], p.220) 
 
 “Damon, Graham, Alex and Dave as they might have been drawn by Hergé. 
These images came in every size, from CD to full-scale hoarding.  Nor was 
there any idea of a limited edition, based on some priceless original.  If you 
bought the album, it could even be argued that you own a quartet of Opie 
portraits.”  (Laura Cumming, 2001, The Observer, 11 February, p.12) 
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“…Pop [Art] shows us how, in a consumerist economy, objects and images 
tend to become serial and simulacral, and how commodities tend to operate 
like signs and vice versa.” (Foster, 2012, p.13) 
 
With the introduction of mechanical (as opposed to manual) means of 
reproduction Benjamin foresaw a “shattering” of the tradition, the residuum, 
of ‘ritual’ or ‘cult’, associated with the hand-made unique or singular art 
object physically presenting its history for the penetrating gaze and 
“unarmed eye” of the knowing viewer.  Mechanical reproduction replaces 
the physically present object and its visible signs of uniqueness (the hand of 
the artist and the object’s passage through time), with a plurality of images of 
the object, taking it outwith the “place where it happens to be” to meet the 
beholder(s) “half-way”.  By erasing the presence over, and in, time and space 
of both the artist and the art object, mechanical reproduction simultaneously 
voids the object of its authority and its ineffable ‘aura’.  With the ‘withering’ 
away of aura art’s (claims to) autonomy, its ostensible separation from social 
life, disappear “forever”.  This change in the very nature of art consequent 
upon mechanical reproduction, is for Benjamin, coincident upon a shift in 
perception, the perception not of the individual (bourgeois) connoisseur but 
of the ‘masses’ who privilege closeness over uniqueness, who are “ardent” in 
their desire “to get hold of an object at very close range by way of its 
likeness, its reproduction” (Benjamin, 1999a [1936] p.217). Mechanically 
produced art forms, such as film enable everyone to be an ‘expert’, their 
views shaped and shared as part of a communal experience of viewing. And 
this viewing is not contemplative, but distracted, a series of ‘shocks’, which, 
for Benjamin, open up the potential for film to be a force for political change, 
albeit one constrained by the film industry’s promotion of “illusion 
promoting spectacles and dubious speculations” (Benjamin, 1999a [1936], 
p.226). 
 
Running in parallel, however, is Benjamin’s ambivalent attitude toward the 
implications of the diminution of ‘aura’ from the imaged, from the subject 
represented in mechanically produced work.  While the removal of the 
human face from the work is a further reflection of the loosening hold of cult 
and ritual associated with traditional representations, at the same time it 
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risks diminishing the capacity for intersubjective recognition – the capacity 
of the imaged to “return the gaze”. 
 
The introduction of digital technologies of production, reproduction, 
distribution, reception and (re) production in the late 20th and early 21st 
century open up the potential for accelerating these shifts in perception, in 
the nature of ‘art’ and its grounds for authority and autonomy, including the 
processes and constituencies of validation and evaluation. 
 
The analysis of the digitally produced ‘group portrait’ of the four members 
of the band Blur, an ‘art’ object intended for ‘mass’ consumption as 
advertisement and record cover, has therefore provided an opportunity to 
explore some of the implications of Benjamin’s arguments.  
 
Analysis of the image as sensuous object, as a representation of and by living 
individuals, and as an object circulating in the field of cultural production, 
revealed its hybridity.  In some respects it follows in the tradition of early 
portraiture:  a portrait commissioned not (ostensibly) as an expression of 
‘essence’ but as an artefact of display (Maynard, 2007).  In this case the 
patron is not monarchical or aristocratic but a culture industry corporation.   
In both cases the portraits are fabricated self-images, but what the Opie 
portraits render visible is not the political authority of a ruler but the surface 
familiarity of the celebrity. 
 
Based on a digital photograph, re-worked using a computer software 
programme with the aim of being reproducible in a range of different 
formats, multiplicity and ubiquity are both integral to the production process 
and embedded in the image’s very raison d’être.  Further, the image draws on 
the readerly (Inglis, 2001) style of the modern cartoon (such as the work of 
Hergé, in the quote from Cummings (2001) above). Yet, at the same time, 
claims (and counterclaims) are made for its authority and authenticity as an 
artwork, and ‘originals’ as put on show within the sacred spaces of the 
Gallery.  Parallel claims and counterclaims are similarly made for the 
‘authenticity’ of the imaged – the four band members – and their place 
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within the nation’s visible record of ‘greatness’ or achievement – the 
National Portrait Gallery. 
 
There is therefore, a constant play in relation to the image and the imaged 
(and their music) between artifice and authenticity (Frith and Horne, 1987), 
between autonomous ‘high’ art and popular or ‘low’ culture, between a pop 
group who produce ‘tabloid teeny fodder’ and an innovative indie music 
band, between distance and closeness, and between surface and depth.   If 
this hybridity is a feature of the work of portrayal in the age of digital 
technology then wither aura?   
 
Focusing on the image as art object the analysis suggests both a diminution 
of authenticity predicated on the existence of an original (hand-made) object, 
but also a parallel move to re-claim uniqueness.  As intimated, the image is 
multiple and ‘mechanical’ at every stage.  There is no ‘unique’ or originary 
object.  Further it could be argued that, given its ubiquity on the cover of the 
CD and in the associated promotional material, the last traces of ritual and 
cult were removed from the work’s reception.  It is, in effect all “exhibition” 
value, and as such its “artistic” function may be only “incidental” (Benjamin, 
1999a [1936], p.219).  As presaged by Benjamin, digital technologies may 
disperse or displace the traditional sites of visibility, valuation and validation 
of the artwork:  displacing the institution(s) as the arbiters of taste and value. 
The ubiquity of the Opie image arguably means that anyone can be an 
‘expert’ on the image.  The use of a familiar graphic language also means that 
viewers do not need specialist knowledge of art history to read or interpret 
the image.  Further, as the quote from Cumming (2001) above, suggests, 
anyone who bought the CD could be said to ‘own’ an Opie.  The same 
ubiquity could also create the conditions for shared viewing in place of 
individual “contemplative immersion”.  Like architecture, reception of the 
image may be “consummated by a collectivity in a state of distraction” 
(Benjamin, 1999a [1936], p.232).  Digital technology, as discussed earlier, also 
opens up the potential for (re) production – any viewer, with the right 
software, can create their own ‘Julian Opie’ portrait. 
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Yet, running counter to this potential democratisation, and for Benjamin, 
radicalisation, of the image denuded of the exclusionary force of aura, is the 
operation of the market and of the artist and art institutions to reclaim the 
grounds of authenticity. 
 
Although commissioned from an ‘artist’, the Blur image is packaging for 
generating and reinforcing product recognition. It is driven by the 
commercial imperative to interpellate a putative consumer.  In effect it is not 
just an example of the commodification of a cultural product (Adorno, 1991), 
but a cultural product in the service of a commodity.  There could, however, 
be an argument for saying that, like the Pop artists before him, Opie was 
strategically using the market to subvert it, to reveal, as Foster suggests “how 
objects and images tend to become serial and simulacral” (2012, p.13).  As 
discussed earlier, the use of the form and content of mass produced goods to 
create its ostensible opposite – an autonomous art, also suggests the 
recuperation of ‘authenticity’ to further rebut commodification.  The 
exhibition of the four portraits making up the Blur image in the context of the 
gallery, effectively seeking a reverse transition from multiple to unique 
object, from consumer good to symbolic good, suggests a move to consecrate 
the work, to return some of its “ritual” authority.  These moves, however, 
raise the question whether playing the market’s game subverts or reinforces 
it. 
 
The play between the multiplicity and authenticity of the Blur image as 
artwork has its parallels in the imputed ‘authenticity’ of the imaged.  As 
record cover and promotional material the image is implicated in the 
constitution of the celebrity of the band and its four members, rendering 
their physical likenesses ubiquitous. Arguably, the cartoon style underwrites 
the simulacral and commodified nature of celebrity, reinforcing the absent 
subjectivity while representing the physical presence.  With this vacating of 
subjectivity may go the potential for intersubjective recognition – the 
capacity to return the gaze:  “the eyes are beady, but go too quickly blank” 
(Lubbock, 2001).  Yet again there could be a counter-argument for saying that 
here too there is a desire to reclaim “aura”. The ‘readerly’ nature of the image 
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(and the potential “erotic” investment of fans (Frith and Horne, 1987)) leave 
open the potential ‘beholder’s share’, the scope for the intervention of 
“polyphonic voices” to read into the image, to impute a subjectivity, and a 
capacity for an intersubjective exchange of gazes even as the image seems to 
deny it.  As discussed in relation to the other case studies, this reading is fed 
by the ‘archive’, the Blur backstory, which also works to constitute their 
subjectivity.  
 
What the analysis suggests is that digital technologies may create the 
conditions for a qualitative and quantitative shift in the conditions of 
production and experience of images, accelerating some of the processes 
identified by Benjamin.  What, however, it may also reveal is that in the face 
of reports of their demise, ‘aura’ and its twin ‘authenticity’ may be putting 
up a robust defence. Both experientially and as evaluative criteria for 
addressing the portrait as art object and representation of an individual, 
there seems to be a desire to cling on to the something ‘ineffable’, albeit in 
changed form. This tenacity may be both indicative, as well as independent 
of, the market-driven need to sustain a discourse of uniqueness and aura to 
maintain the distribution and consumption of both a commercial ‘product’ (a 
band/CD) and symbolic good – an art object.   
 
This resistance may suggest if not a withering away of ‘aura’ then a change 
of shape. In the age of the ubiquitous and multiple ‘selfie’ and 3-d portrait, 
there may be a call to re-think the work of portrayal.  In place of the 
immutable mobile (Latour, 1990), may be the mutable mobile, the chameleon 
image distributed to and between the ‘many’, and, in its wake a shift from 




Like the ‘abject’, sociology has been both drawn toward the art object, 
yearning to embrace it within disciplinary boundaries, but also, if not 
‘repelled’ by it, seeking to maintain a safe distance.  While recognising ‘art’ 
as a social process, discourse and institution, with effects of power, and 
therefore of disciplinary interest, the concern is that by engaging with the art 
object ‘in itself’ (Becker, 2006), it will risk becoming ensnared with a value 
system the discipline seeks to critique, or be drawn into unwarranted 
evaluative statements of right-ness or wrong-ness, truth and falsity.  When 
sociology does seek to engage with the art object it tends to be used or seen 
as an object for illustrating a process outwith itself (e.g. changing 
conceptualisations of the individual, or embodying or reflecting dominant 
ideologies).  The view is therefore centripetal – from the outside in. In the 
context of the sociology of art it has, however, been argued that not engaging 
with the art object is an “abdication” of responsibility and isolates the sub-
discipline from the very object of its enquiry (Harrington, 2004;  Wolff, 2006, 
2008;  Zolberg, 1997).  From other directions, too, there has been an interest in 
reinstating the material as an ‘actant’ in the constitution of the social 
(Hennion, 2007;  Latour, 2005).  
 
This call for a sociological engagement that seeks to take artworks 
“seriously” (Rose, 2003) suggests a model of analysis that, in Harrington’s 
(2004) words brings together “value distanciating” social analysis and “value 
affirming aesthetic appraisal and value affirming social and political 
philosophy” (p.210). It is this space of ‘between-ness’:  between the ‘social’ 
and the ‘aesthetic’ (Born, 2010) that the thesis sought to explore.  It aimed to 
do this through the prism of portraiture.    
 
As “…art works intentionally made of living or once living people by 
artists…and for an audience” (Brilliant, 2002 [1991] p.8), the portrait as image 
and portraiture as social process are mediated by power relations:  in terms 
of who is and is not portrayed, how and by whom;  in the interaction 
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between the portrait as a material object and as a portrayal of a “living or 
once living” individual and a (situated) viewer;  and in the portrait’s 
circulation within the field of cultural production.  As such it is an art 
historical genre that offers itself up to a specifically sociological analysis of 
the operation of power within and through representation, but one which, to 
date, has been under-explored.  
 
The aim (and challenge) was to attempt to develop an empirical approach 
that engaged with and explored the relationships between: the material 
object ‘in itself’; the constitution of the subjectivities represented in and 
through the image;   and the social and historical operation of the field in 
which the image is constituted (or not) as an ‘art’ object. In the course of 
doing this it sought not only to bring portraiture to sociological 
consciousness, but to contribute to a consideration of whether and how it is 
possible to resolve the “antinomy” between ‘essentialist‘ and ‘social 
constructionist’ approaches to meaning and value (Harrington, 2004;  De la 
Fuente, 2007).  The following two sections reflect on what the analysis of the 
artworks yielded and the implications for the method developed.  The 
implications for the discipline and considerations for further areas of work 
are discussed in the subsequent section, prior to a final concluding comment.  
 
8.2 Provocations and entanglements:  what did looking at the 
artworks afford? 
It is suggested that adopting a mode of analysis that encompasses the 
portrait as material object, the subject portrayed and the operation of the 
field has been productive in at least three ways:  it enhances an 
understanding of the processes by which objects become ‘consecrated’ as art 
and their producers achieve recognition as ‘artists’;  it reveals portraiture as a 
site at which power is exercised, particularly in the constitution of 
subjectivities; and it contributes to attempts to understand and capture the 
complex and mediated relationship between the material object (‘in itself’) 




A process with an object 
In very practical terms embedding the (reproduced) images within the text 
and describing their properties qua images, brought them directly within the 
sociological gaze.  They became more than mute objects at the whim of the 
buffetings of the field.   This is perhaps reflected in the very different feel 
(and length) of the three case studies and the balance achieved between a 
focus on and the ‘talk’ about the images.  In part this is due to the approach 
of following the trail the images’ led (albeit within the conceptual frames 
imposed upon them). But, and by the same token, the ‘talk’ the objects 
generate and arguably, their trajectories through the field, are different 
because of the images.  
 
The case studies in chapters 5 and 6 perhaps come nearest to achieving a 
degree of parity between an exploration of the images as material objects, 
their affordances, particularly the subjectivities of the portrayers and the 
portrayed constituted in and through the images, and the positioning of the 
images and the artists within the field.  What they reveal is the complex 
interweaving of these different dimensions.  In the case of the two images by 
Francesca Woodman (chapter 5), for example, the early death of the artist 
becomes the prism through which the work of Woodman the artist is 
evaluated and positioned, and the subjectivity of Woodman the concrete 
individual is read into and out of the images.  This case also serves to 
demonstrate how the (static) properties of the images can provoke different 
responses over time – in this case the evaluative commentary in fact shifts 
from a focus on the artist’s biography, to a consideration of the works’ formal 
properties. 
 
In chapter 6, the comparison of two double self-portraits revealed how the 
material properties of the images (both of which incorporate ‘abject’ 
materials) contribute to the constitution of the subjectivities of those 
portrayed in the images, and the trajectories of the objects through the field.  
Thus, the self-portrait by the ‘established’ artists Gilbert and George is 
evaluated by the field within an art historical frame, the ‘abject’ materials 
represented, effectively aestheticized. The artists’ imputed non-normative 
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sexuality read from and in the image draws on the extra-aesthetic archive to 
which the artists themselves contribute. The black and white, closely cropped 
image of the twins Dresie and Casie by Roger Ballen, reveals how the 
sensuous properties of the image, the representation of the subjects’ 
corporeality, generate among situated viewers less of a consideration of the 
image’s position within the canon, than with the micro-politics and ethics of 
its content.   
 
Of the three cases, the image by Julian Opie of the members of the band Blur 
is perhaps the most weighed down by explanatory context, the ‘outside’ 
within which the image is located, and which seemed to require explication:  
the digital technology of production, distribution and (re) production;  the 
four men who were the subjects of the image;  and the particular format for 
which it was initially intended (a CD cover).  On the one hand it could be 
argued that this exploration of the social context renders this case the most 
‘sociological’ of the three.  But what it does nonetheless suggest is how even 
when, or perhaps because, the material qualities of the image itself appear to 
foreclose or resist in-depth analysis, this too shapes the responses of the field, 
prompting questions, in this case, about the ‘authenticity’ of the image, the 
subjects portrayed and the artist.  
 
Focusing on the material object thus helps to further ground and deepen 
understanding of the operation of the field. In effect it becomes a process 
with an object:  and a process in which power plays out at every stage.   
 
Portraiture as an exercise in power 
The specific objects analysed in this thesis were drawn from the art historical 
genre of portraiture, a genre defined by its focus not just on the 
representation of the human figure, but that of an (ostensibly) concrete 
individual. As the above begins to suggest, focusing on the three 
interweaving strands of the image/portrait, the subject in and of the portrait, 
and the image’s trajectory through the field of cultural production reveals 
not just the operation of power in the process of consecration of the work and 
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the positioning and position-taking of the artists (and the objects), but in the 
constitution of the subjectivities of those portrayed and of the portrayers.  
 
The example of Ballen’s image of Casie and Dresie (chapter 6), illustrates 
how power plays out at the ‘micro’ level of the portrait’s production – as 
noted in this chapter, the portrait process “replicates patterns of authority 
that have wider resonance” (Pointon, 2013, p.59). This image provoked a 
number of questions not just in relation to the power of choice over who is 
(or is not) portrayed, but, importantly how those portrayed are represented – 
the authoring and authorising of the pose. It raises questions not only about 
the nature of the ‘informed consent’ of those who are portrayed, but also the 
power and ethics of looking – including, as discussed in chapter 4, the gaze 
of the researcher. 
 
At the ‘macro’ level each of the case studies reveal in different ways the 
operation of the ‘power’ of the field in positioning the works and the artists.  
The analysis of two images by Francesca Woodman (chapter 5), for example, 
demonstrates the process of consecration and positioning of the artist 
unfolding and gathering pace through key actors, networks and institutions 
within the field – propelled by ‘chance’ meetings between similarly 
positioned players.  Further, this case shows how the ‘circle of belief’ 
(Bourdieu, 2004) once set in motion, gathers its own momentum.  By 
contrast, the example of Opie’s image of Blur (chapter 7), an ‘original’ art 
work, produced using digital technology and intended for multiple 
reproduction, illustrates the nature of the ‘struggles’ by and within the field 
to establish the ‘authenticity’ of the work and the artist.  What it exposed was 
the fine and contested line between the consecration of a work as ‘art’ in the 
restricted field of production and its designation as ‘product’ in the field of 
large-scale production. 
 
But what this case also revealed was the power of institutions not only to 
evaluate the work as ‘art’, but also the subjects of the images as sufficiently 
‘worthy’ or ‘authentic’ for public display in (in this case) a National Portrait 
Gallery.  This opens on to another dimension of power and perhaps one 
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specific to portraiture; the power of situated ‘viewers’ to constitute and 
evaluate the subjectivities of those who are portrayed in the image.  
 
Notwithstanding theoretical arguments for the ‘artist’ (and the ‘subject’) as 
an effect of discourse (Foucault, 1991a [1969]), the analysis of the responses to 
the portraits (including my own) revealed the constant desire to identify or 
constitute a self – a ‘thereness’ (Jones, 2006) – an active creator and an active 
presence in the work.   But, in constituting this presence, this subjectivity, 
what emerged across the three cases was an evaluative ‘flip flop’:  between 
an evaluation of the image and an evaluation of the imaged. This first 
emerged from a review of the commentaries on the work of Francesca 
Woodman (chapter 5), where, as noted earlier, the evaluation of the images 
by Woodman the ‘artist’ is enmeshed with an evaluation of Woodman the 
biographical individual. But the operation of the ‘flip flop’ became even 
more apparent in chapter 6, where the critical evaluation of the image of 
Dresie and Casie, is almost overwhelmed by the ‘evaluation’ of the two men.  
It is their physical presence and the meaning attributed to this, rather than 
the image’s visual properties that are the focus of the critique.  Yet, as 
discussed in the course of the case study, it is the image’s material properties, 
of light and shade, cropping, as well as of surface content, which propel 
these judgements. 
 
What this case study also drew attention to was the significance of the 
(‘extra-aesthetic’) ‘voice’ of the artist in framing the evaluation of the image 
as an ‘art’ object and in constituting the subjectivities of those portrayed.  In 
the case of the self-portrait of Gilbert and George, their own ‘talk’ about their 
work and their knowing performance of ‘Gilbert and George’, operates to 
structure (if not wholly foreclose) evaluations of the images and of their 
(imputed) subjectivities. In the case of Woodman’s work, the void left by the 
artist’s physical absence opens the space for interpretations including the 
two-way play of reading the imputed subjectivity from the work as well as 
the work being read as an expression of an imputed subjectivity. The twins 
Dresie and Casie, are similarly silent, although the artist Ballen is vocal about 
himself, his work and this image.  In the case of this portrait what was 
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revealed was how the evaluation of the image’s visual properties and the 
processes of cultural canonisation can work independently and together in 
constituting the subjectivities of the imaged. Thus ‘recognition’ of the ‘art’ 
and ‘artist’ may parallel ‘misrecognition’ of the subject of the art.  In effect 
the analysis of these portraits illustrates the effects of power in and through 
representation. 
 
Affordances and entanglements:  the portraiture’s mediation 
One of the aims of the thesis was to make a contribution, through the genre 
of portraiture, to calls for a sociology of art able to engage with the art object 
‘in itself’ as well as the circuit or field in which it is consecrated as an art 
object, without resorting to essentialism, or assumptions of immanence or 
transcendence, but also without wholly subsuming the object within social 
explanation.  One way of addressing this, particularly within the sociology of 
music, has been to consider how the material properties of the object are 
productively “harnessed” (Darmon, 2015), or mediated, by situated subjects.  
For commentators such as Born (2005), Darmon (2015), deNora (2004), and 
Hennion (2003, 2007), the ‘collision’ or ‘intermingling’ (Born, 2005) of subject 
and object co-produces both the perceived properties of the object and the 
way it is understood and experienced.  It is this “inward connection” 
(Darmon, 2015) to the “matter” of the images by situated viewers (including 
myself) that the analysis of the case study portraits sought to capture, while 
also, as Darmon (2015), DeNora (2004) and Born (2005) stress, incorporating 
an understanding of the wider social, technical, or macro, dynamics.   
 
This was attempted by considering what the images might ‘afford’, what 
their material properties (of shape, form, colour and content) might provoke 
or evoke in a socially and historically located viewer, their experiential or 
evaluative impact.  The aim was to capture the ‘something’ that emerges 
from the entanglement of viewer and image, a ‘something’ that is neither 
wholly imminent to the object, nor wholly socially determined. In chapter 5 
one attempt to capture this generative potential was explored using Barthes’ 
concept of the ‘punctum’ or disturbance, the ‘supplement’ over and above 
the ostensible surface content that an image might generate in a viewer.  In 
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chapter 6, the notion of the ‘abject’ was used both as a conceptual framing 
device, but also as a way for trying to understand what the two double 
portraits might afford, while in chapter 7 aura and authenticity were 
deployed as a way of capturing what the four portraits of the group Blur 
might offer up (or foreclose).  
  
Born (2005) argues that theories of mediation, applied to music, effectively 
“make mutable” dualisms such as the separation of subject from object. In 
the thesis this mutability is articulated as a sense of ‘between-ness’:  between 
a focus at the micro level of image and situated viewer and macro social 
processes;  between art historical formal analysis and a critique of the ‘good 
eye’; between sociology and new art history.  While illustrative of the 
tensions it seeks to explore this nonetheless poses some continuing questions 
about the empirical methods employed both for mediating these tensions 
and for capturing the object’s  ‘in itself-ness’. 
 
8.3 A reflection on method 
One of the aims of the study was to attempt to develop an empirical 
approach that would keep in play the three dynamics of the visual image; the 
subject[ivity]portrayed in and through the image;  and the object’s trajectory 
through the field of cultural production.  In other words an approach that 
was both centrifugal, from the object out, and centripetal, from the outside 
in. An iterative approach was adopted, characterised, in chapter 4, as ‘taking 
a line for a walk’. This served to emphasise its exploratory quality, but also to 
suggest a process of following where the images led.  
 
As suggested above, as a way of opening consideration of generative 
potential of the images the three case studies were each structured around 
different conceptual frames:  the ‘punctum’ (Barthes, 2000 [1980]) and the 
theoretical ‘death’ of the artist/author’ (Foucault, 1991a [1969]) (chapter 5); 
the  ‘abject’ (Kristeva, 1982) (chapter 6), and aura and authenticity (Benjamin, 
1999 [1936])) (chapter 7).  It is acknowledged that this structuring already 
imposes the ‘outside’ onto and into the images. However, in addition to the 
pragmatic need to provide a point of entry, the frames emerged in a 
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‘conversation’ with the images – they reflected what the images evoked or 
provoked about themselves or what they raised that could be explored in 
subsequent images.   
 
While, as the discussion in section 8.2 suggests, this approach has been 
productive at a number of different levels, it does nonetheless leave some 
questions unresolved.  In particular it exposes the difficulties of developing a 
methodological approach that is sensitive both to the object and the social 
structure, but also ‘rigorous’ with all that that implies, empirically for 
reliability and validity.  
 
The exploration in chapter 5, of the experience of the punctum (Barthes, 2000 
[1980]), for example, allowed for a reflection on the unintentional, 
ungeneralizable and highly personal (but situated) (Rose, 2003) ‘pricking’ 
that a detail within an image may generate. As intimated above this is of 
value in highlighting that the ‘struggles’ of artworks (Rubio and Silva, 2013) 
and artists (Bourdieu, 2004) for recognition in the field do not happen in a 
vacuum but are at least in part stimulated, at source, by an ‘object’.  But 
while, arguably, ‘transparent’ and therefore potentially ‘intersubjectively’ 
defensible, is such commentary too subjective, too ‘personal’ such that it 
breaches disciplinary principles?  Does it shift the analytical balance too far 
toward ‘essence’ and subjective, uncritical commentary and away from 
structure and “value-distanciation” (Harrington, 2004)? 
 
In attempting to grapple with the ‘in-itself-ness’ the thesis has also drawn on 
art historical commentary. This too poses the risk of uncritically reproducing 
the views of situated players within the field – rather than capturing the 
image’s affordances, it captures the affordances, mediated through the prism 
of the field, and thus becomes part of the ‘game’ of positions and position 
taking.   
 
Perhaps this underlines the fugitive nature of the ‘in-itselfness’, and the 
difficulty of capturing ‘something’ that is “co-produced” without 
reproducing the situated character of the co-production.  To paraphrase Prior 
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(2004), perhaps like aesthetic value, it is “well-nigh impossible to isolate an 
‘outside’” from which the in-itself-ness can be ascertained.  
 
Nonetheless, even if the method developed for achieving some sort of parity 
between the art and the social “in a joint venture of cognition of the world” 
(Harrington, 2004, p.3) remains ‘unproven’, and the antinomy between 
‘essentialist ‘ and ‘social constructionist’ approaches not wholly resolved, the 
approach adopted here, and the focus on portraiture in particular has sought 
to explore the points of mutability and tension.   First, by acknowledging and 
reflecting on the portrait’s capacity to generate socially and historically 
situated experience and ‘meaning’;  and second, by exploring how the 
material properties of the visual image play out in the processes of 
evaluation and constitution of both the work as ‘art’ (and its creator as an 
‘artist’), and the subject(ivities) in and of the portraits.  
 
8.4  Implications 
One of the issues raised is the implication for the discipline.  In a sense rather 
than running against the disciplinary grain, the focus on the ‘object’ places 
the project within wider disciplinary streams.  It can, for example, be situated 
within the ‘cultural turn’, a move which, arguably, emerged in the UK in the 
late 1950s with the publication of Richard Hoggart’s (1958) The Uses of 
Literacy and Raymond Williams’ (1958) Culture and Society, but gained 
disciplinary traction with the work of Stuart Hall and the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Bennett et al, 1981;  Chaney, 1994;  Wolff, 2005).  The continued 
combined concern with the “social and cultural” (Inglis et al, 2007) (however 
each is defined) within the discipline is evidenced by the launch of the 
journal Cultural Sociology in 2007 and recent publications in the fields of the 
sociology of culture and cultural sociology (see for example, Back et al, 2012;  
Stewart, 2014).   
 
The thesis also taps into the discipline’s readiness to productively draw on 
insights from other disciplines, evident in Born’s (2010) work and in 
sociological explorations of other ‘sensuous’ domains such as the senses and 
 269 
emotions (see for example, Turner and Stets, 2005;  Vannini, Waskul and 
Gottschalk, 2012). 
 
But, as discussion of the work of Born (2005), deNora (2004), Darmon (2015) 
and Hennion (2003, 2007) above suggests, the artwork or art object is also, 
arguably, (re) claiming a space within sociology in and of itself, and as an 
active participant in the “co-production” of both the ‘social’ and the ‘art’.134  
These intellectual streams suggest the salience of the thesis but also the scope 
for exploring some of the ideas stemming from the analysis.  Some of these 
are less central to the main focus of the study, but emerged in the course of 
the research. These include, for example, the further development of the 
sociology of cartoon (see chapter 7), and explorations into ‘iconicity’, that is 
why and how one painting, such as Manet’s Olympia becomes, in a sense, an 
‘icon’, not just within the field of art but (and perhaps because of its iconicity 
in this field), in the ‘field’ of social theorizing (see chapter 3). 
 
More directly, notwithstanding questions relating to the method, there may 
be an argument for extending the approach to other ‘genres’ to examine the 
dynamic that emerges, for example, to non-representational art, landscape, 
work in different media/other ‘arts’.  Given the ubiquity of representations 
of the face there may also be an argument for a more ‘complete’ or systematic 
‘sociology of portraiture’.  This would seek to fully explore social theorising 
around the ‘face’ and representations of the ‘face’, together with the 
technologies and practices of portrayal. This could potentially extend beyond 
visual art to include, for example, advertising, ‘selfies’, family photography 
etc.  Developing the focus on both structure and object, this would support 
the further exploration of some of the issues raised here regarding the role of 
portrayal in the constitution of identity, subjectivity (and inter-subjectivity), 
perception, status, authenticity, knowledge and power. This would provide 
an opportunity to explore black portraiture, one of the significant omissions 
from the current thesis, but also the implications of portraiture in relation to 
                                                
The setting up in 2015 of a British Sociology Association Sociology of the Arts study group 
may further attest to the art object’s (re) claim on the sociological field of vision. 
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class and gender as well as sexuality and, in a reflection back to the thesis’ 
origins, issues of stigma. 
 
8.5 Concluding comment 
 
“There is no doubt that the sociologist of art much be competent to study and 
to understand both social structures and processes and the meaning of 
artistic phenomena.  That such a task is difficult does not mean that it cannot 
or should not be undertaken.” (Bird, 1979, p.35) 
 
As Bird, suggests, or perhaps forewarns, trying to combine approaches that 
address both social structure and “the meaning of artistic phenomena” has 
proven difficult: developing a method that keeps both within the field of 
vision, keeping different ‘discourses’ in play, drawing on a broad range of 
different types of material, finding a way of talking about images in a way 
that can be shared and, also, meaningful.  Nonetheless, what the thesis 
suggests is the mutual productivity of an approach that does work the space 
of between-ness.  The analysis of the artworks yielded valuable insights not 
only in to the operation of the ‘field’, but also added to an understanding of 
the constitutive role of representation.  Similarly, an understanding of the 
operation of the field provided a frame for understanding evaluative 
responses to the art objects.   Without paying attention to the material object 
the narrative is incomplete and the opportunities for mutual learning and 
understanding lost.  In other words, even if some issues remain unresolved 
there is a value to, and a need for sociology and the artwork to look at each 
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